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PREFACE 
The time frame of this thesis begins in 1826 , when the issue of 
the sea became signif icant in the Latin American states ' r egional poli­
tic s . The Inter-American Conferenc e of 1 8 2 6  regarded the issue of the 
sea in Latin America as very impor tant because of the state of bell iger­
ence which existed in that hemisphere and among the respec tive Latin 
Amer ican states , with the victor dominating all activit ies in the sea . 
The thesis traces a ser ies of sea conferences on the regional level , 
signif icant to the Lat in Amer ican states ' development and the shaping 
of their policies until the 1 958 conf erence on the international law 
of the sea .  At this point , the thesis begins to demonstrate the emerg­
ence of the homogeneous po l icy among the Latin American s tates, tracing 
mos t  of the regional conferences of the Lat in Amer ican states where policy 
declarations were made with regard to the challenge of the sea . The paper 
further surveys the 1 9 60 law of the sea conference , the 19 7 0  convention on 
the law of the sea and the 19 74  conferenc e on the law of the sea . The 
thesis concludes with the 1 9 7 4  conference where differences and similar i­
ties of Latin American policies are examined . The thesis s tops short of 
the 1975 conference s ince few materials on the conf erence had been released 
while it was being written . 
The collect ion of books , ar ticles , journals and government paper s 
which helped in the Writing o f  my thes is , .have been.compiled in the bib­
liography . But the following out standing books have been a great source 
ii 
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of  information: Pacem in Maribus , by Elizabeth Mann Borgese ; The Future 
��_?e Ocean , by Wolfgang Friedman ; El Dominic Del_ Mar , by Teodora 
Alvarado-Guraicoa; and La Doctrino de la Plata Forma Submaria , by Teresa 
H. T. Flouret . These material s  have contributed signif icantly to the 
thought s , assessments and informat ion which ar e v ital to the evolution 
of the international crisis of the sea and the problems of our modern 
nations face in the sea .  
I do not hes itate t o  include Dr . Margaret Soderberg ,  the chair­
person of the Political Science Department and my thesis adviser as a 
vital source of information and organizat ion of  this thesis . Without 
her great effort to help shape this thesis , I do not believe this proj ect 
would have been completed . I expr ess gratitude to Dr . Abdul Lateef and 
Dr .  John Faust  of the Political Sc ience Department for their cont inuous 
help when needed . And f inally to my s ister , Comfort Adiyatu Br imah , I 
express my s incerest felicitation for many of her encouraging greeting 
cards which gave me the zest to continue with the struggle of gett ing 
this paper done . 
King Farouk Brimah 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
The recent Law of  The Sea Conferences failed to p roduce a law 
acceptab le to all parties and nat ions concerned . The nat ions at these 
conferences can be divided into two categories , the " sat i s f ied nations" 
and the " dissatis fied nations" . 1 The satis fied nat ions are mos t ly from 
European background . "The core o f  their catego ry included Wes tern Europ e , 
Benelux , NATO connnon interest  group s , European Connnunity , and Scandinavia . 2 
The supporters of  these nat ions included White  Commonwealth S tates , United 
Stat es , other European States not rep resented in the General Assembly , 
Israel and the United S t ates ' cold war allies , "namely , Japan , Pakistan , 
3 
Democrat ic Republic o f  China , and S outh Korea . " 
The dissat isfied nat ions are the poor nat ions , who could not be 
described as lacking an international law tradition . For examp le ,  the 
Lat in American States have long been active in the forums of international 
law. These emerging nat ions are the "have not s " who have s t rong convic-
tions that their interests  have not been represented by the p revailing 
concepts  of  internat ional law guarding the seas .  Further , many newly­
independent s t ates value their newly-won freedom above all else and re fuse 
to accept certain international rules evolved before they at tained s t ate­
hood . 4 Thus , the traditional law o f  the seas has become an area of such 
protest and react ion "that it warrants considerable attention . 
1 
The p rospect of sea science and technology and the trans fer o f  
new hopes and nat ional asp irations to  the ocean realms are fo rcing the 
pace in the evo lution of the seas . Maj or legal , regulatory ,  and policy 
is sues relat ing to the handling of  disputes  and que s tions of ownership , 
cont rol and regulation o f  the ocean resources mus t b e  settled . These 
deve lopments in the recent history of mankind b ring int o  question the 
t rad i tional laws of the seas . Both nation-s tates , and internat ional 
organiz ations have become aware o f  the fact that law and peace can 
only be achieved through common consent . 
From the dawn o f  history until a quarter  o f  a century ago the 
seas have served two main purposes : " communication and f ishing . 1 1 5 
2 
The ocean bott oms and depths had been a hidden mystery . When, in the 
course of his tory , the seas took on military importance and a strategic 
pos i t ion ,  they were usually dominated by a vict or  nation . This nat ion 
became the mos t  power ful and prestigious nation in the politics and 
decision-making concerning the seas . The sub sequent rivalry that emerged 
between s tates for the control of the s t rategic seas led to  the accep t­
ance of the "mare liberum" open seas doctrine of Hugo Grot ius , p romul­
gated in 1 609 , which p revailed ove r John Selden ' s "mare clausum" closed 
seas doctrine offered in 1 6 35 . 6 Never have the seas become closed or 
divided between nations in time of peace . 
The opening of the seas const ituted a threat to  the coastal s t ates . 
Without any e f fective control o f  their coas tal wat ers , they were exposed 
to enemy att ack. The coast al s t at es began t o  react to such open danger by 
taking actions to exercise j urisdict ional powers over the belt adj acent t o  
3 
to their seacoast . The cannon rule o f  three miles ( the. range o f  e ffec-· 
tive cannon at tack from the sea) was introduced by the British and 
accepted as the sea limits: of all nat ional j urisdict ions . For three 
and a half centuries the three-mile limit and twelve-mile con t iguous 
zones providing free p assage for peace ful purposes has been uphe ld . 7 
Today these limit s are being challenged, due to the fact that resource­
rich ocean beds are being opened up for exp loratii.on and.exploitation 
by various nat ional and corporate interests o f  the techonologically­
advanced nations . Thus, the limitat ions of the t radit ional freedom 
of the seas became que s tionable to t he d isadvantaged nations who are 
unable to exp loit  and exp lore the ocean resources at a rate commensurate 
to that of  the advanced nations . They have exercised sovereign claims 
beyond traditional limits to protect their interests . Thi s  development 
has led to a crisis  situation and unwillingness by both the sat isf ied 
and dissat isfied nati ons to reduce their  act ivit ies , demands ,  and claims 
at the sea conferences . There fore, it is necessary in the twentieth 
century to renegot iate the t raditional laws to the satis fact ion o f  
both groups . Consensus has not been reached at recent conferences , and 
many more drilling rigs, floating islands , s tat ionary p lat forms , submers­
ibles , and artificial structures are appearing above and be low the seas, 
and mechanical power , refrigeration, float ing canneries, radar , sonar , 
power blocks and nylon net s are cont:lnuing t o  invade the deep seas . It 
is not surpris ing that the underdeveloped nat ions have shown reluctance 
to succumb to part ial solut ions which would give advant ages to the tech­
nologically-sup erior nations . The developed nations , on the other hand , 
are not willing to  rescind their ingenious creativity and mastery over 
the resources of the ocean . The result has been continuous adj ustment 
of claims by both parties over the1r s ea territories in an attempt to 
cotmteract the new developments . 8 
4 
In light of  the failure o f  the earlier law of  the sea ( 1 958 , 
1960) conferences to reach comp romises , the difficulty that resulted 
from the later conferences ( 19 70 ,  1 9 7 4 )  occurred as the nations began 
to re flect policies that favored their own interes t s  rather than the 
enlightened int erests  of  all nations particip ating . Since one of  the 
rules of  the lat er conferences allowed p o litical consideration of the 
sea issue , the greater tendency towards p olitical alliance emerged 
among the sympathizers of  a common course . The third world , becoming 
more aware o f  the p o litical strategies o f  the affluent nations , and the 
type of proposals and draft articles they advanced , began to form a 
caucus under the banner o f  ex-co lonial group s  with common co lonial 
experience . They began to view the activities o f  the affluent nations 
as neo-colonialis tic and imperialistic . To them, the affluent nations ' 
desire in the sea issue was mot ivated by the same interes t that drove 
them to Africa , Asia , and Latin America , and that was to colonize the 
sea and to solely exp loit it s resources to their advantage . Realizing 
their present numerical sup eriority , t hey emphasized that all future 
conferences should s till be guided by the parliamentary procedure9 
which had been instituted a long time ago by the Europeans who then 
comprised a maj ority of  the world body . The third world nations 
re fused any change in rules and p rocedure . With the parliamentary 
procedure adopt ed , both advanced and less advanced nat ions be gan bloc 
organizat ion , bloc voting , b loc-·sponsored candidates for the elec tive 
o f fices , and b loc attempts to manipulate the rules of p rocedure at all 
leve ls of  the conference (subconnnittee level , connnittee level , and 
general assembly leve l ) . 
The third world organized effort s ,  constan t ly harras sed their 
opponents , and frequent ly forced their opponents  to water-down or to  
withdraw p roposals opposed unanimous ly by  them. They established a 
system of vot e  mobilization within the ir caucus in order t o  dominat e 
key is sues and p ropo sals which they either favored or disfavored .  
With this s trategy , they have been ab le t o  block p assage o f  various 
United S tates propo sals for six-mile t erritor ial sea and twelve-mile 
contigious fishing zones ; and can also boast of forcing the elimina-
tion of  Brit ish proposals for a fifteen-mile t erritorial limit , and 
of  eliminating the Soviet Union ' s  p roposals  on twelve-mile t errit orial 
5 
limits . They were victorious in gaining for their states a sovereignty , 
rather than exclusive right s , over the continental shel f , and an increase 
10  
of  coas tal states authority over the fishing in waters off  their coast s .  
At the Venezuela Conference o f  1 9 7 4 , they refused t o  yield their desire 
to have international authority to control the international sea . Though 
they have not won ab solute vic tory , they have influenced the policy 
approach of the new laws emerging on the sea . 
The driving force o f  the t hird wo rld nations has been a desire for 
a change in the t raditional laws o f  the seas , which they have regarded as 
a cloak used to camouflage s elf-intere s t  (the domination o f  the many by 
the powerful few) . They perceive the maritime pmvers as not only exer­
cising their special powers in their own coastal areas but as often eager 
to use their technology to expand into the territorial seas of the less 
develo ped countries, therefore deciding the fate of the weak. Thus.far, 
the third world nations have seen fit to reject the legal codifications 
under consideration at these conferences. Relatively weak in power terms, 
they see as their main prote ction from the physically powerful st a tes the 
ability to avoid being permanently obliged to perform required acts not 
yet sanctioned by law. Of the third world nations involved in the debate, 
the Latin American States are the center of study in this paper.· 
Statement of Purpose 
The purposes of the paper are: (1) to trace the emergence of the 
Latin American states as a force in international law deliberations and 
to examine the positions they reflected \;,ithin the traditional law of the 
sea at that time ; (2) to analyze the Truman Declaration of 1945 and its 
effect on the Latin American states' attitude towards the traditional law 
of the sea; (3) to reflect the continuing importance of the sea to the 
economic life of the Latin American nations; (4) to trace the Latin Ameri­
can nations drive for equal participation in the structuring of the con­
temporary law of the seas in the years since the Truman Declaration; and 
(5) to analy ze the law of the sea debates at the conferences, focusing 
primarily on the roles and pol icy positions adopted by the Latin American 
representatives at these conferences. 
It should be noted that this study, though it deals with Latin 
American �tates, does not deal extensively with the land-locked Latin 
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American nations , Bolivia and Paraguay . However ,  it should also be noted 
that they have strongly enunciated policies geared t o  include them in the 
part icipation of  exploration and exp loitation of the seas . They have.also 
won the support of  the rest o f  the Latin American states and have been 
represented and included in the relatively homogeneous regional b loc of  
Lat in America at  the conferences . This s tudy is mainly concerned with 
the claims which the Latin American nations , mainly the coas tal states , 
have posed t o  the t raditional law o f  the seas in terms o f  revamping or 
refusing to allow codifications of  the existing laws o f  the seas , espe­
cially when they b elieved. such p roposed codifications favo red the inte r­
ests of  the Wes tern affluent nations . 
An attempt , therefore , is made by the author to show to what 
ext ent the land-locked Latin American stat es have been able to  work out 
their differences in o rder to  arrive at the unanimity with which they 
approach their policies . It  should b e  noted that on a narrower spectrum , 
this homogeneous policy app roach of  the Latin American states has created 
some conflict involving the ext ent o f  t erritorial sea t o  be claimed . The 
land-locked states o f  Latin America have on occasion j oined forces with 
the re s t  of the land-locked nations at the conferences to p ropose policies 
which would regulate any extensive claim by any coastal state  int o the 
blue sea.  The land-locked states of  Latin America saw this as an attempt 
to protect their interes t as opposed t o  that o f  their coastal neighbors 
who wanted to  lay claim to·corisiderable dis tances in the sea . The land­
locked Lat in Americans saw the claim o f  the coastal states as a means of  
weakening their power to exp loit the resources o f  the s ea within the twelve­
mile limit . 
8 
S t atement of  Proposit ions 
The p ropositions advanced here are : ( 1 )  that the perceived threat 
from the affluent nations embodied in the Truman Declaration necessit ated 
the Latin American states ' ext reme reaction t o  p rotect resources found 
within the regional area o f  their sea as well as the international sea ; 
( 2 )  that the importance of fishing t o  the life and economy of  the Latin 
American states generated in them the desire t o  stop the t echnology o f  
the affluent from reaching the ir regional waters , and also that same 
fear o f  technology motivated them t o  reque s t  an international authority 
in areas beyond traditional national boundaries; ( 3 ) that the resources 
dis covered in the ocean bottom was seen by the Latin American nations as 
a liability at present , rather than an asset , since the only nations 
cap able of exploiting them were the affluent , who also depended on 
mineral import s from the Latin American states ;  ( 4 )  that  the ability to 
allow exploitat ion of the resources by the affluent would mean economic 
chao s to the Latin American s t ates ; subsequent ly , they have envisioned 
the political chaos that would follow as a result of increase in unemp loy­
ment in the domestic sector , since the mineral industries which employ 
many laborers would be for ced to cut down in p roduct ion and labo r ; ( 5 ) 
that the fear of  extinction o f  life in the sea by pollut ant s from the 
vessels , submersibles and oil drilling f loats of the af f luent necessi­
tated in Latin Ame rican s tates the vanguard to defend their interests ; 
( 6 ) that the desire t o  participate in shap ing the laws o f  the sea had 
reflected the unity with which the Latin American states had confronted 
the conferences ; and (7) that Latin American s tates are capable of 
arriving at unified positions and cap able of assuming a leadership role 
among the developing nations . 
Method of Approach 
An his torical analytic approach will be the method the author 
will app ly . This means the author will not t ry to prove the proposi­
tions which have been raised individually . The author will amalgamat e 
all the findings by means of  random appro ach; but when one takes the 
pain to read all the contents of the thesis , he will find the evidence 
and materials which support the proposit ions spread over the ent ire 
paper . The refore , one should not expect to  read the findings in sup­
port of  proposit ion number one . Ins tead , proposit ion number one could 
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be contained in an area o f  the t ext which is also in support of  another 
proposition . The author is doing this because mos t  o f  the arguments  p re­
sent ed by the Lat in American delegat e s  in support of one proposit ion is 
also used somewhere else at another conference in suppo rt of another 
argument . Examples o f  such an argument could be t raced in the arguments 
of  many of  the Latin American representatives when they referred t o  the 
importance of the sea to the l i f e  of the Lat in American people . This 
same argument was used interchangeab ly to  denote the importance of the 
sea to the economy of Latin America .  The usage o f  s imilar argument s 
would mean repet it ion o f  the same argument at d i fferent p laces in sup­
port  of the different pr opos it ions . The author has decided t o  adopt the 
present method since i t  will help to  avo id repetition . 
Informat ion concerning the emergence of  the Latin American nat ions 
into the world body , and the role they played with respect  to any quest ion 
on the sea is colle cted and analyzed . This  investigation gives a basic 
comparison and cont rast between the Lat in American states ' policy before 
the emergence o f  the sea crisis and the a ft ermath po lic ies , adopted when 
1 0  
the sea became o f  much greater importance in the area o f  re sources. An 
in dep th study of the governmental document s o f  the I.at in American state s 
and the U.N. documents  will c ontribute t o  elaborate Latin American poli­
cies covering the period of development of the sea problems . Since an 
inter-American organizat ion , known present ly as the Organization o f  
American States , activit ies have long been in exis tence, i t  is important 
that document s from the organization concerning conferences and meetings 
in which the sea was the issue o f  d iscus sion and debate will further add 
to the info rmation needed to explain respect ive at titudes the Lat in Ameri­
can nations have exhibited all along on the issue o f  the sea .  
U. S. Senate hearings and State Department bulletins will be a maj or 
area o f  study to extract what were the reasons that motivated the Truman 
Declaration o f  1944 and the attitude o f  the American decis ion-makers and 
indus trial men towards the declaration . S ince the declaration generated 
the new crisis of the sea and subsequently led to the following confer­
ences o f  the law o f  the sea , the U . N .  documents concerning all the con­
ferences until 1974 will be reviewed to develop the argument and st rate­
gies adop ted by the Lat in American states in the defense o f  their claims . 
Also , int ernational j ournals , periodicals on internat ional affairs , int er­
nat ional law j ournals  and newspapers will be very important sources o f  
research since they spend much time presenting both sides o f  the contro­
versial clai.ms from bo th the affluent and the poor nations in an at temp t 
t o  determine the legit imacy or legality and illegality o f  such claims . 
Finally ,  since the is sue o f  the sea t o  the Lat in American nat ions has 
been that of protecting economic interests ,  the author will review the 
U . N .  economic j ournals and bulletins with resp ect to what percentage o f  
11 
the gross domestic and the gros s  nat ional p roduct of the Latin American 
states comes  from the sea resources , and also what  type o f  economic bene­
fit they ge t from the resources . Similarly , economic j ournals and docu­
ments from the Latin American S tates will be s tudied to see whether the 
sea actually poses a threat to the land base mineral resources of the 
Latin Ame rican S tates . Information received from this source will 
determine if  the argument p resented by the Latin American states 
j ustifies their att itude t owards p rotecting their national interes t s . 
CHAPTER I I  
THE ISSUE OF TIIE SEA AND LATIN AMERICAN NATIONS 
The History o f  Latin American Nations and the Law o f  the Seas 
In order to acquaint ourselves with the Latin American nations 
challenge to the existing international legal system guarding the ocean , 
a brief historical analysis o f  the Latin American emergence is necessary . 
Latin American influence in international politics re sulted from the 
victories achieved by them in the revolutionary wars against Spain and 
Portugal in the eighteenth century . The same intellectuals and philo­
sophers who called for the liberation s t ruggles were convinced after 
independence that the instability which was common in Latin America 
could only be contained if an orderly society could be developed both 
at the regional level and in the world community . One of  the promul­
gators of Latin American involvement within a world community was Simon 
Bolivar , also known as "The Southern Liberator" . Under  his leadership , 
a conference was convened in Panama City in 182 6  to reach a sett lement 
on a Continental Federation o f  American Nations . 1 1  The intent o f  this 
Congress was for all American states to gather as a col lective entity 
to administe r international j us tice , to set t le the dif ferences among 
them by peaceful methods through arbit ration , conciliation , or sanction 
and to find other institutional means of regulating and controlling 
aggressors and violators of the collective security o f  these nations . 
12 
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Though the intentions o f  the Conference did not materialize at this  early 
stage , it provided inspiration to the Latin American states and their  
determination to organize better and more p ro gressive conferences. The 
result was the reconvening o f  a series o f  conferences , not ab ly , the Lima 
Congres s of 1847, The Santiago Congress o f  1856 , the Lima Congres s  of 1864  
and 1876, and the Montevideo Congress of  1889  sponsored by the United 
12 States. The key word at all these congresses had been the es tablishment 
of peace in the Americas and in the international community of nations. 
Modern conferences o f  Latin American states have continued to use the 
motto: peace among all nat ions . The que s t  for peace in the twentieth 
century became one o f  the s t rongest points at the third meeting of the 
foreign minis ters of the American Republics , held at Rio de Janeiro. 
The group addres sed a reque s t  to  the Inter-American Judicial Committee 
set up at that meeting to consider not only hemispheric problems but 
also to prepare detailed recommendations for post-war international 
organizat ion and security. The findings o f  the commit tee , as a result 
of the Latin American nations request , resulted in the estab lishment of 
the League of Nations through which international peace could be main-
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t ained . The failure and the collaspe o f  the League o f  Nations did 
not discourage the Latin American nations ques t for any ins trument ality 
that would e stablish and maint ain universal peace among all s tates . Thus , 
when in 1945 , at San Francisco , the United Nations was inaugurated , the 
presence of all the twenty Latin American nations was felt . 
It should be noted that the desire for peace and the est ablishment 
of  an international body to lit igate and mitigate in these af fairs of 
nation-states was expounded by the Lat in American Republics not only in 
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the intere s ts of  curb ing the wars and instability that had been rampant 
in the ir region; but also in order to have strong influence as small 
nations in the shaping of  the charter of  the world body. Such a world 
body could help protect them from out s ide interventionist forces of the . 
powerful nations by cons training the great powers within clearly def ined 
limits . They expressed concern over the j udicial equality o f  all states 
rathe r than domination by the p ower ful . Thus , at San Francisco when the 
United Nations was founded , the Charte r  c learly established guarantees o f  
non- intervent ion and non-interference in the dome s t i c  politics o f  nat ions 
by each other . 
The Sea and Latin America 
After independence in Latin America the controversy over the ques­
tion of the sea led to greater confrontat ion among. the states . The sea , 
which was once exp loited and controlled by the Spanish and the Portuguese 
Colonial Governments within the territorial b oundaries o f  the established 
traditional law of the sea, became an as set to the Latin American states 
after independence . I t  provided them with gre at abundance o f  fish market­
able to other nat ions for t rade . However ,  economic b enefits incurred from 
the fish t rade escalated the conflicts and wars among the respective_ 
republics . The Latin American states ' individual claims on the terri­
torial sea l imits were extended to p revent and p rotect regional influence 
from extending into the boundaries occup ied in the sea . S imilarly , the 
naval advantage which.the sea p rovided to the more powerful states within 
�he region gave rise to a s ignificant hegemonic control of the ent ire 
regional sea by the then powerful naval s tates . The multi tude o f  con-
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frontat ions wi thin the repub lics over the issue of exploitability of the 
fish resource s and dominat ion o f  the sea by the powerful states neces­
sitated the finding of the means o f  achieving a solut ion to the crisis 
among the Latin American Republics at the 1826 Congress in Panama . The 
failure o f  the congress to a chieve solutions to  the sea crisis among the 
republics generated greater confusion among the Latin American states in 
the ir efforts to control the sea in their re gion . Chile , in 1855, then 
one o f  the strongest naval forces in the are a , enacted a c ivil code which 
extended her maritime front iers beyond her original boundary . The exten­
s ion provided for a dual zone which included an inner zone of territorial 
seas and an extended zone for other purpo ses , which included the pro t ec­
tion of  fish and security from hostile neighbors . Article 593  o f  the 
civil code indicated that "The contiguous sea t o  the distance of a marine 
league counted from low-water l ine is a territorial sea appertaining to  
the nat ional domain ; but  the right o f  police in all  matters concerning 
the country and the obs ervance o f  the cus tom laws extends to the dist ance 
of  four marine leagues counted in the same manner . 11 1
4 
Chile ' s c laim t rig-
ge red o ther claims within the republics . Ecuador , in 1 85 7 , threatened by 
the civil code of Chile , decreed her own civil code extending her terri­
torial sea limit for the same reason given by Chile . In 1 860  El Salvador 
followed suit . Argentina followed in 1869 and Honduras devised a civil 
code extending her territorial sea in 1 880 .
1 5  These claims became the 
firs t at tempt to challenge the three-mile law of the sea , but failed 
because the three-mile rule had enj oyed unanimous support from the 
European nat ions , who constituted the maj ority of the internat ional 
arbitrat ion body , which e s t ab lished the three-mile rule in 1855. The 
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Hague Conference o f  1882 reit e rated t hat the fishermen o f  each country 
shal l  enjoy the exclus ive right o f  fishing within the distance o f  three 
miles from the low-water mark along the ext ent of t he coasts of their 
respective count ries as well  as o f  the dependent islands and banks . With 
this arbitration deci sion enforced at the Hague Conference , all the Lat in 
American Repub lics withdrew their claims to the original three miles , with 
the reservation that the issue of the sea would once again be raised at 
the coming Congres ses of the American S t ates . At the 1 8 8 9  Montevideo 
Conference in Uruguay , Lat in American s tates t abled p roposals which 
requested the extension of territorial sea claims to five miles .  Eight 
draft treaties , incorporating both pub l ic and private internat ional law ,  
were adopted and app roved a t  the Congress .  They included Art ic)e 1 2  which 
favored a five-mile territorial sea " for the p urpose of p enal jurisdict ion . 
Also declared as territorial waters were those areas which were bound to  
within the extent o f  five miles from the  terra f irma and from the  islands 
1 6  
which cons tituted part o f  the terr itory o f  each stat e . " The eight draft 
treat ies received the s i gnatures of Argent ina , Bolivia, Paraguay and Uru-
guay . Only Uruguay followed up with the f ive-mile limit claims , whereas 
Argent ina , Bol ivia and Paraguay did not change from their three-mile l imit 
claim. Uruguay ' s  adherence to the new five-mile l imit was seen as a con-
trol device over her fisheries in the mouth of the Rio de la Plat a ,  an 
area more than 60 miles wide and including about 5 , 000 sq_uare miles . The 
adopt ion o f  the five-mile t erritorial limit , passed by the Congress ,  was 
intended to s top the _British ves sels from fish ing within the f ive miles 
of Uruguan waters . 
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The event s that triggered the Lat.in. American states1 interes t  in 
the issue o f  the sea in the nine teenth century stemmed from the int e r­
nat ional rivalry that emerged relat ing to the economic resources that the 
sea provided for the nat ions in this region . S imilarly, the naval import­
ance which the sea provided to the powerful nations within the re gion pro­
voked responses from the weaker nations to guard their t erritorial waters 
from the naval forces o f  their neighbors . Finally , the threat imposed on 
Lat in Ame rican fishing resources by foreign ves sels necessitated moves to  
protect one o f  the sources o f  their economic benefit s .  At this period o f  
the development o f  the s e a  crisis , there was n o  coherent regional policy 
towards the ques tion of the sea. The het rogeneous pol icy approach that 
was p revalent at this t ime resulted from the immediate threat that was 
posed to the nat ional interes t o f  the respective Lat in American nations. 
The threat to national economic intere s t s  in the sea at this time was not 
of external origin even though the Brit ish had shown cons iderable interes t  
in the f ish meal o f  Latin America. Their presence in the area did not pose  
an immediate threat. The immediate threat was p osed by their neighbors. 
The conflict  that exis ted among them over the issue of the sea had been 
the p rime reason for the Lat in American state s ' request for views on the 
question of the codification o f  the sea law . 
By the early twentieth century the potent ial threat which Britain 
had shown to the Latin American s tates had shifted hands . At this t ime the 
United States marit ime power had grown s t rong. The proximity o f  the U . S .  
to Lat in America gener�ted another response from Latin America,on·the sea 
issue. They saw the immediate threat to the sea  at a very close range. 
The fear o f  U. S. dominat ion o f  their sea was confirmed when in 1 9 0 2 , the 
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U . S .  de feated Spain in the Gulf of Mexic
o and the Caribbean . In the same 
year the U . S .  is sued a policy declaratio
n in support o f the three-mile 
rule which read : 
The Government o f  the United States cl
aims and 
admits  the j urisdiction o f  any state ov
er it s 
territorial waters only to  the extent o
f  a marine 
league , unless  a di fferent rule is f ixed
 by t reaty 
between two states ; even then thj7t reaty states
 are 
alone affected by the agreement. 
This policy declaration began to influenc
e the policies of the rest of 
the Latin American states who had been a
nxious to retain their extended 
boundaries or those who had intentions o
f extendin g  them. Latin American 
states readj usted their territorial c la
ims to the three-mile limit to pro-
tect themselves from the naval p ower and
 to  win their friendship . The 
firs t move to reserve the sea claim was ma
de by Mexico , which for years had 
claimed three-league (more than three m
iles} territorial waters . Mexico 
pas sed an act which reversed her n ine-mi
le claim to  three miles as the 
territorial limit in response to the desi
re o f  the U. S. p reserve the 
traditional three-mile law of the sea t e
rritory as the only legit imate 
claim. The U . S .  began to  bring the rest
 o f  the Latin American states  
into the three-mile traditional limit. 
She s i gned a smuggling treaty 
with Cuba and Panama which a f firmed the 
three-mile limit as the terri-
torial boundary within which smuggling  l
aws could be  exercised. Until  
World War I the three-mile limit remain
ed the  p rincip al demand on Lat in 
American s t ates and the world in general
. The imp erial p ower of the U . S .  
and her European allies was able t o  dom
inate any contrary claims by the 
weaker nat ions including the Latin Ameri
can s tates . Disputes that emerged 
during this period relat ing to sea c lai
ms were set t led by the Permanent 
Inte rnat ional Court of  Arbitration whi.ch was dominated by the European 
nations. They unanimous ly agreed to the three-mile rule which favored 
1 9  
their exploitat ive inte rest in fish resources beyond the three-mile limit , 
and which also provided greater acces s  to  the sea for their naval activi­
ties . 
1 8  
World War I and Lat in American Res is tance to the Law o f  t h e  Sea 
Considerable damage inflicted to the coastal states by the naval 
vessels of  the belligerent nat ions during World War I result ed in a world-
wide react ion to the viab ility of the three-mile t e rritorial sea limit. 
The new forces that challenged the three-mile doc trine held the op inion 
that the traditional three-mile limit must  be reviewed in order to develop 
new limits that would contain the sup erior destruct ive ef fect s of the 
modern war ships. Realizing that the tradit ional law of the three-mile 
limit had helped the naval powers , mos t ly European nations ,  critics argued 
fnr a new law which would reflect the common consent of all nations . This 
nationalistic  fervor which evolved after Wotild War I rej uvenated the Lat in 
American s tates and led them t o  demand once again , the extension of  their 
sea limits. This new spirit enj oyed wider support amon g the Lat in Ameri­
cans , as well as a maj ority of the " third world nations". 1 9  In 1 9 30 when 
the League of Nat ions Conference was convened in the Hague , the argument 
raised by both Latin American s tates and these new national is t ic forces 
was concerned mainly with new p rovis ions extending the sea l imit to a 
safer limit out of range of the naval vessels o f  the modern e ra. Lat in 
Americans were very voci ferous in discussing the que s t ion o f  the three-
2 0  
mile and twelve-mile contiguous zone limit o f  the s e a  claim. Pas t  
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differences in the respective claims o f  Latin American nat ions persis ted 
and were clearly evident at this con ference . The idea of nat ional inter-
est on the issue o f  the sea dominated all the activities of the respect ive 
nations in Lat in America .  There was n o  indicat ion o f  any closeness in 
their p roj ected policy approach on the question . However ,  what emerged 
at this t ime among the Lat in American states in view o f  this new deve lop-
ment was a greater consensus to expand their territories within th1� sea 
to the area of  the contiguous zone . Thus it could be  noted that whi le 
Chile supported the three-mile with a twelve-mile contiguous zone and 
while Colombia , Uruguay and Brazil vot ed for a twelve-mile territorial 
limit , Cuba , then newly independent , supported a s ix-mile t erritorial 
1. . d 1 ·1 . 
. 2 1  1m1t an a twe ve-m1 e cont iguous zone . Thes e  dif ferences in policy 
approach charact eri z ed the Lat in American s tate s ' claim to the sea . In 
spite o f  these differences there was general accep t ance by the Latin 
American s tates o f  the contiguous zone doct riue . The d i fferences in the 
claims could b e  attributed to the national law o f  each s tate with regard 
to the treaties they had s igned , the exist ing nat ional declarat ions , 
fishing zone protect ion , and the state of  belligerence which exis ted in 
the region . The proximity of the U . S .  and some o f  the Latin American 
states inf luenced their action and inact ion when the expans ions into the 
sea were init iated . Mexico , which shared close p roximity with the U.S., 
ab stained from expressing any view o f  expanding her s ea claims at the 
Hague Conference but s tuck to the s ix-mile claim which it had exercised 
after the U . S .  defeat of Spain in the Gulf o f  Mexico . By 1935, f ive years 
after the Hague Conferenc e ,  Mexico had seen fit to  extend her territorial 
sea l imit . The decree s tated that , 
Sole Article , Section 1 of  Art icle 4 o f  the law 
of  innnobile propert ies o f  the nat ion , o f  Dec.ember 
1 8 ,  1 902  is amended to read as follows : 1 )  The 
territorial waters , for a distance o f  nine nauti­
cal miles (16 , 668  kilometers ) , counted from the 
mark of  lowest  tide in the coasts  of the mainland 
or on the sho res o f  the islands forming part o f  
the national territory . 2 2  
Mexico ' s new decree was an e ffort to cur t ail the overabundant U . S .  
fishing ves sels in the Gulf area o f  Mexican waters . These waters had 
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been overly f ished by the highly-equipped U . S .  ves sels to the disadvant -
age o f  the unsophis t icated vessels o f  Mexico which yielded les s f ish cat ch 
compared to that of the U . S .  Als o , Mexico had b een app rehensive about the 
consequences of dep letion of the fish in their wat ers by foreign ves sels . 
As Table 1 indicat es , the Lat in American s tates ' reac tion at this 
period of the debate on the issue of the sea was generated mainly by eco-
nomic cons iderations . There existe d the des ire to  safeguard the ir fisheries 
and other sea resources from foreign ves sels and f ishermen in order to 
protect Lat in American economies which depended on the export o f  fish to 
other foreign lands for revenue . Secondly , the need to enforce custom 
laws due t o  the increase in smuggling , which had deterred their economic 
development , led to the various national anti-smuggling acts enforced 
rigorous ly in the waters of Latin America .  By creating custom laws , new 
sources o f  revenue were es tablished by the Lat in American s tates in a form 
of taxation on items entering or  leaving the s tates . It  could also be sa id 
that Latin America ' s greatest e ffort to negate the t radit ional three-mile 
rule actually was made during the period 1 9 38 to 1 945 . Although the Lat in 
American nations and othe r  European and Asiat ic nat ions had begun adj us t ing 
-their sea boundaries  because of  the e f fect o f  the First World War on the 
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TABLE I 
SELECTED LATIN AMERICAN NATIONS AND THE 
CONTIGUOUS ZONE CLAIMS 1 9 30- 1940* 
----·-�-·-· ------
NATION EXTENT 
Colombia 20 kilometers 
Cuba 5 miles 
Dominican Rep. 3 leagues 
Ecuador 15 miles 
El Salvador 12 miles 
Guatemala 1 2  miles 
Honduras 1 2 miles 
Venezuela 12 miles 
PURPOSE 
Cus t oms 
Sanitat ion 
Naval Security 
Area 
Fishing 
Pol ice and 
Security 
Port Authority 
Jurisdict ion 
Territorial Sea 
Security , 
Sanitation , 
Cus toms 
MEANS AND DATE OF 
IMPLEMENTATION 
Customs law o f  June 1 9 31 
General law o f  f isheries 
March 2 8 , 1936 
Law #55 o f  December 27 , 
1 9 3 8  
Decree No . 607 o f  Augus t 
2 9 , 1 9 34 
Law o f  Navigat ion and 
Mar ine o f  October 2 3 , 
1 933  
Regulat ions of  Apr i l  2 1 , 
1 9 39 
Const it ut ion of  March 28 , 
1 9 38 
Presidential Decree o f  
September 15 , 1 9 39 
------- --------------------- ---- ---
*Information on the t able was select ed from the document s of  U . N .  
Laws and Regulat ions on the Regime o f  the High Seas , pp . 5 3- 1 68 ;  and also 
f rom the U . N .  Laws and Regulat ions on the Regime of  the Territorial Sea , 
pp. 45-46 .  
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security o f  their coas t s , Lat in America had not exhibited any great con-
cern for the military security of its  coast against naval ve ssels foreign 
to the re gion . The U . S .  had offered the Lat in American nat ions full mili-
tary pro tect ion from any foreign attack on their countries .  The military 
security they enj oyed from the U . S .  was a s ignificant factor in the early 
Lat in American relaxation on the security issue . The period from 1 9 3 8  to  
1945 saw a s ignificant Latin American s t ate s ' at tack on the three-mile 
law , and an extension of their coasts  to within the twelve-mile cont iguous 
zone . They did not overlook the resistance which their closest neighbor 
and friend , the U . S . , would b ring to bear on their new claims . At the 
Hague Conference a change in at t itude was expressed by Argent ina , Chile , 
and Peru , who not only feared the att ack o f  their countrie s  by the Axis 
powers , but were convinced that because of their lengthy coas t l ines the 
U . S .  could not o f fer  them all the necessarY- p ro t e ct ion a gainst any 
invas ion . 
World War II and the Rise o f  Collect ive Appro ach in Latin Amer ica  
Against the Law of  the Sea 
The Panama Conference of  1 9 39 primarily demonstrated the emergence 
o f  greater consensus among Latin American nat ions on the issue of the sea 
laws . The cent ral theme which confronted the delegates was the quest ion 
of the three-mile rule and to what  extent this three-mile l imit provided 
security and safeguarded the neutrality of the Americas · from future wars . 
The experiences from the First World War d emonstrated that the strike 
capability of modern military ves sels could no t  be deterred by the old 
three-mile rule . The Latin American nat ions sensed a new crisis arising 
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and they wanted t o  pro tect  themselves against the confli ct developing 
among the European nations . The attitude p roj ected by the Latin Ameri-
can states at the Panama Conference was influenced by the need to design 
me asures necessary to p ro tect their regional and nat ional interests . All 
the foreign ministers of the Lat in American states , (the U . S .  was also 
pre sent at the meet ing) unanimously declared that Lat in America would 
ratify their  neutrality status in view of the conflict which was dis--
rupting the peace of Europe . Their convict ion was that there could be 
no j ustificat ion for the interest s  o f  the belligerents  t o  p revail over 
2 3  the right s o f  the neut rals . Thus they became convinced that by 
abs taining from the war in dis tant European waters , they wo uld escape 
the horrors which the war would b ring . The fatal and painful conse-
quences , if any , would be lightly felt by them . The foreign minis ters 
at the conference therefore declared a resolut ion to p rotect the ir waters 
from the belligerent states which read : 
As a measure of  cont inental self-prot ect ion , the 
American Repub l ics , so long as they maintain their 
neutrality , are as the inherent ri ght ent itled to 
have those wat ers adj acent t o  the American con­
tinent . . .  free from the commission of any ho s t ile 
act by any non-American belligerent nat ion , whether 
such hos t ile nat ion act be a t t empt ed or made from 
land , sea or air . 24 
The area of  the neutrality belt was described to include all the areas of 
the ten rhumb lines with the excep t ion of Canada , s t ar t ing from the Maine-
New Brunswick boundary , proceeding south , around Cape Horn and then north , 
ending at the Washington-Br i tish Columbia b orde r .  These  neutrality areas 
covered about 5 00 to 900 miles in width and extended to 1 , 2 00 miles at a 
- point o f f  the coas t s  o f  Chile and Peru . The greate s t  prot est t o  this 
declarat ion came from Grea t  Britain which for many years had been the 
protector of the three-mile rule . She c ited the three-mile n1le vio-
lat ion by the American s t a tes as a contradiction to the establi shed 
limit set at the Hague Convent ion . But the determinat ion o f  the 
American states to protect their claims was evident on December 2 3 ,  
1 9 39 , March 16 , 1 940, and May 2 4 ,  1 94 0 , when they protested about the 
hos t ile incident s within the zone by the Axis p owers . 25 
Further , the Panama Declarat ion openly repudiated the Hague 
Convent ion ' s innocent passage rule which allowed neutral s t at e s  to be 
impart ial to belligerent states  with respect t o  the usage of  their 
2 c  . :>
harbors or roadsteads p rovided the belligerent p owers ' vessels had me t 
11 h 1 . f h 1 . i h . Z 6  a t e regu at 1ons o · t e neutra powers n t e i r  waters . The Decla-
ration of  Panama denied any innocent p assage to any other ves sels except 
h f h A . bl " 2 7  t os e o .  t e mer ican repu ics . 
Af ter the war only a few Lat in American s t ates reversed their 
claim to within the three-mile l imit which the U. S .  had long favored . 
As Table II indicates , though there had been d ivergent claims , the 
greater consensus among the maj ority of the Lat in Americm1 repub l ics  
fmm red expansion of  their sea  in order t o  enj oy a wider fishing area 
l imit . Even those who favored the t radit ional three miles have favo red 
greater control of the sea for the purpose of fishing . 
TABLE I I  
OFFSHORE CLAIMS O F  LATIN AMERICAN NATIONS 
AFTER WORLD WAR I I  
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Arranged According to  B readths o f  the T er ritorial Sea 
DISTANCE CLAIM 
THREE MILES 
Argent ina 
Braz il 
Cuba 
Dominican Republic 
Nicaragua 
S IX MILES 
Colomb ia 
Hait i  
Uruguay 
TWELVE KILOMETERS 
Honduras 
NINE MILES 
Mexico 
TWLEVE MILES 
Ecuador 
Guatemala 
Panama 
Venezuela 
FIFTY KILOMETERS 
Chile  
TWO HUNDRED MILES 
El Salvador 
NO SPECIFIC TERRI­
TORIAL LIMITS 
Costa Rica 
Peru 
LENGTH OF 
COASTLINE 
2 , 12 9  
3 , 692  
1 , 74 7 
325  
445  
1 , 022  
5 84 
308 
374  
4 , 848 
45 8 
1 7 8 
9 7 9  
1 , 08 1 
2 , 882 
164  
446 
1 , 25 8 
FISHING LIMITS IN 
NAUTICAL MILES 
10 
1 2  
5 
1 5  
2 0 0  
1 2  
1 2  
2 00 
200 
OTHER LIMITS 
Cont inental Shelf  
Continental Shelf  
The republics favored exp ansion o f  their sea with regard to the f ish­
jng limit they �anted to enj oy . Even those who favored the t radit ional three 
miles have favored great er control of the sea for the purpose o f  fishing and 
p rotecting their fishes . 
CHAPTER III 
THE TRUMAN DECLARATION AND LATIN AMERICAN REACTION 
With World War II over , the crisis over the claims relating to  
the sea by Latin American states had not  subs ided when the Truman Pro-
clama t ion concerning the continental shelf and fisheries conservat ion 
was is sued . This gave added s t imulus to the Lat in American nations who 
began extending their claims beyond the twelve-mile l imit which had 
dominated their earlier decrees and declarat ions . The Truman Declara-
tion of 1945 was a response by the U . S .  t o  maj or developments  that had 
been taking p lace in the adj acent waters o f  the U . S . , namely , the growth 
of foreign fishing and the discovery of o il .  These developments called 
for the necessary laws within the U . S .  to  protect their fishes and to 
exp loit the new resources discovered in that area . Events leading to 
this significant p roclamat ion can be traced back to  the 1 9 30 ' s  when the 
question of el iminat ing foreign ve ssels in the areas adj acent to the U . S .  
contiguous zone was vigorous ly argued in the U . S .  Congress . The subsequent 
years saw the emergence of fishing interes ts as a vociferous lobby . Their 
influence in Congres s  led to  the introduct ion in 1 9 37 of two bills in bo th 
Houses which , though never passed , were intended to eliminate foreign fish-
ermen from the Alaskan Cont inental Shel f .  The bill read : 
The salmon which are spawned and hatched in the 
wat ers o f· Alaska are hereby declared to be the 
property of the United States , and it shall be 
unlawful for any person • • • to f ish for , take , or 
2 7 
cat ch any of  the said salmon in the waters 
adj acent t o  the coas t  of Alaska . • . east o f  
the international boundary in the Bering  
Sea  between U . S .  and USSR,  the dep th o f n 8 
which is less than one hundred fathoms . :.! . 
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This b i l l , i f  passed , could have alt ered the international law of  owner-
ship of  fisheries es tablished by the Hague Convent ion on f isheries and 
also could have violated the three-mile limit rule on territorial sea 
l imi t e s t ab l i s hed by the same convent ion . The cont inental shel f of  
Alaska lies between the 100 fathoms line and covers about ha lf  of  the 
Bering Sea which extends over four hundred miles from the Alaskan main-
land . The failure o f  passage o f  the bill  did not deter the determined 
fishing interests . By 1 9 38 , a less s tringent bill  was int roduced by 
Senator Copeland which exp lained the shallow depth o f  the Bering Sea 
to be t h e  slightly submerged margin o f  the American cont inent which , as 
determined by exper ts , d id not p artake in the qualities of a true con-
tinental shel f .  This second b ill s tressed the s ignificance o f  protect-
L: g the U . S .  fishes and minerals from foreign exp loitat ion .  " . . .  U . S .  is 
hereby declared to  extend t o  all the waters and submerged land adj acent 
to the coast o f  Alaska lying eas t  o f  the interna.tionaJ. boundary in the =-
Bering Sea • • .  and lying within the l imits  o f  the cont inental shelf , the 
edge of such cont inental shel f  having a depth of water of one hundred 
f h 1 1
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at oms • • •  This bill was passed in the Senate but failed in the House . 
I f  this law had been passed , though it  was more moderat e than the House 
version , it would nevertheless have been a violation of  the Hague Conven-
tion which required al� nat ions to f ish in the areas beyond the three-mile 
limit of the territorial sea whi ch was referred to as the high seas . Since 
such protec t ive bills did not rece ive the approval of the nat ional legis-
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lators , the respect ive s tates , began t o  enact their own laws concerning 
the ocean issues . Louisiana and Texas took the first init iat ive in 1 9 38 ,  
each enact ing legis lat ion which proj e ct ed the extent of sea t e r r. :i. t o ry 
they could claim. Louisiana claimed 24 miles territorial sea , 30 while  
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Texas claimed 2 ?  miles , respective l y .  The rat ionale behind their claim 
was that the effective range o f  cannon had extended beyond the t raditional 
three-mile limit due to changes in technology . Passage o f  these laws by 
Louis iana and Texas brought a confrontat ion between the federal government 
and the state governments  over the issue o f  decis ion-making in interna-
tional mat ters . The U . S .  Supreme Court held that only the federal govern-
ment has the ultimate right to make decis ions affect ing inte rnat ional 
relations . Thus , Louisiana and Texas were prohib ited from press ing their 
marit ime c laims . But , all indicat ions showed that in p as s ing such laws 
extending their sea l imits Louis iana and Texas were concerned with main-
taining the ir j urisdict ion over the o il deposits  that lay about 10 to 1 30 
miles into : the ocean . 
The failure of  the s t ates to pass any law concerning the sea moved 
the fishing and oil interes ts  to direct  their e f forts  towards the federal 
government . This time , the oil  and fishing int erests  were able to  convince 
the U . S .  government o f  the importance of such industries to the economy o f  
the United S tates . By 1 945 , i t  became apparent that the execut ive b ranch 
was willing to p ro claim ,  for the first t ime , what the Congress  had cont in-
ually batt led ove r prior to the Second World War . The pro clamat ions on 
mineral resources o f  the sea were collaborately p repared by the Stat e  
Dep_ar:tment, Justice Department and Interior Department which j oint ly empha-
sized that : 
Whereas the Government o f  the Unit ed S tates o f  
Amer ica , aware o f  the long range world wide view 
for new resources o f  p etroleum and other minerals 
• • • Whereas it is  the view of the Government of the 
United St ates that the exercise of j urisdict ion over 
the natural resources o f  the subsoil and seabed of  
the continental shelf by the contiguous nat ions is 
reasonable and j us t ,  since the e ffect ivenes s  o f  
measures to  ut ilize o r  conserve thes e resources 
would be cont ingent upon cooperat ion and protec-
tion from the shore , s ince the cont inent al shelf  
may be regarded as  an extension o f  the land mas s  
o f  the coastal nation and thus naturally appurtin-
ant to it , since these resources frequent ly form a 
seaward extension o f  a pool or  deposit  lying within 
the territory , and s ince self-protect ion compels the 
coastal nat ion to  keep close wat ch over act ivit ies o f  
its shore which are o f  the nature necessary for ut ili­
zat ion of these resources . 
The Government o f  the Uni t ed States regard s the 
natural resources of the subsoil and seabed of the 
continental shelf  beneath the high seas but cont i­
guous to the coast s  of the United States as apper­
taining to the United S t ates subj ect to  its j uris­
dict ion and contro l .  
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The proclamat ion declared that " the character as high seas o f  the waters 
above the cont inental shelf  and the right to the ir free and unimpeded 
navigat ion are in no way this a ffected . " 32 
A letter from the Secretary o f  the Int erior in 1 94 3  t o  the White 
House showed the vigor with which the fishing indus tries demanded govern-
ment re gulation devices to protect the ocean from foreign vessels . The 
letter , which was one of the preparatory works for the Truman Proclamat ion , 
indicated that : 
The cont inental shelf extending some 100 or 1 5 0  
miles from our shores form a f ine breeding place 
for fish of  all kinds ; it is an excellent hiding 
p lace for submarines and s ince it is a continua­
t ion o f  our cont inent , it probably contains o il ,  
and other resources s imilar t o  tho se found in 
our s tates . 33 
The le tter , the refore , sugges ted the advisabili ty o f  la1ing the ground 
work for avail ing the U . S .  of the r i c hes in the submerged l and and in 
the wat e r s  ove r them . Nevertheless , the letter recognized t he legal 
problems that would accrue in the internat ional scene , and therefore . 
advised the government to evolve a new concep t o f' maritime terr itorial 
limits beyond three miles . 
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Franklin D .  Roosevelt  held o f fice when 
these le t t e rs arrived . He deve loped a greater int eres t in the subj ec t 
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mat ter and concluded that , " the o l d  three-mile limit o r  t he twenty-mile 
35 limit should be super seded by a rule of conunon sense . . .  The President 
reque sted the es tab lishment of an int erdepartmental board to  invest igate 
nll areas of the continental fisheries issue s  including submarine areas . 
The final result o f  the s tudy by the S tate Department , Interior Depart-
ment and the Jus t ice Dep artment led  t o  the 1945  Truman Proclama t ion . The 
fisheries p roclamat ion s t res sed that : 
Whereas for some years the government of the 
United States o f  America has viewed with con­
cern the inadequacy of present  arrangements 
for the pro tect ion and perpetuation o f  the 
fisheries resources contiguous t o  i t s  coasts 
• . •  ; Whereas such fisheries resour ces have 
importance to coas t al connnunit ies • • •  and • • •  
Whereas there is an urgent need to prot.ect 
coastal fishery resources from des truct ive 
exp loitation ; having due regard t o  condit ions 
peculiar to each region and s ituat ion • • •  the 
government of the United Stat es regard s it 
as proper to estab l ish conse rv at ion zones 
in those areas o f  the high seas contiguous 
to the coas t s  o f  the United States wherein 
fishing activit ies have been or in the future 
ma y  have deve loped and maintained on a sub­
s tantial scale • • •  the charac ter as high seas 
of  the areas in which such conservat ion are 
in no way thus affecte d . 3 6  
Whether or not the U . S .  p roclamat ion o f  the cont inental shel f and 
subsoil could . be charac terized as legal or illegal , it demonstrated one 
thing and that is  stated in the p roclamat ion , " the exerc ise o f  j ur i s­
diction over the contiguous nat ion is reasonable and j us t . " Whatever 
reason the p roclamat ion gave for the j us t i ficat ion o f  the c laim is 
innnaterial since any coastal s t ate has the right t o  p ro t ect her sea 
resources no mat ter what distance she recommends as the limit of  the 
claim . Thus , Latin American act ion and react ion was in response to  
the U . S . proclamations . If  the U . S .  could protect her economic and 
nat ional interests  in the waters so close t o  Lat in American waters , 
similarly the latter could do likewise .  But this had not been the 
policy of Latin America over the i ssue of the sea af ter the Second 
Wor ld War . The Truman Proclamat ion brought the area of  threat , to 
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the security and economy of Lat in America , from Europe to a c loser 
p roximity to Lat in America herse l f . The threat is  now posed by the ir 
North American neighbor , the United  Stat e s . The Truman Proclamation 
generated in Lat in American s tate s  the need to  watch the act ivi ties o f  
the U . S .  very care fully . The U . S .  p roclamat ion made the explo i tat ion 
of Latin Amer ican waters a p rime t arget for nat ions previous ly fishing 
in the U . S .  waters because of the weaknes s  of Lat in America as a super­
p ower and the consequences these nations would encounter if  they were 
to break the U . S .  proclamat ions . The e ffect o f  such a �holesale exploita­
t ion by foreign vessels in the waters of  Lat in America would mean more 
economic underdevelopment in Lat in America and more dependency on the 
U . S .  as the prime t rader with the Lat in Amer ican countries . The super­
power position of the . u . s .  has b een a mat t er the Latin American states 
feared would eventually evolve into U . S .  dominat ion o f  both p ol it ical 
and econom i.c activit ies of Latin America . Their p olicy o f  alliance with 
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the U . S .  in the field of t rade and military pro tect ion was the ext ent 
to which the Lat in American republics would p ermit their relationship 
to go with the U . S . There were new fo rces in Latin America who wanted 
great er independence from the U . S . , and who viewed ·the s trength of the 
U . S .  as a threat to their freedom with respect to internat ional relat ions . 
The theory expounded so far has indicated tha t  the Lat in American 
states ' reaction t o  the sea issue was generated primarily by the xheno­
phobic reaction first within her periphery and then from among her own 
Lat in American republic s .  This fear o f  domination o f  the sea by one 
ent ity expanded and developed to other areas where the threat had been 
not i ced emerging with greater force and power . They feared the damage 
that could be done to their economy and national int ere st s  if approp riate 
measures were not t aken by them to p rotect the sea close to home . The 
geographical interest  began to be a considerable factor in the Lat in 
American ques t to def end the sea . The reactions and act ions of  Latin 
American s tates during the period before the First World War and after 
the Second World War demonst rated the repercus s ion taken by the Lat in 
American s tates and the inter-Ameri can states as a whole to protect their 
interests against that o f  the warring European nat ions . But when the U . S .  
emerged no t only as a superpower but made a declarat ion on the sea , the 
susp icion of their neighbor grew s tronger and the confidence t hat Lat in 
America once had in the U . S .  began to decline . The Truman Declarat ion 
was viewed as the U . S .  intent ion to use it s newly acquired power to dom­
inate both regional and international relations . Latin American republics 
took dras t ic counter measures to balance the U . S .  claims . Thus , Latin 
American s tates saw their action as " reasonable and j us t , "  in the same 
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ways as  the U . S .  viewed their proclamat ions . Thus , Lat in Ame rican claims 
to the sea have always been necessitated by peculiar event s init iat ed by 
the s trong nat ions who se desire had been to dominate internat ional a f fairs . 
As indicated at the Geneva Conference of 1 95 8  by the Peruvian delegat e ,  
" the great powers which were at p resent resi s t ing the rights claimed by 
coastal states had , in fact , during t he Second World War , demanded that 
small countries o f  Latin America exercise , over a vas t  sea area , rights 
fo j ur isdict ion and control which included the obstruct ion o f  navigat ion 
and t rade . 1 1 37  This s tatement of the Peruvian delegate clearly criticized 
the nature of  the policy set by the U . S .  aft er the Second World War . It 
mus t be remembered that prior to the Second Wo rld War , at the Panama Con­
ference of American S tates , both the United States and the partic ipat ing 
Latin Amer ican states had endorsed the ext ens ion of the lat ter ' s  terri­
torial sea to areas beyond the three-mile limit in order to ward o f f  
enemy ve ssels and act ivities in their region . Af ter the war , the U . S . , 
now the world ' s  mos t  power ful nation , began changing and shaping the 
legal order to suit her interests . The Truman P roclamat ion was viewed 
strictly by Lat in America as U . S .  domination o f  world order . The irri­
tation Lat in American states felt towards this dominat ion and the future 
threat it posed to the nat ional interest s  of the Lat in American s t ates 
precipitated a series o f  claims by Lat in America to areas o f  the sea not 
included in previous c laims . 
The charact eris t ics and nat ure o f  the claims o f  the Lat in American 
nations at this t ime p laced them into three distinct group s . The first 
group , which included Braz il , The Dominican Republic , Guatemala , Nicara­
gua and Venezuela , followed s imilarily the U . S .  claim ,  by claiming the 
cont inental shelf and excluding the super adj acent waters . The second 
group , which included Argentina , Honduras and Mexico , is sued a more 
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modes t  claim. They claimed the cont inental shelf and the waters cover ing 
it . And f inal ly , the third group , Chi le , Costa  Rica , Peru , Ecuador and 
El Salvador , used the method o f  the c ont inental shelf as a measure t o  
claim seaward distance up t o  200 mil es due t o  the narrownes s  of  their 
shel f . 
Mexico was the f irst o f  the Lat in American stat es to extend her 
sea boundariea in response to the Truman Proclamat ion . On October 29 , 
1945 , a month after the Truman Proclamat ion , Mexico issued a President ial 
38 decree containing similar claims to that o f  the U . S .  Argent ina soon 
followed and on October 1 1 ,  1 946 , issued a stronger decree than that of 
Mexico . She proclaimed areas over the cont inental shelf  t o  be inc lusive 
in her j urisdict ional claim. Her j ust i f icat ion for such a c laim was that  
the waters over her cont inental shelf const ituted a transitory zone of  
mineral reserves and aqua t ic life  which are all suscep t ib le to  indust r ial 
· 1 ·  . 39 ut1 1.zat1on . S ince the U . S .  and Mexico claimed their shelves , the 
government of  Argent ina followed suit . The Argent ine Declarat ion read : 
The Government o f  the United States  o f  America 
and of Mexico have issued declarat ions assert ing 
the sovereignty of each of the two countr ies over 
the respective peripheral ep icontinent al seas and 
continental shelves • • . It is hereby declared that 
the Argent ine epicontinental seas and cont inental 
shelves are subj ect t o  the sovereignty power o f  
th . 40 e nation . . •  
Thus , Argentina , which has the mos t  extens ive cont inent al shelves in the 
Southern hemisphere ( 100-300 miles ) declared sovereignty over all this 
area . Panama ,  in 1 94 6 , also issued a decree claiming her cont inental 
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shelf . In 1 947  Chile and Peru followed suit . In 1 94 9  Costa Rica is sued 
her decree , and in 1 95 0 , Nicaragua and El S alvador d id l ikewise . Clearly , 
the main reason for the extension by the Lat in American s tates o f  their 
sea territ ory was their reaction to the U . S .  p roclamat ion which had done 
the same . However , while the U . S .  p ro clamat ion provided for innocent 
passage , the Lat in American decrees did not c larify whether or not the 
right to free and unimpeded navigation would be af fected . 
At this point in the history o f  the sea it became evident that 
both the three-mile and the twelve-mile rules , which the maj or marit ime 
powers favored strongly , had become unaccept ab le to the Lat in American 
states . Such rej ect ion by Lat in Americans sur faced in almo st all the 
regional and int ernational conferences held to discuss the sea issue . 
At the 1 95 0  Int er-American Counc il o f  Jur is t s  meet ing to s tudy the regime 
of the territorial sea and quest ions concerning Lat in American claims , 
the maj ority of the Inter-American Counc il o f  Jurists committee members 
rep resented at the meet ing were the nat ions which claimed generous exten­
sion of j urisdict ion over territorial seas . 4 1  These nat ions (Ar gent ina , 
Peru , Chile and Mexico ) took advantage of  the conference to prepare a 
draf t convent ion which accommodated the ext ra-t erritorial claims by the 
other nat ions . Another group at the Confer ence , comprised o f  Brazil , 
Colombia and the U . S . who claimed moderate l imit s ,  obj ec ted st rongly to 
the committee ' s  endorsement of the extra claims of the radical group s  
(Argent ina , Chile , Costa Rica , Peru , Ecuador and El Salvador ) .  But the 
signatory states to tl;i.e draft convention emphas ized that the present 
" internat ional law" granted to the littoral s tates "exclusive sovereignty 
over the soil , subsoi l ,  and waters on its cont inental shelf and the air 
space and s t ratosphere above it . 42  These states  claimed , there fore , 
that all s tates have the right t o  estab lish an area o f  protect ion , to  
cont rol and p revent economic explo itation .  They also expressed the 
view that s tates with a narrow continental shelf have the right , by 
virt ue of  the narrownes s of their cont inental shelf , to establ ish a 
dis tance o f  two hundred naut ical miles from the low wate r  mark along 
4 3  
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their coas t s . This marked the first t ime since the Truman Proclama--
t ion that the issue of  claiming a specific distance in miles was ment ioned . 
The delay in ment ioning speci fic distances was intent ional . The topo-
graphy of  Latin American sea coas t s  shows the irregularit ies of the con-
tinental she lf along the Pacific coas.t of both South and Cent ral America . 
The continental shelves in these areas range from a dis tance o f  ten miles 
in some p laces to about a dis tance of eighty miles in o thers and s ince the 
U . S .  has one o f  the longest continental shelves in the world , the Lat in 
American nat ions calculated that a two-hundred mile claim would b e  j us t i-
fied against that o f  the U . S .  Thus , the two hundred-mile limit was <level-
oped by Latin Ame rica in response to the exclusive fishing and mineral 
rights in the cont inental waters claimed by the U . S . 
The two hundred-mile limit began t o  gain overwhelming support 
I 
among the maj ority of Latin American s tAtes . In 1952 , at the Sant iago 
Conference on Exploitation and Conservat ion o f  Maritime Resources of the 
South Pacific , Peru , Ecuador and Chile were s i gnat ories of the Sant iago 
Declarat ion ,  which not only supported the idea o f  the two hundred-mile 
claims of  Latin America ,  but estab l ished a permanent commission for the 
exp lo itat ion and conservation of the marine resources of that area . The 
purpose was to unify fishing and whaling regulations , and to promote 
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scient ific study and coordinate conservat ion measures aimed at cont rol-
ling the possibil ity of future ext inct ion of some of their fishing resources 
threatened by massive fishing by foreign vessels . At the 195 4  Lima Confer-
ence , Peru , Costa Rica , El Salvador and Honduras claimed this time "exclu-
sive authority" over the two hundred-mile zone . A claim o f  "exclus ive 
authority " over the two hundred-mile limit was made by these s tates as a 
result of  a s tudy undertaken in 1 9 5 0  by the Organizat ion o f  American States . 
The purpo se of such a study was to analyze the effects of the economic and 
j udicial aspects o f  the regimes o f  the continental shelf , the waters o f  the 
sea and its natural resources . The study revealed the resources contained 
in the continental shelf area and beyond in the ocean .  The OAS Council o f  
Jurists  unanimously agreed that the seabed and the subso il o f  the cont. in-
ent al shelf , adj acent to the coastal state to a dep th o f  two hundred met ers 
or , beyond that limit to where the depth allows exploitation of  natural 
resources , shoul d be " exclusive sovereign authority of that state and sub­
j ec t  to its j urisdict ion and contro l . 1 1 4'4 Due to this recommendat ion by the 
OAS Council of Jurists several Lat in American s tates , namely , Chile , Peru , 
Cnsta Rica , Ecuador and El Salvador by 1 9 5 5  had adopted the two hundred-
mile limit including both exclus ive rights to .  f i shing and control of the 
mineral resources . All of  these nat ions began t o  revise their former 
decrees to include the language " two hundred-mile limit . 1 1  Examples t aken 
from Chile ' s  old and new decrees typ i f ied the nature o f  the changes made . 
Art icle 3 . The adj acent sea up to  a distance o f  
fifty kilometers measured from the low-water mark , 
const it�tes the territorial sea and belongs to the 
nat ional domain : but the right of policing , with 
respect to mat ters concerning the security of the 
country and the ob servance of fiscal laws , extends 
up to a distance o f  100  kilometers measured in the 
same manner . 45 
The new decree  read : 
Art icle 7 .  The territory o f  the Republic wi thin 
its present boundaries is  irreducible ; it  includes 
the adj acent sea within a distance of 200 marine 
miles measured from l ine o f  lowest t ide , and i t  
embraces the corresponding cont inental shel f . 4 6  
Supporters of  the two hundred-mile limit cont ended that the 
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principles upon which the three-mile l imit and the twelve-mile cont iguous 
zone were founded no longer fulfilled the security needs o f  the nat ions in 
the international community . Their new decrees and their new drafts called 
for new rules in the area of internat ional law designed so  that the st ronger 
nat ions could not dominate and reflect decisions safeguarding only their 
nat ional interests . According to the Lat in American states , the present 
rise in awarenes s  that the internat ional rules o f  the game are shaped 
only by a few nat ions calls for the transformat ion of internat ional law 
so that it will be applicable t o  all and p rotect the common interest o f  
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all . 
Lat in American Intellectuals and the 200-mile Limit 
This at titude of Latin American states wtth respect to the crisis 
o f  the sea was given considerable support by both the intellectuals and 
the citizenry . The support given by the populat ion as a whole acted as 
a catalyst in encouraging the leadership to take a very radical ro le in 
shaping the common law o f  mankind on the sea . Garcia Amandor , an out-
spoken Cuban intellectual and a member of  the Internat ional Law Commission , 
has j usti fied the two hundred-mile claim o f  the Latin American states . He 
cited scient i fic and moral reasons in j us t ification o f  his support of  Lat in 
America ' s two hundred-mile claim.  Realiz ing the comp lex ecological sys tems 
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wh ich exist  within the two hundred-mile limits , Garcia Amandor  declared 
that it was nece s s ary for Lat in America to Ini t iate measure s t o  preserve 
i t s  fishing from ext inc tion . On the moral issue , he emphas ized the evo-
lutionary changes occurring on the cont inental shelf  of  both the eas t and 
west coas ts o f  the American continents . As a means o f  legit imizing the 
Lat in American claim to the two hundred-mile l imit , he exp lains that the 
wes t  coasts have virtually lost the width of the ir cont inental shelf  
whereas the east coas ts  have a larger cont inental shelf due to  slower 
evolutionary changes . 48  Thus , the more fortunate east  coas t states have 
taken advantage of their large continental she lf and have undert aken 
measures to exp loit them for the well being of the ir subj ect s .  The two 
hundred-mile claim o f  the western s tates o f  the Lat in American nat ions 
meant tha t the se countries have compensated themselves in broader j uris-
dic t ion over the sea in replacement o f  their narrow cont inental shelf , 
there fore balancing the prehistoric geological calamity which nature has 
49 caused to human soc iety . 
Ano ther Lat in American educat or and pub lic ist o f  Ecuadorian 
descent , Teodoro Alvarado�Garaicoa , supported the Lat in American claim 
o f  two hundred-mile limits  by arguing that .the passage o f  time and the 
p rogress of modern armaments  and the discovery o f  new natural resources ,  
has called for modificat ion o f  the classic delineation o f  the t erritorial 
sea . He condemned the three-mile li mit r ule· as illogical and not cons ist-
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ent with the p resent evolut ionary stage, =. o f  technology . The validity of 
the Lat in American claims of a two hundred-mile limit was considered both 
on the governmental and intellec tual level as very logical and morally 
j ust ified . Their challenges ,  on whatever bas i s , showed that Latin· America 
cons idered the tradit ional laws guarding the sea as obsolete . The 
unanimity with which Lat in American nat ions endorsed the two hundred-
mile claim at the Inter-American Council of Jur is t s  meeting held in 
1 9 5 3  demonstrated the emerging homogenity with which Lat in American 
nations would initiate and attack any policy concerning the sea is sue . 
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The only opposition t o  the two hundred-mile limit proposal at the con-
ference came from Brazil , Colomb ia and the United S tates . The fears 
that generated the two hundred-mile claim was expressed by the Council 
in these words , 
It is an obvious fact that development o f  
technical methods for exp loring and exp lo it­
ing the riches of  these zones has had as a 
consequence the recognit ion by international 
law of the right of such states to p rotect , 
conserve and promote these riches , as well as 
to  insure for themselves the use and benefit 
thereof . 5 1  
By 1956 , the opposition from Braz il and Colomb ia had witbered away . A 
greater consensus was �eached on the two hundred-mile claim with the 
only opposit ion coming from the U . S .  By the close o f  the 1956  Mexico 
Conference the Council had unanimously declared that the right to estab-
5 2  
lish the two hundred-mile limit was the sole responsibility o f  each state . 
Included in the draft convent ion o f  the conference was a clear descr ipt ion 
of the resources within the continental shel f up · to the two hu,Jidred-mile 
limit that were regarded as the p roperty o f  the coastal state . These 
included 'all marine resources , animal and vegetable species that live in 
a constant physical and biological relat ionship with the shelf not exc lud-
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ing the bethonic spec ies . " The Council reserved the coastal s tates 
exclusive right . to " species closely related t o  the coas t , the life o f  
the country , o r  the needs o f  the coas tal p opulat ion . . .  , when the exis tence 
42 
of certain species has an important relat ion t o  the indus try o f  act ivity 
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essential to the coas tal country . " Among the twenty-one nat ions pre-
sent at the Mexico Conference , as  indicated in Tab le I I I , f ifteen vo t ed 
in favor of the act , f ive abstained and one voted agains t .  
STATE 
Argent ina 
TABLE III 
SECOND INTER-AMERICAN COUNC IL OF JURISTS VOTE 
ON PROVISIONS ON FINAL ACT 
Dominican Republic 
Colombia 
Bolivia 
Guatemala 
Nicaragua 
Brazil  
U . S . A .  
Uruguay 
Paraguay 
Cuba 
Venezuela 
Peru 
Ecuador 
Mexico 
Chile 
El Salvador 
Honduras 
Haiti 
Panama 
Costa Rica 
VOTE 
Yes 
Abstain 
Abs tain 
Abs tain 
Ab s t ain 
Abs tain 
Yes 
No 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Source : Compiled by the author from U . N .  records and U . S .  
Department o f  State documents . 
CHAPTER IV 
LATIN AMERICAN SECURITY CONTROVERSY 
The perception of military , t echnological and economic threats in 
a changing world appear to be s ignificant factors in Latin American exten­
s ions of their sea claims to the two hundred-mile limit . As indicated by 
the earlier pace of developments , the Truman Pro clamat ion galvinized Lat in 
American claims which otherwise would have taken a considerably longer 
period of time to develop to the magnitude of the p ost-Truman Dec larat ion 
period . But the events after Wor ld War II which led the U . S .  to proclaim 
j urisdiction over the cont inental she l f  did no t go unnot iced in La t in 
America . Increasing act ivit ies in Lat in American waters after the Second 
World War had already been observed by the Lat in American states . 
The f ishing industry which had become one o f  the main sources o f  
economic development i n  Lat in America was threatened b y  foreign f ishing 
fleet s .  Unfortunately , no definit ive stat ist ics exist testing the vali­
dity of the argument by Lat in Americans as to the extent to  which these 
foreign vessels posed a threat t o  the fishing int eres ts  o f  Lat in Americ a .  
However ,  reliable statis tics are available which measure the extent t o  
which Latin Amer ican nations depended o n  their own f ishing indust ries . 
Between 1 950  and 1 9 7 0 , as indicated in Table IV , Lat in American nat ions 
have p roduced , in the field of commerce , millions o f  metric t ons o f  fish 
in her South Pac ific waters . Peru ' s records indicate that her gro ss 
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TABLE IV 
GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT AT FACTOR COST 
AND AT MARKET PRICES BY INDUSTRIAL ORIGIN 
Thousands of Millions of Pesos at 1 9 60 Prices 
COUNTRY PERIOD 
Argent ina 1 950- 1 9 6 9  
0 . 4  1 . 0  
Bol ivia 1 9 5 8- 1 9 6 9  
906 2088 
Braz il 196 1- 1 9 6 9  
1200 302 . 8 
Colomb ia 1 9 5 0- 1 969  
1 7 . 8  1 30 . 9  
Chi le 1 950- 1 96 9  
0 . 3 20 1 
Ecuador 1 950- 1 9 6 9  
2545 855 2  
Paraguay 1 9 5 0- 1 9 7 0  
1 . 3 84 . 1 
Peru 1 95 0- 1968  
88 . 3 7 2 9  
Uruguay 1 955- 1 9 6 7  
1 1 4 7  
Venezuela 1 9 60- 1 9 69 
1650  3647  
Cos ta Rica 1 9 5 0- 1 9 7 0  
54 35 1 450 . 3 
El Salvador 1 958- 1 9 7 0  
2 . 0 1 4 . 1 
Guatemala 1 958- 1 9 7 0  
28 6 . 5  403 . 8 
Honduras 1 9 5 0- 1 9 70 
1 9 7 . 2  45 1 . 9  
Mexico 1 95 0- 1 9 70 
152  6 7 5  
Nicaragua 1 965- 1 9 7 0  
1 2 . 8 33 . 2  
Panama 1950- 1 968  
2 . 3 7 . 6  
SECTOR OF ACTIVITY 
Fishing 
Thousands o f  Millions of Pesos 
GDP at factor cost  by indus tr ial origin 
Agriculture , Forestry , Hunt ing , Fishing 
Millions of Pesos 
Hunt ing and Fishing 
Mill ions o f  new Cruz ellscars 
Hunting and Fishing 
Mill ions of . Pesos ( 58  price s )  
GDP a t  marke t - prices and by ori gin 
Hunt ing and Fish ing 
Mill ions o f  Escudo s 
Agriculture , Hunt ing ,  Fishing , Forestry 
Mill ions of  Sucres 
i ishirtg and Hunt ing 
Millions of Guaranies 
Hunt ing and F "lshing 
Millions of Soles ���������· 
Hunting and Fishing 
Millions of Peso s 
Agriculture , Fores try , Hunt ing , Fishing 
Mill ions of Bol ivares 
Agriculture , Fores t ry , Hunt ing , Fishing 
Millions of Co lones 
Hunting and Fishing 
Millions o f  Colones 
Agriculture , Fores try , Hunting , Fishing 
Millions o f  Guetzales 
Agriculture , Fon�stry , Hunting , Fishing 
' Millions o f  Lempiras 
Hunt ing and Fishing 
Millions of Pesos 
Hunt ing and Fishing 
Millions of Co rdobas 
���������-
Forestry , Hunt ing , and Fishing 
Mill ions o f  Pesos 
Source : Stat istical Bullet in for Lat in America , Vol . IX , No . 1-2 , 
June 1 9 7 2 ; United Nations , N . Y .  1 9 72 , pp . 1 -38 7 .  There is  es t imat ed vari­
at ion due to changes in annual market prices of these act ivit ies which were 
not t aken into  cons ideration . 1 9 5 0  marke t prices could be dif ferent from 
1 954  or 1 9 6 0  market prices . The importance of the table is to expose the 
great er economic signif icance of the f ishing industry . 
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domes t i c  product from net fish catch sold at  market p rices had inc reased 
s igni f icant ly . In the same period the Chilean fish catch increased con­
siderably from thousands of metric tons to almo s t  mill ions of metric 
tons raising the gross  domestic p roduct to  a level surpas sing earlier 
fishing records kept by the Latin Americans . The economic bene fit  from 
the fishing indus tries grossed some extra thousands o f  mill ions o f  peso s 
to the gross nat ional product o f  the Lat in American states , rai s ing the 
per cap ita income to a higher level . Peru became the number one bene­
fact or from the fish resources , grossing the highest  monet ary benefits  
and regis tering the highes t in the annual metric tons of  f ish catch . 
This made her the prime producer o f  fish not only in Lat in America but 
also in the world . Chile , the second ranking p roducer o f  f ish in the 
region also ranked fourteenth in the world . 55 Thus , it is no surprise 
that the appearance in Lat in American waters o f  enormous fishing vessels 
from Britain , Japan , Russia and the U . S .  out s ide the three-mile and twelve­
mile cont iguous zone limi ts  after the Second World War were seen as a 
maj or  threat by those republics who now regarded the sea as the ir future 
source of wealth . The invas ion o f  their waters was seen as an unnecessary 
situat ion in which the more t echnologically advanced nat ions were applying 
new techniques and equipment , unknoW!l to the Lat in Americans . The Lat in 
American s tates s t ill utilize the old and the new methods in fishing . The 
developed nations app ly st rictly new methods in fishing in the Latin Ameri­
can waters . Using de tecting sys tems--sonar or - -echo sounders--the advanced 
nat ions were able to interpre t  the informat ion on the exact locat ions of  
the fish , wh ile Lat in American states ' f ishing ves sels had to  fend for the 
fish wherever they could be t:raced . The vessels o f  the advanced nat ions 
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have been equipped with pump f ishing clevices , with light lures t o  att rac t 
the fisheries within the range o f  the suc t ion pump , which draws them out 
of the water and dumps them into the holds of the ves sels . They also 
have int roduced in the waters of Lat in America large factory trawlers 
equipped with very sophisticated nets and p reservatories which allow the 
trawlers to  stay for days and months exp loring and exp lo iting greater 
distances in Lat in American waters without going to their nat ional coas ts 
to dump their catch . These  trawlers have been noted by t he Lat Jn Ameri-
cans to have frozen all the fish caught for several months in the seas 
. h d . 56 wit out ecomposing . The Lat in American states could not see t hese 
deve lopments and act ivities o f  the advanced nat ions in the ir waters  as 
fair and equal compet ition . Thus , when the Truman Declarat ion was pro-
claimed , the Latin Amer ican states took advantage of the s ituat ion and 
enacted measures to protect the interests  o f  their waters from the indus-
trial nations , whose use o f  sophis ticated fishing equipment was de trimental 
to the fishing indus tries of Latin America . The fear o f  over fishing , which 
had long bo thered . the Latin American states , could be regulated in this 
manner . Latin Ame rican nat ions , there fore , embarked on a pol icy of  exp and-
ing their sea limits even though this was contrary to the tradit ional rules 
of the internat ional law of the seas . Tradit ional law was viewed as pro-
mating the interes ts  of the great maritime powers who advocat ed the open 
seas s ince they alone possessed the fishing fleets and the military force 
(see Table V) t o  back the ir vessels  in exploiting the riches of  the s eas 
to the benefit of the ir commerce and indus tries at the expense o f  the 
underdeveloped nat ions . The Lat in American nat ions , therefore , regarded 
· their move as logical . They alone have t o  promote their interes ts j ust 
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TABLE V 
WARSHIPS OF THE POWERS , 1 9 4 6  
---- -
BATTLESHIPS FRIGATES 
CARRIERS DESTROYERS PATROL 
COUNTRY CRUI SERS ESCORTS SUBMARINES CRAFT 
U . S . A .  1 9 7  6 6 3  200 4 2 3  
U . K . 8 6  400 1 19 9 4 3  
USSR 1 1  5 7  100 409 
FRANCE 1 5  4 9  1 4  1 32 
CHINA 2 4 2 3  
ITALY 6 2 2  2 2  
JAPAN 1 8  1 0 4  5 8 7 4  
GERMANY 2 1 5 30 94 
Source : Swarzt rauber Sayre , The Three Mile  Limit o f  Terri torial 
Seas , p .  1 7 1 . " The figures for Italy do not include 3 bat t leship s , 6 
cruiser s , 8 dest royers , 7 submarines and 46  pat ro l  craft surrendered t o  
the Allies . The ·  figures for Japan are the ships s urrendered to the U . S .  
The figures for Ge rmany are the surviving seaworthy ships surrendered and 
divided between the U . S . A . , the U . K . , and USSR. " 
as the marit ime power s have lon g  been p ro tecting theirs . They thought 
that any laxity in policy towards the sea issue would give advantage to 
the already r ich indus trial nations who would eventually monopoliz e  t he 
last resource area le ft on the p lanet Earth . There fore , the Lat in Arneri-
can s tates ' unanimous endorsement of the two hundred-mile l imit was a 
measure intended to  protect the main industry , fi sheries , from dominat ion 
. by the industri&l nat ions . 
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Lat in American Enforcement o f  the Two Hundred-Mile Claim 
At the Int er-American Conferences , it became apparent that  the 
U . S . , a participat ing member at all these conferences , openly re fused 
to recognize the extended terri torial claims o f  the Lat in American 
states . As indicated in Table III , at the Mexican Conference o f  1 9 5 6 , 
the only state which voted against the two hundred-mile limit claim was 
the U . S .  The o ther marit ime powers also re fused t o  recognize the new 
Latin American b oundaries into the sea�  By 1 95 3 ,  the Latin Amer ican 
nat ions who had claimed the two hundred-mile l imit , saw it  would be 
neces sary to defend their claims a gainst the cont inuous violat ions by 
the vessels of the aff luent nations . Mexico was the f irs t Lat in Ameri�an 
nation to be tested . Mexico did not claim the two hundred-mile l imit at 
that t ime . It claimed a moderate nine-mile l imit which , if accepted , 
would limit fishing in the shrimp-rich Gulf o f  Mexico . Despite. the 
Mexican protest , the United S tates , Japan , and Rus s ia cont inued shrimn 
f .  h "  . h G l f  f M . . . 1 . f h M . · " l  1 5 7 is 1ng in t e u o exico in v10 ation o t e exican nine-mi e ru e .  
In July 1 9 5 3 ,  Panama ' s  new territorial claims were cha llenged by the tuna 
clipper o f  the United States , "THE STAR CREST" . Panamanian autho ritie s  
confiscated the tuna vessel for violating the ir claim to t h e  cont inent al 
5 8  shel f .  In Spring 1 95 3 ,  Ecuador followed by capturing U . S .  t una ves sels  
which had entered her two hundred-mile zone . The United Stat es , like the 
rest of the af fluent nations fishing in La t in American waters and refusing 
to recognize  the Latin American claims , viewed the seizure o f  the U . S .  
vessels with mixed reactions . A s cheduled meet ing between o f f ic ials o f  
_the Unitej Stat.es and the Ecuado rian authorit ies_ ,  t o  talk over the seizure 
of U . S .  ves sels , ended in failure . The re fusal by the Ecuadorian Govern-
49  
ment t o  reach an agreement with the U . S .  was in fact due t o  the det er-
mination of the Lat in American states to pressure the af fluent nat ions 
to reco gnize their two hundred-mile claim. At the meet ing the Ecuador ian 
delegate stated that the seizure o f  the U . S .  tuna vessels could not be 
resolved by the U . S .  and Ecuador alone . The Lat in American nat ions with 
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t1"0 hundred-mile claims mus t part icip at e  in the decis ions on the is sue . 
The determinat ion by Ecuador t o  inc lude o ther Latin American nat ions in 
the decis ion over the seizure o f  foreign vessel s resul ted in a closer 
relationship between Ecuador ,  Chile , and ?eru . After the seizure o f  the 
U . S .  tuna vessels , _Ecuador , Chile , and Peru agreed that , irre spect ive o f  
who seized any forei gn ve ssels o r  car$oes violat ing their territor ial 
waters , the proceeds · from such seizures would be divided equally among 
them . The agreement implied that either Peru , Chile , or Ecuador could 
apprehend any foreign ves sels in any of the three nat ions ' territorial 
waters . In addition , none of  them were to enter into any form o f  agree-
nent with any foreign country that would nullify the enforcement of the 
h d d · 1  1 11  f . 1 
60 two un re -mi e ru e on a o reign vesse s .  The agreement reached 
by these Lat in American states guaranteed only to each other the relaxa-
tion of their territorial sea boundaries to the twelve-mile exclus ive 
fishery zone l imit . 
The failure of  the U . S .  t o  reach and agreement with the Ecuadotian 
Government over the seizure o f  the tuna ves s els  in the Spring o f  1 9 5 3  led 
to the U . S .  enactment of "The Fishermen ' s  Pro t ect ive Act of 1954 " . The 
legislation guaranteed reimbursement t o  U . S .  fishermen for f ines that 
. 6 1  might be imposed by Chile , Peru ,  and Ecuado r : The U . S . government would 
seek to secure immediate release of all U � S .  ves sels seized by these Lat in 
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American nat ions and the U . S .  would later seek reimbursement a t  a diplo-
matic level ( Internat ional Court ) .  Such counter measures taken by the 
U . S . did not achieve any great degree of  success . The purpose o f  the U . S .  
appeal to the Int (�rnat ional Court o f  Jus t i c e  was to deter these Lat in 
American nat ions from imposing arbitrary rules contrary to the inter -
national law on foreign vessels in what the U . S .  reco gnized as inter·-
nat ional waters . 
The clash in territorial claims and the determinat ion by these 
Latin American nat ions to protect their economic interest s led to the 
cont inued seizure of foreign vessels irrespect ive of the three-mile rule . 
In 1954 Ecuador again seized two U . S ,  vessel s , THE ARTIC NAID and the 
SANTA ANA off  the wes t  coas t o f  the Ecuadorian island o f  Sant a Clara 
within fourteen and twenty- five miles of the Ecuadorian t errit ory . The 
dramatic s eizure o f  these boats warrant s further discussion . On s ight ing 
the U . S .  ves sels , the naval ves sel  o f  Ecuador ordered them to  s top but the 
two boat s kept on go ing . A warning shot was f ired by the Ecuadorians t o  
no avail . More gunfire from the Ecuadorian naval vessel seriously wounded 
one of the fishermen , thus forc ing both boats to stop . The U . S .  protest  
6 2  was ignored b y  Ecuador which imposed a f ine o f  $49 , 000 o n  the two boat s . 
In 1 9 6 3  Ecuador again seized two San D ie go tuna boat s , THE WHITE STAR and 
THE RANGER and imposed a fine o f  over $20 , 000 on them for violation o f  
territorial waters . 6 3  Peru followed suit i n  1 9 6 7  b y  seizing the U . S .  tuna 
boat s HORNET and CARIBBEAN , twenty miles o f �shore , and impos ing a fine o f  
$20 , 000 on the two boat s . Ecuador , at the same time , cap tured the U . S .  
vessel , DAY ISLAND . Peru followed two months later by capt uring the U . S .  
vessel , MARINE . The U . S .  became weary o f  the seizures o f  her vessel s and 
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gave up hopes o f  having these Lat in American seizure cases re ferred t o  
the International Court of Jus t ice . Both Ecuador and Peru res isted all 
U . S .  effort s to  send the cases to  the Internat ional Court o f  Just ice for 
sett lement . 64 S ince one of the rules for the t rans fer of a case to the 
Internat ional Court o f  Justi.ce for settlement requires concurrent agree-
ment by all part ies , the refusal by any party to  send the case t o  the 
Internat ional Court makes the case untrans ferable . In re sponse t o  these 
seizures by Ecuador and Peru , the U . S .  in 1968 suspended all military 
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sales to  these two countries . Both  count ries ignored the military 
embargo imposed on them by the U . S .  In March 1969 , Peru arrested two 
6 6  
U . S .  boats , S AN  JUAN and CAPE ANNE ,  and imposed a heavy f ine o n  them.  
The U . S .  Congres s could no longer t olerate such act ions on U . S .  vessels . 
Congres s ,  therefore , demanded the recall from Peru o f  the destroyer , 
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ISHERWOOD , which was on loan t o  Peru . The three Lat in American nations , 
in response to  the p ressure exert ed on Peru and Ecuador by the U . S . , 
i s s ued a j oint s tatement in June 1 9 6 9  declaring that the U . S .  had been 
app lying force on the South Pac ific states  to back down from their two 
hundred-mile claim. 6 8  
A t  a meet ing between the U . S .  and t h e  three Lat in American s tates , 
the contract ing part ies rep resent ed by Peru , a&reed to discuss the contro-
versy over the two hundred-mile l imit on the condition that the milit ary 
embargo be lifted . With the military embargo lifted , the number o f  seiz-
. ures declined but continued into the 1 9 70 ' s .  Boat seizures are estimated 
at ninety-two with th� total f ines adding up to $ 7 7 5 , 00o .
6 9  
Unt il a per-
manent solution is reached at the U . N .  level , t he prevalent attitude in 
Latin America favored wholeheartedly the Chilean , Peruvian and Ecuadorian 
5 2  
approach towards the protect ion o f  the two hundred-mile l imit . Even at 
this t ime of conf rontation between Peru , Ecuador , Chile and the U . S .  not 
many o f  the Latin American nat ions have adopted the two hundred-mile 
limit . Yet the Lat in American republics have shown greater support for 
the p rotect ion o f  their f isheries from foreign dominat ion . The greater 
consensus with which the res t  of the repub lics support the C . E . P .  s tates 
is a clear indicat ion of their att itude toward future adopt ion o f  the 
two hundred-mile limit . 
CHAPTER V 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE MINERAL RESOURCES OF THE SEA 
Protection o f  the economic security and the nat ional 
interes t s  o f  the Lat in American nat ions was not confined only to the i r  
fisheries resources . The Truman Proclamat ion on the cont inental shelf  
also  t riggered o f f , among the Lat in American repub lics , the des ire to  
protect the mine ral resources o f  the  ocean within a desirab le limit which 
they re ferred to as thei r territorial limit . By c la iming a two hundred-
mile sea l imit , Lat in American nat ions , in essence , were t ry ing to bar 
the technology of  the af fluent f rom reaching the ocean zone where an 
abundance o f  mineral deposi t s  could be found . Thus , the call for meas-
ures by the Lat in American states to  protect these mine ral re sources was 
a common sent iment shared by all t he Latin American republics . Some o f  
the ir intellectuals , no tably Teres a  H .  I .  Flouret , the Argent ine p ro fessor 
and Teodoro Alvarado-Garac ia , the Ecuadorian pub l icist , point ed out that 
there Ls no distinct ion be tween the le gal st atus o f  the soil and that o f  
the waters above . Flouret indicated that " the sovereignty over the sub-
soil o f  the cont inental shel f  would demand corre lat ive rights ove r the 
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resp ectiire , waters . " Flouret added that if the subsoil is allowed to 
be exp lo ited , it  would automatically a f fect  the waters above . Alvarado -
Garacia also pointed out that " international law , influenced by the p ro-
_ gre ss  o f  modern ?rmaments and now by the discovery o f  new resources , had 
1 17 1 
become obliged to  modi fy the class ic delimination of  the territorial sea • • .  
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The int e l lec tuals explained that the new threat evolving i n  the s e a  from 
the emergence of mode rn technology and discovery o f  mineral resources in 
the ocean could have serious economic consequences for the less  deve loped 
nat ions if they allowed this technology to exploit the new resources in 
the sea . Thus , many Lat in American nat ions supported the "Bioma Theo ry" 
which had been developed in Lat in America to  j us t i fy the expans ion of 
their territorial waters . The Bioma Theory was propounded , especially 
by Chile , Ecuador and Peru , during the init ial s t ages o f  the enactment 
of their two hundred-mile claims . The Bioma Theo ry , the wo rk o f  b io-
logis ts and ecologis ts , explained the b io t ic factors , mainly climate 
and water , as capable of creat ing a part icular situation that would 
p ermit an aggregate of vegetables and animals to  live within i t , eco-
system. Within this ecosys tem, many living communities including man , 
may co-exist in a particular chain , or success ion , const ituting a who le 
called a " Bioma" . This  "Bioma" p o ints out the comp lex o f  l iving com-
munities o f  a region _ which through t ime becomes more homogeneous unt il , 
in its  final phase ,  a complete ent i.ty . (The l iving · things within this 
Bioma become inseparable--one entity . )  An ecosystem could comp rise one 
or more Biomas , but each one o f  these will maintain its unity within the 
. l f < h b . . . 7 2  sy s te m ,  except in t 1e areas o contact wt1ere t ere may e an internn.xing . 
All the complexes that may form a B.ioma are in a s tate o f  dynamic equili-
brium which is subj ect to  the laws of nature . A perfect unity and inter-
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dependence exis ts  be tween the communit ies that exist  in one Bioma . The 
Bioma Theory was , the.re fore , regarded by the Lat in American s t ates as a 
concept of  bio�ogical unity . From it , one can arrive at the pre ferential 
right of coastal count ries to  p rotect their sea s ince the human populat ion 
S S  
o f  the coas t forms part o f  the biological chain which originates in the 
adj oining sea , and which extends from the microscop i c  vegetable  and animal 
life (Fitoplankton and Zooplankton) to the higher mammals inc luding man . 
The Lat in Amer ican states , therefore , deemed it a prime duty o f  every 
coas tal state t o  insure the s afety o f  the sea life in any way po s s ible . 
To allow their sea to be exp loited by the techno logy o f  aliens who do 
not live in their Bioma is , in es sence , a violation of the princ ip al law 
of nature . The removal o f  such re sources from their Bioma by a non­
littoral person would eventually have a drastic consequence on the life 
of the inhabitants o f  that Bioma . 74  
The emergence o f  the Bioma Theory enlightened the Latin 
American s tates to the po tential resources that exis t on the ocean floor 
in the South Pacific and At laµt ic . The new science o f  the ocean has been 
able to sub s t ant iate the fact that these new riches would accrue t o  whom-
ever has the technology to exp lo re and exploit it . Weak in the area o f  
sea technology ,  the Latin American s tates did not hesit ate to  react t o  
the Truman Proclamat ion on the cont inental she l f . They not iced the 
increase in activities of the industrial nations after 1 94S . Count er 
measures were , therefore , deemed necessary by the Lat in American states 
to protect not only their Bioma but also to  see t o  it that their economic 
interests were not lost to the affluent nat ions , who have the needed tech­
nology to success fully carry out exploitative expeditions in areas beyond 
their waters . The use o f  such technology by the af fluent nations in Lat in 
American waters caused great concern to the Lat in American s t ates . As 
. indicated in th� previous chapters the vessels o f  the U . S . , USSR and Japan 
had been s ighted in the Lat in American waters , with modern equipment cap -
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able o f  exploit ing thos e resources which science has revealed t o  exist in 
the Pacific and Atlantic Oceans . A study conducted in 1 9 5 8  and 1 9 5 9  by a 
group o f  U . S .  scientists  on the Pacific Ocean alone revealed about 1 , 700 
billion tons of  manganese nodules . Other mineral contents of  the mangan­
ese nodules were estimated t o  be 16 . 4  billio t ons o f  nickel , 8 b illion 
tons of  copper and 8 . 8 billion tons of c obalt . 75 Among the other minerals 
discovered in abundance in the Pacific were coal , sulphur , iron o re , salt , 
oil , and gas . ( See Tables VI and VII)  Equipment , which included ladder 
bucket dredges , sur face pump hydraulic  d redges , wireline dredges and air 
hydraulic  dredges , began to appear on ves sels beyond the three- mile Lat in 
American waters . 7 6  The Latin Amer ican nat ions reco gnized the pot ent ial 
danger such equipment posed to  them if  the e conomic benefits  from such 
exp loitat ion only improved the al ready superior economic and living con­
ditions o f  the af fluent nat ions . Their own economic imp rovement from the 
additional discovery of mineral resources in the ocean and ocean bot toms 
co uld , in fact , be  severely hampered . The Lat in American stat es , lacking 
technology and unable to compet e  with the affluent states , de clared al l 
the areas o f  the s ea believed t o  contain rich mine ral resources within 
their j urisdict ion . Thus , the Lat in American nat ions ' proclamat ion o f  
the two hundred-mile l imit , in response t o  t h e  Truman Proclamat ion , was 
des igned to  sabotage any intent ion o f  the af fluent to exploit alone the 
resources of the ocean . They thought that the Truman Proclamat ion was 
intended to  bene fit the indust rial count ries alone because their techno­
logical superiority g�ve them the upperhand against those nat ions which 
did no t posses the technical know-how to exploit the riches of the sea . 
Exploitation o f  the waters o f  Lat in America was nothing new , since in 
TABLE VI 
MINERALS FROM THE SEA : ANNUAL PRODUCTION 
(Valued in millions o f  U . S .  dollars ) 
FROM SEA WATER 
Salt 
Magnesium metal 
Fresh water 
Magnesium compounds 
Heavy water (D20 )  
Others (Potassium, 
Calcium, Salts , 
Sodium Sulphate 
TOTAL VALUE FROM SEA WATER 
FROM SEA FLOOR ( Sur face Deposits ) 
Sand and Gravel 
Shell 
Tin 
Heavy mineral sand 
(Vmenite , Rut ile , Zircon , 
Garnets , et c . ) 
Diamonds 
Iron sands 
TOTAL VALUE OF SURFACE DEPOSITS 
FROM SEA FLOOR ( Sub-Surface Depos it�) 
Oil and Gas 
Sulphur 
Coal 
Iron Ore 
TOTAL VALUE OF SUB-SURFACE DEPOSITS 
TOTAL 
1 72 
7 5  
5 1  
45 
4 1  
2 7  
1 
4 1 2  
1 00 
30 
24  
43  
9 
4 
180  
6 ,  100  
26  
335 
1 7  
6 , 4 7 8 
7 , 070  
5 7 
Source : Evan David Luard , "The Control o f  the Seabed . " Origin­
ally produced by Marine Sc ience Affairs--Selec t ing Priority Pro grannnes , 
Annual Report o f  the Pre sident to  the Congress on Marine Resources and 
Engineering Development , U . S .  Government Printing Office , April 1 9 70 
(UN Doc E/4 9 7 3  o f  Ap ril 2 6 , 1 9 7 1 ) . 
TABLE VII 
SELECTED L I ST OF MARINE BEACH DEPOS ITS 
(Maj or  Lat in American States ) 
MINERALS 
5 8 
LOCATION PRESENT REF 
Cos ta Rica HM 
Braz il HM, M2 
Argentina HM 
Southern Ch ile HM ,  Au 
Guatemala HM 
Source : Selected from John L .  Mero , The Mineral Resources o f  
the Sea , Elsevier Oceanography Series , p .  1 2  • .  
HM =  Heavy Minerals (Magnet ite , Umenite , Z ircon , Rut ile , 
Manazite)  
M2 = Monazite 
Au - Gold 
19 2 3 Venezuela had undertaken with the U . S .  the drilling of Venezuelan 
c 7 7 o t .L-shore o il .  But in 1 945 strong Lat in American reaction grew up in 
response to the development of large- scale o ff-shore drilling. and o il 
and mineral research activit ies in t he Latin American waters by the 
affluent nat ions . �fter the 1 9 45 Truman Declarat ion the act ions o f  
the Latin American states reflected their determination to secure 
their waters from the greed o f  the indust rial nations . This was the 
sent iment expressed in the Mexican President ial Decree of  Oc tober 1945 . 7 8 
The activities o f  the U . S .  in the Gulf o f  Mexico was seen as a threat 
by Mexico , which saw the large-s cale buildup of  ·u . s .  o il dr illing equip­
ment in the area as inj urious to its economic int erest s . 7 9  Thes e  act i-
vities generated in Mexico the need to  expand the exis t ing l imit s  in 
order to protect her territorial claims . Failure t o  deal with U . S .  
ac tivities in this area would encourage and allow easy ac cess to the 
U . S .  to exploit the waters beyond her sovereign claim. Such ac t ivi-
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t ies had sp read throughout the waters o f  Lat in America beyond t he 
tradit ional three-mile limit . Out s ide these l imits , oil  dri l l ing r igs , 
float ing is lands , stat ionary plat forms , submers ibles and art ificial 
s truc tures have appeared in the At lant ic and Pac i f ic Oceans . 80 The 
decrees and proclamations which followed these new development s  were 
an at tempt by the Lat in American nat ions to deal with the s ituat ion in 
the o ceans . Chile indicat ed in Art icle 3 o f  her President ial Declarat ion 
that " the adj acent sea up to a distance of f ifty kilomet ers , • . • belongs to 
the nat ional domain. But the right o f  polic ing , with respec t t o  mat t ers 
concerning the security o f  the count ry . • •  extends up t o  a distance o f  1 00 
kilometers . 1 1 8 1  El Salvador , responding to  the new development in the sea , 
· also indicated in Ar ticle 7 o f  a 1 9 5 0  decree that " the territory o f  the 
republic within its  present boundaries ( 2 00 miles ) is irreduc ible ; it 
includes the adj acent sea within a distance of 2 00 marine miles measured 
. . .  It emb races the air space above , the subsoil and the corresponding 
cont inental shel f . 1 1 82 The nature of event s develop ing in the sea after 
the Second World War appeared to have serious consequences beyond the 
control of the Lat in American states . Exp loitat ion and the resulting 
pollut ion , which had already destrqyed some of the life in the sea,  was 
cons idered by the Lat in American s tates to  .have serious imp licat ions for 
their ecosystems in the future if  drastic act ion was no t taken early 
enough to  stop t
.
he colonializat ion o f  the sea by the aff luent . The 
extension of their terr itorial l imit to two hundred miles was intended , 
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there fore , to pro tect the ocean mineral resources and t he marine l i fe 
within the ir Bioma . They regarded t he dest ruction o f  any life in their 
seas as det rimental to the total ecosys tem.  In j ust ifying their claims 
they have realized that any single blow-out from an o f f-shore o il well 
could pollute vast expanses of their wat ers , destroying the ecological 
balance and thus affect ing all the nations within that re gion . They 
have had considerable experiences from the was te mat erials which were 
s t irred up from the sea during the mining and dredging of  the ocean .  
The dumped was te materials from this dredging had resulted in the 
ext inc t ion of some o f  the life in the sea . 8 3 • 
The Military Threat 
The quant ity of military equipment and act ivit ies in the oceans 
after the Second World War also influenced the Lat in American states 
reaction to the Truman Pro clamat ion . The development o f  both U . S .  and 
Soviet military act ivities in the Pacif ic and Atlan t ic Oceans was observed 
by the Latin Amer ican republics with great interest . The Truman Proclama­
t ion was the open declaration o f  the expansion o f  both U . S .  and USSR mili­
tary might in the oceans , which had been regarded as one o f  the mos t  stra­
tegic locat ions for military dominance . The o ceans and their seabeds , 
therefore , became and area for concealment o f  mil it ary equipment and a 
base for nuclear tests . 84 ( See Table VII I )  This military expansion 
reached the waters oi Lat in America within and beyond the tradit ional three­
mile l imit . This r esulted in the Lat in American s tates ' questioning o f  t he 
credibility of  the three-mile rule . The Chilean delegat e ,  at the twenty­
thrid sess ion o f  the UN General Assembly mee t ing ,  pointed out that with 
TABLE VI II  
MILITARY EQUIPMENT OF U . S .  AND US SR IN  THE OCEAN 
AFTER WORLD WAR II 
U . S .  
SUBMARINE AND OTHER SHIP-LAUNCHED MIS S ILES 
Ballis t ic Mis s iles 
Submarine Launched 
From Underwater 
Ballistic Mis s iles 
Surf ace Launched 
From Submarine 
Ballist ic Miss iles 
Ship Launched 
(Des troyers ) 
Cruise Mis s iles 
Ship Launched 
(Cruisers ) 
Sawfly Missile 
A Polaris type 
( in Y Class Sub )  
" Sark" 
"Sark" 
In Service 
Polaris I 1 9 6 0  
Polaris II 1 9 6 3  
Polaris III 1 9 64 
Poseidon 1 9 7 0  
USSR 
In Service 
1969  
1 959  
1 964 
Range 
1 380 f t . M  
1 7 00 ft . M  
2 850 ft . M  
R�nge 
12 , 000 
300 
6 30 
6 1  
Warhead 
0. 7 megaton 
0 .  7 m.:� gaton 
0 . 7 megaton 
Warhead 
1 megaton 
1 megaton 
1 megaton 
" Strela" 1 9 6 1 4 00 kiloton range 
" Scud" 1 95 7  150  kiloton 
Snaddock 1 9 62 2 5 0  kilo ton 
Source : Pacem in Maribus by Elizabeth Mann Borges e .  
range 
range ·  
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the present military escalat ion in the ocean and oceanbed , there were , 
in reality , no international laws governing the mil itary act ivit ies o f  
the seabed . 85 This new military development made Lat in American s tates 
even more dissatis fied with t radit ional law . They see the new mi. J  i. tary 
buildup in the ocean as the bigges t  threat and violat ion of the pr in·­
ciple o f  freedom of  the sea , navigat ion and fishin g .  They charac te:rize 
these activit ies as illegal and s ee them as the greatest threat to their 
security . They realize the threat which the superp owers are beginning 
to pose to their neutral stand on the cold war . The Lat in American 
s tates , there fore , are condemning all military act ivit ies in the sea . 
They openly condemned the superpowers ' tests  on nuclear weapons in the 
sea o ften protes t ing about these act ivities at the internat ional level . 
They saw these nuclear t ests  in the ocean floors as des truct ive t o  the 
life under the sea . Re-emphas izing their "Bioma Theory" , they saw that 
such tests in their waters resulted in extensive pollut ion that would 
86 
exterminate life in their waters and eventually des troy their ecosystem . 
The only recourse availab le to  the Latin American states to  regulate such 
military activities of the superpowers was to extend their t erritorial 
boundaries to the two hundred-mile range . 
The Truman Proclamation led to the new development s which produced 
a more determined effort on the p art of the Lat in Americans not to rescind 
any of their claims on the sea until an acceptable solut ion is reached . 
Solut ions cannot be attained through act ion by individual nation states ; 
but rather mus t come through the inst rumentality o f  the United Nat ions . 
CHAPTER VI 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE GENEVA LAW OF THE SEAS 
CONFERENCE OF 1 95 8  
The law o f  the seas conference sponsored by the U . N .  emerged from 
the desire of the world body to avo id a cri sis and to sett le the differ-
ences in s ea claims . At these conferences the arguments , strategies and 
tact ics app l ied by the delegates o f  Latin American states further support s 
this thesis . As members of  the international community , the Lat in Am:eri-
can nations wanted to have some influence i n  fo rmulat ing the laws of  the 
seas . They refused to recogniz e any tradit ional rule or law designed to 
pro tect the ent ire internat ional community whi ch they had not helped to 
forlllll at e .  They re fused to  recogniz e  any rule made by the af fluent which 
they regarded as represent ing the interest s o f  the affluent against that of  
the poor nat ions . When the f irst law of  the sea conference under United 
Nations ' auspices opened in Geneva in 195 8 , all the Latin American rep re-
sentat ives were p resent . (See Table IX) The need to nego t iat e an accept-
able solut ion at the U . N .  level r evealed the failure of  the nat ions to 
reach agreement at the regional level and emphasized the magnitude of the 
conflict , especially over the i s sue of territorial claims . It was clear 
that the develop ing nations considered maintenance of the three-mile limit 
as an e f for t by the super p owers to exercise their own intere s t s  on the 
international conununity . Whatever the mot ives o f  the p artic ipating nat ions 
the conference was regarded as a common meeting ground to cod ify the laws 
of the seas which had b een in turmoil since the Second Wor ld War . 
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Argentina 
Bolivia 
Brazil 
Chile 
Colomb ia 
Costa Rica 
Cuba 
Dominican Republic 
Ecuador 
El Salvador 
Guatemala 
Haiti 
Honduras 
Mexico 
Nicaragua 
Panama 
Peru 
Uruguay 
Venezuela 
Paraguay 
TABLE IX 
LATIN AMERICAN NATIONS PRESENT 
AT 1 9 5 8  SEA CONFERENCE 
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Source : Yearbook of U . N .  1 9 5 8  (New York : Columbia University 
Pre s s ) , p .  3 8 1 .  
Even though concept s  o f  nat i onal interests  could be  disrupt ive t o  
the nego tiat ions , the conference was authorized t o  take int o  cons iderat ion 
all aspec ts of national interest including legal , technical , b io lo gical , 
8 7  
economic and poli t ical aspects  o f  the s e a  p roblems . This approach to  
the conference generated wide attendance by U . N .  members who realized that 
refusal to appear at the conference could lead to  a bypas s ing o f  their 
nat ional int eres ts . Realizing the extent t o  which the superpowers have 
dominated the internat ional decision-making mechanism, Latin American 
states came prepared to  part ic ipate fully in the discussions . When the - ' 
conference committees were es tablished Latin Amer ican representat ives 
65  
were elected , among o thers , t o  var ious official posit ions . ( See Table X) 
The Lat in American rep resentat ives re garded this as polit ically quite 
significant . At the conference the p roposals o f  the Lat in American s tates 
centered aro und the twelve and the two hundred-mile limit while that o f  
the advanced nations and their allies centered stric t ly on the three-mile 
limit . A princip al p roposal st ipulat ing a three-mile limit with an exclu-
88 sive fishing zone of  twelve miles was int roduced by the U . S .  The Soviet 
Union p roposal reques ted that each individual s t ate  should de termine the 
89 extent o f  its  territorial waters within the three to  twelve mile range . 
The La t in American nat ions proposals at this t ime varied , due to  the fact 
that many were st ill respe c t ing the traditional three-mile law while ques-
tioning its  continuat ion . Colombia , one of the moderate s t ates in the 
region , proposed a twelve-mile limit , while Chile , Peru and Ecuado r ,  the 
more radical nations , claimed that " each state is competent to f ix its 
territ orial sea within reasonable limits . 1 1 90  Mexico , in a j oint p roposal 
9 1  with India , p roposed that  any limit up t o  twelve miles should be accep ted . 
In the fo llowing month durat ion of  the conference , Mexico , along with 
Burma , Co lombia , Morocco , Indone s ia ,  Egyp t , Saudi Arab ia and Vene zuela , 
sponsored the "eight power" p roposal which suggested that t he limi t every 
s tate should claim as their breadth of territorial sea should be up to  
1 · 1  9 2 twe ve mi es . 
to a s talemate . 
The dif ference between these proposals led the conference 
This could be att ribut ed to the fact that the s t at e s  at 
the con ference we re not actually willing to sacrifice their nat ional 
interest  in place o f  other nations ' intere s t . The claims o f  all the 
nations which occurred withou t changing the length of the territorial  
Iimit was an indication that the  p roj ect ion of  the national interes t  of  
TABLE X 
GENEVA CONVENTION OF 1 95 8  CONFERENCE 
ON LAW OF THE SEA 
President o f  Conference 
His Royal Highness Wan Waithayakon Bongsprabo ( Thailand) 
Vice-Pres ident 
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Argentina , China , France , Gua temala , India , Haly , Mexico , Netherlands , 
Poland , USSR , U . A . R . , U . K. , Northern I reland and U . S . A .  
General Connnittee 
Chairman : The Pres ident o f  the Conference 
Firs t Committee : (Territorial Sea and Cont iguous Zone ) 
Chairman : Mr . K .  H .  Bailey (Australia) 
Vice-Cha innan : Mr . S .  Gut ierrez Oliuos (Chi le )  
Rapporteur : Mr . Vladimir N .  Koretsky (Ukranian) USSR 
Second Committee : (Hi gh Seas : F ishing , The Conservation o f  Living 
Resources ) 
Chairman : Mr . Carlos Sucre (Panama ) 
Vice-Chairman : Mr . E . Kr ispis  (Greece ) 
Rapporteur : Mr . N .  K .  Panniter 
Fourth Committee : (Cont inental She l f )  
Chairman : Mr . A .  B .  Perera (Ceylon) 
Vice-Chairman : Mr . R. A. Quarshie (Ghana) 
Rapporteur : Mr . L .  D iaz  Gonzalez (Venezuela ) 
Fifth Connnittee : (Que s tion o f  Free Access to the Sea o f  Land-locked 
Countrie s )  
Chairman : Mr . J .  Zourek (Czechos lovakia) 
Vice-Chairman : Mr . W .  Guevara Arze  (Bolivia) 
Rappor teur : Mr . A. H. Tab ib i  (Afghanis t an)  
Drafting Committ ee 
Chairman : Mr . M. Wersho f (Canada) 
Source : American Journal of Internat ional Law , Vol .  52 ,  1 9 5 8 , 
PP .  830-86 7 .  
the respe ctive nat i ons dominated the con ference . The radical Latin 
Ame rican states s tuck to their demand on the t erritorial sea limit . 
The moderate Lat in American states claimed considerable support fo r 
their extens ions , while the conservat ive Lat in American state s hoped 
fJ I 
the conference could find a bet ter solution t o  the probl ems o f  the sea .  
In an e f fort to break the deadlock , the U . S .  made a p roposal hop ing to 
att ract the conservat ive and moderate Lat in American states . This pro-
posal out li ned a s ix-mile t erritorial rights  z one and a s ix-mile exclu-
s ive fishing rights zone with the p roviso that foreign vessels which had 
tradit ionally fished in such waters could cont inue to do so in the out er 
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s ix miles . This proposal came c lose to  breaking the deadlock with a 
vote of  forty- five out o f  eighty- s ix ,  only seven votes short o f  the two-
thirds maj ority . Ano ther proposal came from Canada , put t ing pressure on 
the claims of  Chile , Ecuador and Peru . The Canadians pushed for a six-
mile territorial sea limit and a s ix-mile exclusive fishing zone without 
any quali ficat ion of traditional foreign fishing rights in the outer s ix 
mi.les . The Canadian proposal was intended to  prevent the U. S .  from fishing 
in their waters and to  deny them any t raditional fishing rights in the outer 
limits of  their territorial  waters . But this proposal also suffered a 
narrow de feat , fail ing to  receive the two- thirds maj ority necessary for 
adopt ion of a resolution . ( See Table XI ) 
Cont inental She l f  Debate 
The cont inental shelf issue was of great s ignificance to the Lat in 
American s t ates . Prior to the 1 9 5 8  confer1�nce , they convened a meeting in 
- 1956  in Ciudad Truj illo , Mexico at which the Dominican Repuc lic had p roposed 
TABLE XI 
PLENARY VOTE ON THE TERRITORIAL SEA 
AND FI SHING ZONE 
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CANADIAN PROPOSAL U . S . A .  PROPOSAL 
THESE LATIN AMERICA..� STATES SUPPORTED THE PROPOSAL 
Costa Rica 
Ar gentina 
Chile 
Colombia 
Ecuador 
El Salvador 
Guatemala 
Panama 
Peru 
Uruguay 
Venezuela 
Mexico 
IN FAVOR OF BOTH 
Paraguay 
Bol ivia 
Braz il 
Cuba 
Dominican 
Repub lic 
Hait i 
Honduras 
Nicaragua 
Source : Selected from U . N .  Document on Law o f  the __  Sea Con ference 
1 95 8 .  
the seabed and the subsoil o f  the cont inental 
shel f and insular terrace , or other submarine 
areas , adj acent to the coastal s t at e ; outs ide 
the area o f  the territorial sea , and to a depth 
of  two hundred met ers or  beyond that  l imit t o  
where the depth o f  sup eradj acent waters admits  
o f  the  exploitat ion o f  the natural resource3 o f  
the seabed and subsoil , appert ain exc lusively to 
that s tat e and are subj e ct to its j urisdict ion 
and control . 94 
With overwhelming support , a copy o f  the resolut ion was , there fore , for-
warded to the International Law Connnission which had been authorized to 
seek informat ion from nations with respect to  their claims on the sea , in 
order to es tablish the differences and to  pre sent _ ._them .to the conference . 
When the In te rnat ional Law Commis sion Draft on the cont inental shelf  was 
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introduced at the conference i t s  content s d i d  not conform to the Domini-
can Republic ' s proposal . Instead , the resolut ion present ed by the Inter-
nat ional Law Commission signified that  
for  the p urposes o f  these articles , the term 
' Continental Shelf ' is used as referring to  
the seabed and subsoil o f  the submarine areas 
adj acent to the coast but outs ide the area o f  
the territorial , to  a depth o f  2 00 meters 
(app roximately 1 00 fathoms ) or beyond that 
l imit , to where the depth o f  the super 
adj acent waters admits o f  t he exp loitat ion 
of the nat ur al resources o f  the said areas . 95  
Lat in American states received this with mixed feelings but  did not  react 
immediately . The conference proceeded and Lat in American states were 
willing to push forward and support any p roposal that respected and repre-
sented the national claims to the areas within and beyond t he cont inental 
shelf . They showed a strong inte rest in p roposal s  which reques ted the 
es tablishment of an international regime to exercise j urisdic t ion in areas 
beyond the national limits . When the idea o f  establish i n g  an International 
Off ice o f  the Sea , for the sake o f  exp loration and exp lo itat ion of the 
resources o f  the subsoil o f  the continental she l f  was p roposed by the 
representat ive from Monaco it was overwhelmingly supported by the Lat in 
American s tates who saw this as the only means o f  p rotecting the resources 
of the sea from monopolizat ion by the af fluent nations . Such nat ions were 
not particularly responsive t o  this proposal which they deemed det riment al 
to their interests . Their unwillingnes s  t o  support Monaco ' s  proposal 
acco unted for it s failure . Ins tead the German delegate made a proposal 
which required that all nations exp lo ring and exp loit ing the subsoil o f  
the sea mus t exercise self-execut ing rules which would govern their act i­
vities in the sea . 9 7  The affluent nat ions overwhelmingly supported this 
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propo sal . This withering away o f  the int ernat ionalis t approach to  the 
solut ion of the cont inental shelf  and the int roduct ion of a more nat ional 
app roach to  the is sue af fected Lat in American a t t it ndes towards the con-· 
ference . The f i r s t  outward react ion was their open protestat ion over 
the change in the resolution of  the Dominican Republic which was not 
given expression in the resolutions forwarded to  the confe rence by the 
Internat ional Law Commiss ion . The Lat ins emphas ized the ir claim over 
the ent ire cont inental shelf and beyond and int roduced a p roposal which 
they hoped would generate enough support to change the original dra f t  to 
include " exclus ive" and "j urisdiction" to  all the areas of the cont inental 
shelf and beyond . Their  int ension was , there fore , to c laim exc lus ive 
j urisdict ion over thes e areas and t o  prevent the technology of the a f f lu-
ent from invading such areas . This proposal failed . A Phil ippine draft 
which captured the support of the Lat in Americans read "all references in 
these art icles to the ' Continental She l f ' shall be underst ood to apply to 
s imilar submarine areas adj acent t o  and surround ing the coast is lands . " 
This gave the Lat in American s tates a great er cont rol o f  the areas beyond 
the ir narrow cont inental shelf , but neverthe les s , they would not be fully 
satisfied unt il they could gain the accep t ance of  sove reign control over 
these areas rather than the exc lus ive r i ght which the conference favored . 
The Latin American states realized that sovereign contro l , if  granted , 
imp lied a legal control o f  activi t ies within these areas o f  the sea terr i­
tories . In light o f  this , Mexico made a p roposal concerning the continen­
tal she lf which indicated that 1 1 the coas tal state exercises sovereignty 
over the seabed and subsoil of the cont inental shelf and over the natural 
resources thereo f , to the exclusion of o ther states , phys ical or virtual 
occupation not being a necessary condit ion . 1 1 9 8  Though this p roposal 
failed by a vo te of  24 in favo r ,  37 agains t and 6 ab stent ions , the 
words " sovere ign right " regained ground over the words " exclusive 
right" . Finally , at the Eighth Plenary Sess ion the " sovereign right " 
of the coas tal s t a te over the cont inental shelf  p roposal was unani-
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mously passed over the "exclus ive right " p roposal by a vote o f  5 1 in 
favor , 14 against and 16 abs t ent ions . 99  The f irs t paragraph o f  Ar t icle 
2 on the continental shelf  was wo rded " s overeign right" . 
This victory encouraged the Lat in Amer ican states to init iate 
f urther p roposals . One o f  their success ful p roposals was initiated by 
Argent ina concerning the exclus ive right o f  a coastal s tate t o  exp lore 
and exploit the cont inental shelf . The Argentinian proposal indicated 
that " the right s of the coastal state are exc lusive in the sense that 
if  that s tate does not exp lore or exploit the cont inental shel f , no other 
may undertake these activit ies without its consent . " lOO Argent ina empha-
s ized in an earlier amendment that this exclus ive right o f  the coastal 
stat e  did not affect the freedom o f  navigat ion on the high seas or the 
1 0 1  
air space ; but i t  applied t o  the regulat ion o f  coastal fisheries for 
h f . 1 0 2  t e purpose o conservat ion . Conservation would not extend or pro-
hibit fishing in their sup eradj acent water . However ,  the Argentinian 
amendment was rej ected for fear that it would restrict freedom o f  navi-
gat ion on the high seas . Thus the original proposal o f  exclusive right 
to explore and exploit the cont inental shelf  by the coas tal stat e  p assed . 
One o f  the Latin American p roposals came from the Cuban delegate . It  
stres sed that the nat·ural resource o f  the subsoil and seabed , whether 
1 0 3  livi11 g or  unliving , should belong t o  the coas t al s tate . This pro -
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posal gene rated a lo t o f  discus s ion in the commit tee . I t  was modi fied 
b y  a j o int proposal from Aust ralia , Cey lon , Federat ion of Malaya , India , 
Norway and United Kingdom and passed by a vote . o f  5 9  in favor , 5 against 
d 6 b . 1 04 an a s tent 1ons . At the conclusion o f  the convention on the con-
t inent al she l f , it had become apparent that the Lat in Amer ican states 
ha d gained the upperhand by b locking all the avenues through which the 
affluent nat ions could invade the sea without violat ion of a U . N .  reso-
lut ion . Art icles 1 through 5 of  the convent ion on the cont inent al shelf 
specifically declared all the areas of the sea beyond the cont inental 
shelf as the exclusive and s overeign righ t  of the coastal state . This 
freed the Lat in American repub lics  to begin looking at areas beyond the 
limit s as cribed by the convention . 
High Seas Convention on Fishing and Conservat ion of Living Resources 
The issue of conservat ion of f isher ies which developed around the 
twelve-mile f ishing l imit int roduced in a j o int U . S . -Canadian p roposal was 
not welcomed by the more radical Latin American s t ates , not ably , Chile , 
10 1: Ecuador and Peru . � They s taunchly de fended their exc lus ive c laims , 
arguing that each s tate has a r ight t o  estab l ish a t erritorial sea claim 
with reasonab le limits  to safeguard its  f isher ies from foreign exp lo ita­
t ion .  1 0 6  Mexico exp re ssed the same sent iment so far as p rot e ct ion o f  her 
fisheries was concerned but she settled fo r a maximum of  twelve miles as 
the length o f  her claim to  t he sea . Colomb ia also claimed twelve miles 
indicat ing that it wa� neces sary to protect her fisher ie s  from foreign 
exp loitat ion . El S alvador ,  Cost� Rica and Honduras , who later entered 
into the two hundred-mile c laim o f  the i r  t err ito rial water ,  c i ted the 
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same reasons as the res t  o f  the Lat in American states  who had requested 
extention o f  the tradi t ional three-mile rule to  compensate for the new 
developments in the ocean .  
The conference adopted resolutions which ruled that t h e  claims 
of the radical Latin nat ions to a l imit of two hundred-miles were 
illegal . Art icle 3 o f  the convent ion on high seas emphat ically ruled 
out any sovereigft claim beyond two hundred miles . But at  the same t ime 
there was no ment ion in any o f  the thirty-seven art icles o f  an accep t ­
ab le limit on t erritorial s e a .  The vagueness o f  the resolut ion only 
indicated the dif ficulty in reaching an accep table agreement among the 
nations at the conference . 
Lat in American View o f  the Conference 
The accomplishments of the confe rence d id not imp ress  the Latin 
American s tates . The vic tory they had expected had no t come . The out ­
come actually hurt t he alliance which the Lat in American s tates had 
at temp ted to organize  at the conference . The emerging nations o f  Africa 
and As ia were no t enlightened about the economic and polit ical signif i­
cance of the sea and , therefore , s imply followed in the foot step s of their 
former colonial lords . These new nat ions were in no posit ion at this con­
ference to fo rsake their former mas ters . Even the mos t  national istic 
nations among these newly-emerging nations d id no t see any grounds for an 
alliance with Latin America culturally , economically or politically . Thus , 
they refused or ignored t he Latin American call for solidarity and unity in 
policy app roach against the af fluent nat ions . 
The solidarity with which the Lat in American nations prepared 
for the conference fell apart early . Their vot ing records on reso lu-
tions and pol icy proposals concerning the territorial sea b rought to  
ligh t  some vas t  differences in their claims . Some ranged from three 
to  two hundred miles , irrespect ive of the fact that the 1 9 5 2  Sant iago 
Conference had declared the two hundred-mile limi t  as the sole sover-
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einty and j urisdic tion of each . Some of  the dif ferences that <level-
oped among the Lat in American nat ions could be attributed t o  the sophi-
st icated counterat t ack of the affluent nat ions . The nat ure o f  their 
proposals b roke the backbone of the Lat in American nat ions who had not 
anticipat ed the accommodat ing p roposals which came from the a f f luent 
nat ions . Thus , :the conservative and more moderat e Lat in American 
nations wer e easily won over to support the proposals o f  the af fluent . 
Even on some occasions the r adical Latin American states (Peru , Ecuador ,  
Chile )  were influenced into  support ing some o f  the p roposals o f  the 
affluent , there fore , refraining from their own hard line . 
The adj ournment of  the c onference and the failure to  reach agree-
ment saved the Latin American states from comp letely breaking away from 
their prior agreements .  This gave the Lat in Amer ican s tates t ime to  
rethink the ir diverse claims and their d isorganizat ion and to  regroup 
into a better organized force for future conferences . The f irst  import ant 
move by the Lat in American s tat es was the format ion of the t ripartite  alli-
ance o f  the Southeastern Pac ific , which was generated by the des ire o f  
Lat in Amer ican s tates t o  strike , once and for all , a fatal , blow t o  the 
traditional three-mile limit . The f irs t move among some o f  the Lat in 
Americans , there.fore , was to ful f ill the " Sant iago Declarat ion" o f  the 
I �  
two hundred-mile soverei gnty o f  Lat in American waters . The need for a 
change in pol icy of all the Lat in Amer ican stat e s  became evident . They 
realized from the 1 95 8  conference that future d ire consequences could 
resul t from their failure t o  take co llect ive action . Therefore , any 
a c t ion necessary must be taken t<> protect and preserve their l imited 
resources in o rder to ensure that a s imilar s i tuat ion t o  that which 
oc curred in Chile was prevente d , i . e . , Chile ' s  s tockp ile o f  whales had 
been devas tated mo stly by foreign f ishermen . All the Lat in American 
nations became aware that the lack o f  b ilateral , mul tilateral and 
regional agreements woul d make them vulnerable to the techno logy o f  
the affluent nat ions which had b ecome a threat t o  their resources , 
revenues and nut ritions . They were , there fore , determined to  preserve 
and protec t their weal th from the p illaging vessels of the seafaring 
affl nent nat ions . The only alternat ive envis ioned by the Lat in Aemricans 
was to seek a legal sanct ion to their new extended claims in the ocean s o  
t hat i t  would b e  ille ga l  f o r  fo re i gn  ves.sels to trespass into their sover­
eign waters without p rior not i ficat ion to the coastal s tates . This sp irit 
o f  unity that had began t o  p revail in Lat in America had no t gained full 
maturity ; it  was in its init ial s tages but gathering momentum t o  enable 
them to present a united front for the protect ion of regional interests  
at the fo rthcoming 1 960 conference . 
Lat in America and the 1960  Conference on the Law o f  the Sea 
Eighty-seven nat ions were represented at the second conference t o  
discuss  the p roblems which had not been solved at the f irst  conference . 
These included : a )  the breadth o f  territorial sea and fisheries limi t s , 
b )  the b readth o f  terr ito rial sea bordering each coas tal s tate , c ) the 
es tablishment of fishing zones by coastal s t at es in the high seas con-
tiguous to , but beyond , the outer limit o f  the territorial seas o f  the 
1 08 
coas tal states . The conference fo rmed a committ ee , comprising all 
the repre sent ed s t ates , to  facilitate discuss ions , negot iations and to  
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debate the var ious proposals on  the  subj ect mat ter fac ing the conference . 
The conference stated that the committee o f  the who le could adopt , by 
simple maj ority , a report or p roposal t o  the p lenary sess ion o f  the con-
ference where an affirmat ive vo te of two-thirds of the states present 
would be required for the f inal adoption of any resolut ion .
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Lat in 
American s t ates  saw this rule as benef ic ial to their collect ive interest . 
The na rrowly -defeated American proposal at the 1 95 8  con ference was the 
firs t p roposal to be t abled again . The U . S .  proposal called for a s ix-
mile f ishing z one and a s ix-mile territorial sea .  It  claimed that the 
outer s ix miles should remain \lllder the sovereign right of the coastal 
s t at es but subj ect  to  "his toric right " to the f ishing vessels  o f  states 
which had , p rior t o  the p roposal , been fishing during the f ive-year period 
(known as the base period ) in these water s . l lO The Lat in American s tates 
did no t endorse this p roposal s ince it  would automat ically give the U . S . , 
Japan and Soviet Union the right to exp loit the resources o f  the Lat in 
Americans , which they had been p rotesting about s ince the Truman Declara-
t ion . Similarly , Canada d id no t accept the wording o f  the U . S .  proposal , 
which would give the U . S .  historic right in Canadian waters , while Canada 
could not bene fit fro� any his toric right in U . S .  waters s ince they had 
not developed such a right . Canada , sensing the danger such a proposal 
pre sented to them,  reintroduced its p roposal which narrowly failed to pass 
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at the earlier conference . The Canadian proposal omitted the "histor ic 
fishing right" , which was contained in the U . S .  p roposal , but emphasized 
the six-mile f ishing wat ers and s ix-mile territorial waters . The dif fer-
en ces between the two proposals were settled by the chairman of both the 
U . S .  and Canadian delegat ion resul t ing in the j oint Canada-U . S .  proposal . 
This cot11promise proposal was framed in a way that suspended the "historic 
fishing right" dur ing an inter im p eriod o f  ten years and f ina1 ly gave to 
the coas t al s t ate exclus ive contro l and j urisdiction over this water . 
Those vessels of  states which had respected and fulfilled the agreement 
by f ishing exc lus ively out s i de the fir s t  s ix miles (territor ial sea) 
within the base period ( five years ) from January 1 ,  1 95 3  to  January 1 ,  
1 9 5 8  could cont inue to fish for another t en-year p eriod . When this t en-
year p eriod expired , these foreign vessels would no longer be allowed 
access  to f ish in this outer s ix-mile zone without a bilateral treaty 
with the coastal s t at e . The coas tal state , there for e , was required t o  
claim a l l  her twelve-mile territorial limit a s  fi shing j urisdiction if  
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she refused the b ilateral agreement . The aftermath o f  this j o i.nt 
proposal generated some polit ical maneuvering within the conference . 
The Soviet Union , realizing the support this proposal was gainin g ,  
reint roduced a p roposal which she had earlier t abled a t  the 1 95 8  con-
ference in order to neutralize the j oint U . S . -Canadian proposal . The 
Soviet proposal extended the fishing rights to twelve miles and left 
the opt ion o f  territorial limit from three to twelve miles subj ect to  
the des ire of  each nation . 1 12 This proposal did no t gain much support · �  
from the Lat in American s t ates due to  the flexib le nature of the p ro -
p osal . Mexico sponsored the "Eighteen Power" proposal which came from 
a group o f  thi rd-world nat ions , in res ponse t o  the U . S . -Canadian p ro-
posal . It  provided a scale o f  fishing zone bonuses for t e rritorial 
sea claims between three and twelve miles . The less territorial sea 
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a s tat e claimed , the more fishing zones within the twelve-mile limit 
she would be ent itled to get . 1 1 3  In the end the U . S . -Canadian pro-
posal re ceived a slight maj ority vo te in the committee as a whole . 
Forty-three nations voted in favor o f  the j o int p roposal , thirty-three 
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voted agains t and twelve abs tained . But , at the p lenary ses s ion , 
the U . S . -Canada proposal failed to get a two-thirds maj o rity vo te ; 
receiving a vote o f  54 in favor , 2 8  against and 5 abs t en tions , and 
failed by one vote t o  pass . ( See Tab le XII) 
Both the p assage of the U . S . -Canadian p roposal at  the committee 
leve l and its failure at the p lenary ses s ion could be attributed to the 
degree with which Lat in American s t ates ' support and lack o f  support 
affected the outcome o f  the p roposal . Though the failure o f  the adopt ion 
of the U . S . -Canadian proposal at the plenary session was caused by the 
late withdrawal o f  p romised suppo rt from Chile , Ecuador and Jap an , the 
pas sage of the same proposal at the committee level could be  at t ributed 
to the greater suppor t the proposal received from the Lat in American 
s tates . The Lat in American nat ions were able to  influence the shap ing o f  
the j o int U . S . -Canadian propo sals . A t  the committee leve l ,  Peru and Cuba 
separately proposed that coastal s tates mus t be allowed p r eferential 
fishing rights in the areas adj acent t o  their fishing z ones if this meas-
u r e  would boost the economy of those nat ions which depended on f ish for 
. 1 1 5 their economic development . This  proposal received l i t t le support from 
�he U . S . , C anada and the USSR . The Pe ruvian p roposal was , there fore , with-
TABLE XII 
VOTES ON THE JOINT u . s . -CANADIAN PROPOSAL 
Lat in American Nat ions Cap italized 
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IN FAVOR : ARGENTINA , Aus t ralia , Austria , Belgium ,  BOLIVIA , BRAZIL , 
Cameroon , Canada , Ceylon , China , COLOMBIA ,  COSTA RICA , CUBA , 
Denmark , DOMINICAN REPUBLIC , Ethiop ia , Finland , France , Ghana , 
Greece , GUATEMALA , HAITI ,  Haly See , HONDURAS , Ireland , Israel , 
Italy , Jordan , South Kore a ,  Laos , Liberia , Luxemberg , Malay s ia ,  
Monaco ,  Netherland s , New Zealand , NICARAGUA, Norway , Pakis t an ,  
PARAGUAY , Portugal , S an Marino , South Africa , Spain , Sweden , 
Switzerland , Thailand , Tunisia , Turkey , United States , United 
Kingdom, URUGUAY , Vietnam and Wes t  Germany . 
AGAINST : Albania , Bulgaria , Burma , Byelorus sian S SR ,  CHILE , Czechoslo­
vakia , ECUADOR , Guinea , Hun gary , India , Indonesia , Irac , Libya , 
MEXICO , Morocco , PANAMA, PERU , Poland , Romania , Saud i Arabia , 
Sudan , Ukranian SSR,  United Arab Republic , Soviet Socialist 
Rpublic , VENEZUELA, Yugoslavia , Yemen . 
ABSTENTION : Cambodia , EL SALVADOR , Iran , Japan and Philipp ines . 
1 9 6 0 .  
Source ; Selected from U . N . Document on Law o f  the Sea Conference , 
drawn be fore a vote could be taken on it . The Cuban proposal was vot ed 
down by the conunittee . This did no t deter the Latin Americans from pres-
suring for what they considered neces sary before they would support the 
U . S . -Canadian prop os al .  Braz i l , Cuba and Uruguay , in their j o int amend-
ment to the U . S . -Canadian proposal , indicated that 
the coast al stat e  has the right to claim p re­
ferent ial fishing rights in any area of  the high 
seas adj acent t o  its  exclus ive fishing zone when 
it is scient i fically established that a special 
situation or condit ion makes the exp loitat ion o f  
the living resources o f  the high seas in that 
area of fundamental impo rtance to the economic 
development o f  the coastal state or the feeding 
of  its populat ion . 1 16 
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The argument was made in conj unct ion with Art icle 9 of the 195 8 conven-
tion which requested a special commission t o  find out and determine if  
the s tate requesting the p re ferent ial right had a sc ient i f ic bas is for 
such a claim or whether special conditions actually existed t o  warrant 
the pre ferent ial right . At a hear ing conducted by the special commis s ion , 
both the coas tal state and fishing s tate concerned would have the right 
to p resent all re levant evidence , technical , geographical , biological and 
economic , to substant iate the fact that such a condition d id or did not 
exist . 1 17 The ir amendment t o  the j o int U . S . -Canada p roposal rej ected the 
ten-year phas ing out period clause established in the init ial p roposal ,  
indicat ing that historic fishing rights, mi,ght vary between -respect ive 
states which ent er into agreements whether b ilaterally , mult ilaterally 
. 1 1  
1 1 8 
1 d or reg1ona y .  Argent ina a so p ropose an amendment t o  the U . S . -
Canadian p roposal . Fol lowing the format o f  the Cuban and Peruvian p ro-
posals , the Argent inian proposal stated that coastal stat es could claim 
p referen t ial fishing rights in the high seas o f f  their coas ts  beyond 
twelve miles without necessarily informing fishing states in advance or 
sus taining any burden o f  p roof before an impart ial international commis-
sion , if  the area adj acent to  the exclus ive fishing zone of the coastal 
s tates sus t ained the economic wel l-being of  the nat ion and the populat ion 
1 19 
as a whole . Ecuador , on the other hand , re-emphasized her desire to  
control the ent ire two hundred-mile limit as her te rritorial waters . The 
Ecuado rian delegate argued that no foreign vessel woul d be tolerated in 
the outer s ix miles o f  her t erritorial waters regardless  o f  the "his tori-· 
cal fishing rights" .  The delegate emphas ized that the domestic law o f  the 
Ecuadorians did not respect any hist oric fishing right s o r  any phas ing out 
period . Expressing the paramount and special right o f  Ecuado r in her 
own waters , the delegate of Ecuador s t ressed that "each s tate was free 
to  fix the breadth o f  its territorial sea within reasonable limit . 
1 20  
Though many of  these p roposals and amendment s  d id no t win over the 
af f luent nat ions , they propelled the U . S . and Canada to reconsider the 
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t yp e  of  act ion required in o rder t o  win the support o f  the Latin Ameri-
cans in backing their j oint p roposals . The U . S .  representat ive met with 
the Lat in American s t at es ' represent at ives , Wes t ern European states ' 
representatives and Canadian representatives t o  recons ider many o f  the 
Latin American amendment s  which had favorable support and vote in the 
connnittees . The U . S .  o f fered support for the amendment s  o f  Braz il , 
Cub a ,  Uruguay and Argent ina with the following reservat ions that , a )  
the p rocedure o f  settlement o f  claims under the ausp ices o f  an int er-
nat ional commission set up by Art icle 9 of the 195 8 convent ion on fi shing 
and conservat ion of living r esources of the high seas mus t be app licable 
to c laims by the coastal s tate t o  p referent ial f ishing r ights  in the high 
seas ; b )  that the commission should hear evidence o f  bo th s ides as to  the 
scient if ic proo f j us t i fying  p referent ial f ishing rights for the coastal 
s tate in the high seas beyond the twelve-mile limit before making its  
d . . 1 2 1  ec1s 1on . The U . S . -Canada p roposal thus became officially accep table 
to many of  the Lat in American states ; notably , Argentina , Cuba , Guatemala , 
El Salvador ,  Chile and Ecuador . Panama and Venezuela were the only ones 
who openly showed d is favor for the U . S . -Canada j o int p roposal due t o  the 
fact that their ves ted intere s t s  in the P anama Canal and the Venezuelan 
oil off  her coasts would be  j eopard ized if they were to support the pro-
posal . After the p roposal had passed the connnittee wit h favo rable support 
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from the Lat in Americans , the p ackage deal o f fered at the p lenary session 
of  the p roposal was put to  the vote . El Salvador and Ecuador p ledged to  
abstain from vot ing and the rest  of the Lat in American s tates , exc luding 
Panama and Venezuela , expressed their full support for the j oint U . S . ­
Canadian p roposal . The result of  the vo te showed Ecuador , Chile , Mexico 
and Peru taking a different s t and from their original proposed s t and . 
Thus , the U . S . -Canadian j oint proposal was one vo te short o f  enj oying a 
two-thirds maj ority . The conference j there fore , ended without any deci­
sion on the territorial sea and the cont iguous f ishing z one issue . The 
conference closed with no p lans for a third conference . The failure of  
the twelve-mile limit  to pass was a great victory for the Lat in American 
s t ates . Both the three-mile and the twelve-mile limits have withered away 
leaving the two hundred-mile limit thriving . 
Latin American States Contribution to the Failure of  the Two Conferences 
It  is clear that even after two conferences , a compromise could 
not be worked out between all the nat ions p resent at these conferences . 
Latin America , in part icular , realized the imp ortance o f  the is sue not 
only to  Lat in America but t o  other developing nat ions who could utilize 
the resource s  of the sea , if the aff luent nations ' strong monopo ly was 
regulated , to alleviat e poor nat ions ' economic , social and polit ical 
underdevelopment . In addit ion , it would lead t o  their increased parti­
cipat ion in other decis ions which affected all the human communities . 
By proj ecting such an att itude , it became obvious that greater support 
was needed from the developing nations for the p olicies  o f  the Lat in 
- American nations . This was especially true o f  Chile , Ecuador and Peru 
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who wanted to  take ne cessary act ions to  p revent the affluent nat ions 
from dominat ing and exp loitin g  the riches of the s ea due to the ir mili­
tary superiority and their technological advantage over the developing 
nations . They , therefore , realized that to represent unaware , developing 
nat ion� their nat ional and collect ive policies mus t s tead fast ly be de fended 
unt il the other develop ing nations were more enl ightened on the fact s  o f  
the ocean and the cunningnes s  o f  the affluent nat ions to t ake advantage ' 
of the resources o f  the ocean t o  the det riment o f  the poor nat ions . The 
radical and moderate Latin American s tates maintained that these interes ts 
had to be regarded as national , regional and internat ional . The Latin 
American nations realized that much polit ical maneuvering would t ake 
p lace at the conference in order to finally reach decis ions they con­
sidered to be bene ficial to the interests  of the p oor nat ions . The last ­
minute withdrawal o f  some o f  their votes f rom the j oint U . S . -Canada p ro­
posal , had been a clear indicat ion o f  what political maneuverings entailed . 
This need t o  p ro te ct the nat ional , regional or internat ional int eres t s  o f  
the poor nat ions was demonst rated b y  Lat in America a t  the conference and 
outside the conference in the hope that more support would be generated 
from the poor nat ions in backing Latin American p roposals which rep resent ed 
the int eres t of the poor nat ions ' right to pro tect  their resources in the 
ocean . 
All of the af fluent nations and some o f  the enlightened develop ing 
nat ions also  showed greater considerat ion for their national interest but 
this was mixed with the collect ive interest o f  their colleagues . The 
national intere s t  of many nat ions p revailed at these two conferences . As 
indicated in the U . S .  delegat ion leader Arthur Dean ' s test imony to the U . S .  
Senate , " The Unit ed States is making extensive preparat ions • . • with the 
hope that agreement on some formula for the b readth of t he terr i torial 
sea and fisheries rights in a conti guous zone , accep tab le to the U . S .  
1 2 2  
will resul t . " This statement b y  Arthur Dean s i gnified one area o f  
the U . S .  national interest which would be  s t rongly emphas ized a t  the 
conference . It is  no wonder t  therefore , that the j o int Canada-U . S .  
p roposal reflected this intere s t  indicated by Dean . In referring to 
other areas o f  U . S .  interes t Dean s t ressed that , "our navy would l ike 
84 
to see as narrow a terri torial sea as possible in o rder t o  preserve the 
maximum pos s ibility o f dep loyment , t rans it and maneuvering ab ility on and 
over the high seas , free from the j urisdict ional control of individual 
1 2 3  s tates . " Reiterating the advice given to h im b y  Admiral Arleigh Burke , 
Chief Naval Of ficer , on the p reservation of  U . S . seap ower , Dean said that 
the "naval forces are more important in the miss il e  age than ever before . 
Mobility is a primary capability o f  the navy to  move unhampered , to 
wherever i t  is needed to support American foreign policy . "  His reason 
for s uch an attitude was that free access t o  the sea for the navy t o  
support American foreign policy would be a great contribution o f  United 
S d h f f . " li . 
1 2 4  
t ates seapower towar t e pro gress o ree c ivi z at ion . From such 
a tes timony by Dean to the U . S .  Senate , it was evident at the two confer-
ences that the U . S .  p roposals and policy stands were primarily concerned 
for her security interest and thus any e f fo rt by the conference t o  expand 
the territorial sea could not be app roved by the U . S .  s ince it would seem 
to be in conflict with U . S .  interes ts . In view of  this and the confusion 
that surfaced at the two conferences , the U . S .  made a sacri fice by extending 
the three-mile limit to s ix miles and no t further than that . The extent 
to which the additional three-mile extension o f  the cont rovers ial three-
mi le rule would affec t U . S .  security was not overlooked by the U . S .  as 
indicated by Arthur Dean , 
U . S .  de fens ive cap ability would be so  profoundly 
j eopa rdized by our accep t ance o f  a greater than 
6-mile territorial sea that thos e  responsible for 
p lanning for our defense have concluded that we 
mus t  t ake a position agains t such a course in any 
event . 1 2 5  
The stat ements made by Arthur Dean and the att itude expres sed by 
the U . S .  at the con ferences coul d no t easily be overlooked . It is worth 
not ic ing , there fore , that all the act ions of the U . S .  had been generated 
by the danger to U . S .  foreign policy from the cold war . The U . S .  ab ility 
to dispatch immediately her warship s and their support ing aircraft 
unhampered through the interna tional s t raits would be af fected i f  con-
siderable extens ion was made int o  the sea . Such ext ension conveyed t o  
the U . S .  that  not only woul d it wipe out U . S .  vital passageways on the 
high seas which would then be subj ected to nat ional sovereignty ,  it would 
also make the U . S .  virtually weak in e ffec tua t ing a strong connect ion with 
he r cold war allies and her friends among the non-aligned nat ions . The 
U . S .  was not really ready t o  do this . Even with the limited sacri fice o f  
the three-mile limit to  s ix miles , the U . S .  real ized what that would mean 
t o  their security . They knew that fif ty-two o f  the one-hundred -s ixteen 
international straits would be annexed by the coastal s t ates , thus becoming 
a p art of  their wat ers . Eleven o f  these f i f ty-two s traits  thus annexed by 
the coastal stat es were likely to cancel or  inter fere with the passage o f  
U . S .  warships o r  aircraft . The handicap in defense capability that would 
resul t  from the closure o f  the e leven straits  was considered by the U . S .  
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t o  be tolerable . The U . S .  had refused to  accep t extens ions o f  mo re than 
s ix miles since that would allow eighteen of the one hundred -s ixteen 
s t ra i t s  to be cont rolled by nations who were l ikely to revo ke the rules 
p ermit ting U . S .  pas sage in such wat ers . This was considered an unaccept-
able hinderance on  the U . S .  warships ' operat ion and de fense capabilities . 
Therefore , U . S .  preparat ion for the sea conference and the dras tic act ions 
taken by them had been influenced by the exist ing atmosphere between it 
and the Soviet Union after the Second World War .  The Soviet Union buildup 
o f  military capabilit ie s  in the sea had become the main c oncern o f  the U . S .  
In Dean ' s  argument , it was clear that the S oviet submarines with the ir 
long-range e f fect on coas tal states  would p ose a cons iderable threat t o  
warships o f  the United S t at e s  i f  the territo rial l imits were expanded 
beyond the limits of s ix miles whi ch the U . S .  had endo rsed .
1 2 6  
Dean 
claimed that the Soviet s , relying heavily on the long-range submarines ,  
would have the advantage o f  s t r iking at  U . S .  warship s in their newly-found 
abode , that is , the new neut ral waters o f  the neut ral s tat es as the resul t 
o f  the increase in area o f  this new territory . Their act ivi t ies in these 
extended t e rritorial wat ers could hardly be detected , thus making the U . S .  
submarines and warships  openly vulnerable to  the at tack o f  the illegally 
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hidden Soviet submarines . Such act ivi t ies o f  the Soviet Union according 
to Dean could cause a grave threat to the nat ional security of  the U . S .  
Another effect on the U . S . , if the sea boundaries were allowed t o  be 
extended beyond the s ix miles , according to Dean ' s statement could be 
real ized in the area o f  economic repercuss ions to the U . S .  fishing int erest . 
The extens ion o f  the territorial sea would imp ly that the U . S .  would lose 
· some of her fishing rights in waters which were once free sea but would 
now �e under fore ign control . The United Stat es , therefore , saw as 
unacceptable any move by the conference to extend the territorial 
boundaries from the present s ix miles which they had sacrif iced . 
Thus , the U . S .  saw it ne cessary t o  protect the interest  o f  her 
fishing indust ry so that only a minimum amount o f damage would be 
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done to  her connnercial intere s t . The force with which the United 
States presented these national interests  at the c on ference made it 
imperat ive that Lat in America also represent their collect ive int erests  
with· a certain de gree o f  conviction (which began t o  surface more at the 
1 2 8  
second conference) .  
The Soviet Union had also been determined to  b ring her 
national interes t and security t o  the at tention of the two conferences . 
Though on many occasions Soviet p roposals and policy stands re flected 
support for her allies more than her own interests , in this case it 
re cognized the threat which their cold war enemy , the U . S . , posed t o  
them o n  the mili tary development s o n  the s e a .  They realized the short 
range of American submarines and ,  therefore ,  agreed t o  the idea o f  the 
twelve-mile l imit which was exp ressed in almost  all their p roposals con-
cerning the t erritorial sea . Their obj ect ive , then , had been to  wipe out 
the e ffect ivenes s  of  the U . S .  submarines . Thei r  p roposals also included 
the banning of nuclear tes t s  on the high seas . This was intended t o  sabo­
tage the development of  p olaris submarines which the U . S .  had undertaken 
and were t est ing in the ocean . In addition t o  these demands the Soviets  
aamo:u'flage their real. nat ional interes t  by int roducing resolut ions and 
proposals which largely reflected the interest o f  the landlocked and 
non-ali gned nations in o rder to win their support . Their p roposals 
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requested the abso lute  right o f  landlocked nations to  t ravel acros s  the 
territo ries of adj acent coastal states with free access to their p ort s 
and also allowing the landlocked s tat es  duty free ent ry o f  goods . This 
was a polit ical st rategy to win more influence and support o f  the land-
lo cked nations so that they , in t urn , would tend to support Soviet 
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int erests . The Soviet Union , therefore , sought their national interest 
at  these conferences . 
At these two conferences ,  Jap an and Great Britain were st rong 
advocates of their respect ive nat ional interes t s . Although the sea power 
once possessed by Great Britain had been los t  aft e r  the Second World War , 
he r f ishing power had been very pervas ive in her European wat ers--often 
violat ing the three-mile rule o f  her neighbors in Europe . Thus , any 
e f fort to  increase the territorial limit t o  twelve miles or  beyond would 
have disas terous consequences  on Britian ' s f ishing indust r ies which obtain 
mo st of the ir f ish from the free waters o f  the European Community . Simi-
larly , Japan depended he avily on her f ishing industry . Possessing one o f  
the leading fish industries  in the world , Japan could not support any pro-
posal or res olut ion extending the t erritorial limit . She realized that i f  
such an extens ion was achieved , h e r  fishing interest in the waters o f  India , 
Burma , Thailand , South Vietnam, Cambodia , Kore a and the South Pacific includ-
ing Latin American waters , whe re her f ishing was heavily concentrated , would 
be lo s t  to the coas tal states . The Latin American states had become exposed 
to the polit ical maneuver ings tha t  had characterized both conferences and 
had learned to play the game according to the rules .  Whether individually 
or on a collective basis , they began t o  subscribe to  policies and prop o sals 
which would benefit them t o  the fulles t .  They had become very awa re o f  the 
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fact that the great doctrine o f  intenlat ional law which limited the ter­
ritorial l imi ts to three miles , s ix mile s and twelve mile s ,  respect ive ly , 
had protec ted the commer c ial interes t s  and internal security o f  the great 
powe rs by enab ling their fishing and mil itary ves sels to  app roach all areas 
in the sea c lose to  the three-mile established t erritor ial sea of o ther 
s t ates and to exp loit virt ually every living and non-living resource found 
there . It also allowed the great powers ' military vessels t o  threaten them 
at will without actually infringing on their sovereignty . The Lat in Ameri­
cans viewed the military activit ies of these p owe rful nat ions in their 
waters as a direct infringement and interference with ther dome s t ic secur­
ity . The p roximity o f  these nat ions in their waters was regarded by them 
as a means for invas ion and overthrow o f  the ir legitimate regimes . From 
an economic point o f  view the Lat in Americans viewed the question o f  
explo itation o f  their coasts  as very detrimental . The e conom i.c cr isis  in 
Lat in America had reached its  peak when p rice contro l s  at the interna.t ional 
l evel af fec ted the domestic  prices o f  their exportab le goods such as cof fee , 
woo l , cotton , sugar , tuna , shrimp , lead , z inc and copper .  The rise in p rice 
of raw materials of o the r third wo rld count ries made the Lat in American 
s t ates  aware o f  the need t o  secure an in fluent ial bargaining posit ion at 
these confe rences . This would enable them t o  acquire a bet ter port ion o f  
the newly discovered and o ld resources which the sea provides in order t o  
al leviate their miseries before the affluent nat ions with their superior 
technolo gy claimed the resources from their periphery . Throughout the 
debates , and even after the conferences ,  the Lat in American s tates con­
t inued to dispute any fo reign ves sels that came within the nine-mile limit 
they claim regardless of the t radit ional three-mile limit rule . 
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They vehemently de fended the claim t o  this l imit both a t  the conference 
and outs ide the conference , and refused to  support any p roposal which 
did not reflect the nine to twelve-mile territorial limit . The Latin 
American s tates feared that  if  s t rong measures were not embarked upon 
at the conference to recognize and rectify the threat which existed in 
their waters , then the continuous exploitat ion o f  the resources in their 
waters without adequate p rotect ive measures would result in serious con­
:sequences .  The extinction o f  the marine t una would subsequent ly a f fect 
the p roduct ion of the guano dep os it s  (b ird fece s )  which are a source o f  
fertilizer for dome s t ic agriculture and for foreign exports .  Thus , Ecua­
dor , Pe ru and Chile were determined to protect their nat ional interests  
from the  threat faced in  the sea .  This att itude was paramount in their 
act ivities at the conference . At both conferences , Panama fought to p ro­
tect he r nat ional interes ts  with regard t o  the Panama Canal . Panama had 
seen the need to protect her claim to the canal as an historic water , 
th erefore , legally excluded f rom the high seas . Mexico , on the o ther 
hand , desperately fought to exclude foreign ves sels from her fisheries 
in the nine-mile waters . 
The Latin American states did not exhib it  any conformity in their 
overall policy app roach but the degree to  which they de fended their respec­
t ive claims s ignified their unwillingness to concede to  any sort of instant 
arrangement which would be o f  grave consequences in the future . Realiz ing 
the extent to whi ch nat ional and regional interests  dominated the confer­
ence , the Latin American states became less willing to sacrifice any more 
than they had in the past . Cont rary to the reasons g iven by Arthur Dean ,  
the U . S .  represenative , the failure o f  the passage o f  the j o int U . S . -Canada 
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prop osal and the result ing failure o f  the conference could no t be blamed 
on either Chile , Ecuador or El Salvador for their late change in at t itude 
which earlier had been favorable to the j oint U . S . -Canada p roposal . 1 30 
The f ailure of the conference and the j o int U . S . -Canada p roposal could be 
att ributed to the degree with which national and regional int ere s t s  o f  
Lat in America had cap itulated o n  the theme o f  the conference .  The vo ting 
stat ist ics on the p roposals tabled at the two conferences supported this 
point . In addition , the verbal argumen t s  exchanged for and against many 
proposals indicated the unwillingness o f  nat ions to refrain from repre­
sent ing their own nat ional interest s . It  could be argued that while this 
nat ional interes t dominated the p roposals of the affluent nat ions , Lat in 
American s t ates  were split on what  should be regarded as the center on 
which their coilllllon int eres ts  should be focused . Being d ivided in the 
area of collect ive policies , they also showed a lack of cohes ivenes s on 
policy app roach . Their vot ing p at terns reflected a diversity in their 
obj ectives and they were o f t en influenced by the superp owers . They lacked 
homegenity in the p olicies they p ro�ounded and supported,  but they were 
acquiring an awarenes s of the p o l i t ical nature of the con ferences . This  
was the p rime factor in st imulat ing them to  occas ionally form a bloc or 
alliance to propose or  o ffset a p roposa l  that was unfavorable to the 
interests  o f  their s t ates . The eight , t en ,  eighteen and nineteen powers ' 
prop osals which called for contrary resolut ions to those o f  the affluent 
nations at t hese conferences indicate the way Lat in America and some o f  
their third-world friends began t o  view the p olitical nature o f  the 
debates . Lat in America as a who le , there fore , did not hes itate t o  
· attempt t o  ut ilize such tactics which had become p revalent i n  the act i-
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vit ies o f  the a f f luent nat ions so  far  as the conferences were conce rned .  
When referring t o  the extension o f  a broader territorial sea t o  within a 
twelve-mile _ limit the Mexican delegate , Dr . Alfonso Garcia Rob les , indi-
cated that , " It had been suggested that the states , whose fleets  carried 
almost all the wo rld ' s  marit ime transport should be asked why they oppo sed 
h t . 1 3 1  t e e x  ens ion • . • •  He s t ated that the marit ime p owers were opposed 
because the old rule gave them advantages in o ther areas o f  the seas . 
These advant ages he saw as detrimental t o  the int erest o f  all concerned 
and especially the poor nat ions . S imilarly , Peru , Ecuador , Chile and 
El Salvador realized the advantage the j oint U . S . -Canadian p roposal gave 
to the affluent . The degree to which this j oint p ropo sal benefited the 
marit ime p owers p romp ted the f inal withdrawal of support from Chile , Ecua-
dor and El Salvador . The Peruvian delegat e ,  Mr . Ulloa Sotomayor , not ed 
that , " the rules o f  internat ional law had somet imes been unilaterally 
created in the intere s t  of great powers . It  was , t here fore , reasonable 
for certain rules o f  law to be initiated by small s t ates in their legi t i­
mate interest s . 1 32 The Chilean rep resentat ive , Mr .  Lecaro s , also expres sed 
that , " the rise and development o f  the law of the sea had been p rompted by 
one s ingle factor , " this s in gle factor he referred t o  as political , eco­
nomic and nat ional int ere s t . 1 3 3 This  interes t had permeated the defini-
tion o f  the law of  the sea through the centuries . The Latin American 
states saw the j oint U . S . - Canadian p roposal as benef it ing only the int er-
ests of the few. Ecuado r , Chile and El Salvador re fused t o  support the 
p roposal because they · want ed a general review of the international law to  
satisfy all  par� ies and not j us t  a part  o f  the wo rld community . Modern 
technology demands modern laws to pro tect the sea . The Lat in American 
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states have realized that the ques t ion o f  codificat ion o f  legal princip les 
concerning the sea would only be p o s s ible when a comp lete rest ruct ure o f  
the sea has taken p lace t o  accommodate the co llective intere s t s  o f  all . 
In conclusion , the j oint U . S . -Canadian p roposal did not o f fer them much 
security in terms o f  their interests . 
Latin America and the 1 9 70 Convent ion on the Peaceful Uses o f the Seabed 
and the Ocean Floor Beyond the Limit o f  National Jurisdiction 
The 1 960  conference which fai led to settle the sea issue d id not 
make any provision for futur e conferencesr ·on the law o f  the sea but this 
did not deter the Latin American nations from making p reparations for 
future conferences . At this p ar t icular time Latin America like the res t 
of the third world had become conscious of  the wealth to be  exp loited 
from the s eabed by the technologically-advanced nations . This awarenes s 
revitalized in Latin America the need to look into the question o f  the 
uses of the seabed and ocean floor and subsequent ecological hazards 
which might result due to the exploi.tation of the sea ' s resources . 
Though the issue o f  technology had affected the outcome o f  the earlier 
conferences this t ime it had infiltrated into an entirely new area o f  
the sea ' s resources , one wgich the Latin American s t ates viewed with 
the utmo s t  suspicion . These new development s  escalated the race into 
the vast o cean by the technology of the affluent nations . This caused 
a considerab le damage to any effort at  reaching a solution to the sea 
crisis at the international leveL This crisis  in the sea which Latin 
America has long pred�cted and which had influenced the Latin American 
states ' position at the international conferences , was recognized by the 
rest of the developing nations . In response to this awareness , the U . S . 
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became more concerned about the problem . The Nixon Declaration , which 
represented the alteration of the U . S .  policy with respec t  to the influ­
ence of technology in the ocean dep th , recognized for the firs t time " that 
the law of the sea is inadequate to meet the needs of modern technology 
and the consensus o f the international community . "  The U . S . , therefore , 
endorsed that if the international law "is not modernized multilaterally , 
unilateral action and international conflict are inevitab le . "  The Nixon 
Declaration , therefore , indicated that " this is the time , then , for all 
nations to set about resolving the bas i c  issues of the future regime for 
the o cean • • •  and to resolve it  in a way that rebounds to the general benefit 
in the era of intensive exp loitation that lies ahead . 11 1 34 The Soviets 
recognized that the nations of the world community had become aware of 
the riches of the seabed and ocean depth and were very anxious to control 
and conserve these riches . The Sovie t  government had , therefore , consid­
ered how these new resources could b e  regulated and divided when there was 
scarcity or conflict . 1 3 5  
This common attitude resulted i n  the overwhelming support for the 
Malta representative ' s proposal at the 1 9 6 8  U . N .  General Assembly meeting , 
which for the firs t  t ime called for a regulatory centralized authority to 
research and control pollution due to technological presence in the deep 
waters . This resolution ( 2 340 XXII)  was co-sponsored by the Latin Ameri­
can s tates , who also served in the thirty-five member ad hoc commit tee 
entrus ted with the duty of looking into the question of the reservation 
exclusively for peaceful purposes of  the seabed and the ocean floor and 
the subsoil beyond the limits o f  present national j urisdiction for the 
utilization of such resources to b enefit mankind . 1 36 The commit tee was 
TABLE XIII 
MEMBERS WHO SERVED ON THE AD HOC COMMITTEE 
Latin American S tates Capitalized 
ARGENTINA, Aus tralia , Austria , Belgium , BRAZIL , Bulgaria , Canada , Sri 
Lanka , CHILE , C zechoslovakia , ECUADOR, EL SALVADOR , France , Iceland , 
India , Hally , Japan , Kenya , Liberia , Libya ,  Mal ta , Norway , Pakis tan , 
PERU , Poland , Romania , S enegal , Somalia , Thailand , United Soviet 
Socialis t Republic , United Kingdom , Tanzania , United S t ates , and 
Yugoslavia . 
CO-SPONSORS OF RESOLUTION 2 340 (XXII) 
Afghanis tan , Aus tralia , Austria , Belgium, BOLIVIA , BRAZIL , Bulgaria , 
Canada , Sri Lanka , CHILE , COLOMBIA ,  ECUADOR , France , Japan , Kenya , 
Libya , Luxembourg , Madagascar , Malta ,_ MEXICO , Netherlands , Nigeria , 
Norway , Pakistan ,  PERU, Poland , Romania , Senegal , S igapore , Somalia , 
Sudan , Trinidad � and- - Tobago'i Tunisia , Turkey ,  U . A . R . , United Kingdom , 
United S tates , VENEZUELA and Yugos lavia . 
Source : U . N .  Conference Document on Law o f the Sea , 1 9 7 0 . 
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also entrusted with the duty o f s tudying the past and present U . N .  scien-
tific , economic , technical and legal activities with respec t  to the o cean 
floor and to find means of promot ing international cooperation in conser­
vation and exploration of such areas . 1 37 The Latin American intention in 
co-sponsoring this resolution was to cur tail all activities which the 
technologically-advanced nations had undertaken in the ocean floor without 
directly affecting their two hundred-mile claim .  This was indicated by the 
Chilean delegate in a debate that followed the endorsement of resolution 
2340 (XXII ) . The wording of the resolution had made it clear that national 
jurisdiction claims of the nations were in no way included in the research 
· zone which the U . N .  had proposed . The same expression was contained in 
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the arguments  of  the Colomb ian delegate when he argued that the es tablish-
ment of  such an international organization would not affect the r ights of 
the par ties at the Geneva Convention and did not restrict or modify their 
1 . . 138  c aims . The commit tee ' s recommendations ;to the · General ' Assembly , wl:iich 
were contained in four draft resolutions and class ified under resolution 
2467  A-D (XXIII) , reflected the interests  of  the Latin .AI!lerican s tates . 
The resolutions ( a) s tressed the peaceful uses o f  the ocean seabed and 
the ocean floor , (b) s tressed the need for the Secretary-General to 
study the catastrophic  aspect o f  marine pollution , (c)  emphasized study 
by the Secretary-General on the es tablishment o f  international machinery 
to exploit the resources of the sea b eyond nat ional j urisdiction , and (d) 
requested an international oceanographic exploration . The Latin American 
states did not hesitate to unanimously cast their votes in support o f  
these resolutions . They were particularly responsive to resolution D 
which banned all exp lo itation act ivities in the ocean beds and sub soil , 
pending the establishment o f  an interna tional regime in these areas out"'." 
side the national boundaries . Results  o f  the vot ing on the resolutions 
were as follows : 
IN FAVOR AGAINST ABSTENTION 
Resolution A 1 1 2  7 
Resolution B 1 19 
Resolution C 85 9 25 
Resolution D 1 19 
The General Assembly further estab lished a forty- two man committee to 
review the adopted resolutions and to accept proposals which would gener-
ate both national and internat ional programs which would be undertaken 
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during the decade with regard t o  the interes t s  of developing nations and 
to transmit these proposals to the U . N . The result of the review o f  these 
resolutions did no t p lease the Latin American s tates . Their mos t  favored 
resolution D received a mixed reaction though it was adop ted by a simple 
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maj ority (62  in favor , 28 agains t , and 8 abstentions ) .  The large nega-
tive reaction generated in the Latin Americans the determination to adopt 
resolution D without which the deep seas would once again be easily open 
for the affluent nations to exploit . Thus , they argued that any alterna-
tive to resolution D would b e  contrary to the previous affirmation that 
the seabed and the ocean floor beyond the limits o f  national j urisdiction 
were the common heritage of mankind . In the Latin American representatives ' 
arguments to promo te resolution D , they emphasized the comple te domination 
by the affluent nations over the mineral resources of the ocean by virtue 
of  their superior technology . The Mexican representative remarked that 
though resolution D was limited and inexplicit , to find ano ther solution 
equally accep table to the General Assembly would be dif ficult . Thus , the 
obj ective of the draf t  which barred any kind of exploitation and explora-
tion o f  the ocean floor and seabed beyond the limits of national j urisdic-
tion mus t  be retained pending the es tablishment of an international regime 
to exp lore and exp loit for the benefit o f  mankind . The representatives o f  
Uruaguay ,  Chile , Guatemala , Trinidad and Tobago and Ecuador agreed with 
the views outlined by the Mexican delegate . They s tated that the attemp t 
to kill resolution D was the work of  the affluent nations who were trying 
to sabotage the draf t resolution in order to protect their national inter-
ests . The affluent nations had been bitterly oppo sed to the draft reso lu-
tion D .  The United S tates representative showed his opposition to the 
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resolut ion b y  indicating that  h e  would vo te against i t  s ince this draft 
proceeded on an unsound hypothesis that would retard the development o f  
deep s eabed exploration by those nations who had already developed the 
ins truments and scientific means for achieving better results in the 
ocean . To the Latin Americans the issue was not to prevent technologi-
cal undertakings in the deep sea but to expose · the technological advant­
age of nations who have it to use it for reasons of benefiting themselves . 
Unless it moved forward to a p oint where ' every nation could benefit from 
its exploits , the Latin American s tates would continue to show s trong sup­
port for resolution D .  To this argument , the affluent nations unanimously 
responded by indicating that  no one country or group o f countries had 
exclusive use of technology for exploitation of the seabed any more than 
they had exclusive use of technology for exploiting the land resources . 
The Latin American s tates were no t ready to entertain the explanations 
of the affluent nations which they regarded as camouflage -for their real 
interests . In no way were the Latin American s tates convinced that  the 
technology of the affluent nations would not abuse the deep sea in which 
their activities had already escalated to all the areas beyond the national 
j urisdic tion . These activities of the affluent nations in the oceans could 
not reassure the Latin Americans that the sea would be safe if resolution D 
was altered to include national activities in the seabed and ocean floor 
beyond the national j urisdiction of the coastal states . The Latin American 
states ' desire to pressure for the adop tion o f  the draft resolution D 
resulted in the final - testing o f  all the draft resolutions A-D . 
Resolution 
A 
B 
c 
D 
Final Vo tes on Resolutions A-D 
In Favor 
5 8  
1 1 2  
9 9  
5 2  
Ab stention 
40 
1 3  
35 
Against 
1 3  
1 
2 7  
9 9  
With the adop tion of all the resolutions , the 2 6 th session o f  the General 
Assembly endorsed the convening of a conference on the sea to iron out the 
dif ferences on the sea is sue . 
One predominant attitude ob served at the General As sembly meetings 
prior to the third law of the sea conference , was the fear that the Latin 
Ameri cans had over the af fluent nations ' attempt to dominate the outcome 
o f the sea issue . Once again , not only were the Latin Ameri cans afraid 
of the technology of the affluent nations , they realized the degree to 
which the affluent nations were prepared to go to represent their own 
interests , irrespective of  the new attitude expres sed by the affluent 
nations that due to the development o f  modern technology the law of the 
sea mus t  be reconsidered and new laws mus t be made . The argwnent presented 
by the affluent nations in support of their technological activities in the 
oceans and their lack of support for resolution D ,  called for Latin America 
to demons trate as they had done in earlier conferences , their determination 
to represent what they considered to be their vital interests . Thei.r vo ting 
pattern at this General As sembly meeting not only demons trated their will­
ingness to represent their interes ts , but also their desire to pro tect the 
interests o f  all developing countries from that o f  the developed nations . 
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The Latin American s tates ' consensus on any decision on the sea could only 
be forthcoming when the interests o f  all nations had been duly represented 
in the f inal decision . This feeling among the Latin American s tates at 
the General Assemb ly meeting was reflected in their proposals and their 
statements during the floor debates . The Latin American s tates relented 
on so�e issues when the ques tions and proposals o ffered by other nations 
sounded a moderate tone ref lecting the interes ts of the poor nations . In 
such cases , they showed a willingnes s  to modify their basic position and 
consider an alternative proposal . If this alternative demand failed , they 
innnediately returned to their original hard claims . The controversy that 
emerged over resolution D ,  and the type o f  legal regime to be es tablished 
over the seabed in the 1970  convention on the sea , was a typ ical example 
of the Latin American states ' method of conso lidating their activities in 
order to have their interest s  considered . 
The possib ility o f  convening a future conference af ter the 1 9 70 
convention stimulated the Latin American s tates to meet again at Monte-
video to consider policies which , up to that point , had not been homogene-
ous . At the conference , thos e  repub lics present , emphasized again their 
belief that there existed a geographical , economic and social linkage 
between the sea , the lands and the inhabitants . Thus , any norm that was 
to govern .. the limits o f  the national s overeignty and j urisdiction over the 
sea , the ocean floor and the sub soil , and the conditions for exploiting 
these resources , must take account o f  the geographical realities o f  the 
coas tal s tates and mus t  also consider the social responsibilities of the 
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developing nations . The Montevideo Declaration , which received the 
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signatures of Argentina , Brazil , Chile , Ecuador ,  E l  Salvador , Nicaragua , 
Panama and Peru , reiterated that s cientific and technological advances 
in the exploitation of the natural wealth o f  the sea necessitated the 
Latin American action to protect its  living resources from inj us tice o f 
abusive harves ting p ractices . Their declaration contended that such 
abusive harvesting of the sea was liable to affect the ecological con­
ditions of the coastal s tates , a fact which supports the right for coas tal 
states to take the neccessary measures to protect those resources within 
and outside the limit ascrib ed by the traditional law of the sea . The 
claim of the adj acent areas of the s ea would act as an auxillary measure 
allowing regulation of any fishing or . aquatic hunting carried out by 
ves sels operating under the national or foreign flags . This would also 
give the Latin American states the right to conserve , develop and exploit 
the natural resources o f the maritime areas adj acent to their coasts . They 
considered these actions taken at the Montevideo Conference as an accept­
ance of the right o f  s tates to pro tect the resources in their waters with­
out any interference with freedom of navigation or overfly by any foreign 
ship . 
By the end o f  the Montevideo Conference the greater connnunity o f 
Latin America had shown a strong desire to cooperate at all future confer­
ences  in order to fully def end all the principles embodied in the Monte­
video Declaration on the law o f  the sea . This attitude o f  solidarity 
among the Latin Americans b egan to surface at the seabed connnittee con­
vention . The narrative working papers introduced by Chile , Colomb ia ,  
Ecuador , E l  Salvador , Guatemala , Guyana , Jamaica , Mexico , Panama , Peru , 
Trinidad and Tobago , Uruguay and Venezuela embodied mos t  of the Monte-
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v i  eo ec aration . In the sub committee charged with the issue of the 
sea b eyond national j urisdiction , Latin American states reiterated their 
usual argument in either separate or j 9int proposals and working papers . 
They argued that the respons ib ility of  regulating and controlling the 
areas of the sea beyond the national j urisdiction must  be  left in the 
hands of an international organization . They emphasized their support 
for the General Assemb ly Resolution 2574  (XXIII)  of  1969 which was 
reopened for discussion . This resolution barred all activities on the 
ocean f loor and the sub soil until an international regime had been 
developed to administer that area . 1 42 The Latin American states ' con-
tention was that evidence had proven that a number o f  organizations and 
comm.ercial interes ts  of  the affluent nations had already engaged in opera-
tional activities in this area without wait ing for international agreement . 
The affluent nations ' actions called for all nations to conform with the 
provis ions of the General Assembly resolutions which forbade the exp loita-
tion pf the ocean resources until a pe.rmanent solution had been reached 
on the is sue . The Latin American s tates indicated that since resolution 
2749 (XXII) of the 1 7 th December , 1 9 70 voted by the General Assemb ly for-
bade the apportionment of the ocean floor and seabed beyond the limits o f 
national j urisdiction by any state or person , no state or person "natural 
or j uridicial" shall acquire or exercise within these areas any control 
14 3 or authority incompatib le with the international organ to be established . 
The Latin Americans were again opposed by the af fluent nations who viewed 
the Latin American s tates ' action as detrimental to their progress in the 
ocean floor and sub soil beyond the limit of national j urisdiction . The 
- force with which the Latin American s tates met the oppo sition from the 
103  
affluent nations enabled them to generate more support from the island 
communities of the Caribbean who now showed a greater interes t in the 
economic benefits from the sea and the threatening activities o f  the 
affluent nations . This led to  the calling o f  a specialized conference 
of the Caribbean countries at Santo Domingo ,  Dominican Republic , in June 
19 7 2  to unify their collect ive efforts and to reinforce their position 
with respect to the coming law of the sea conference . The approved 
declarations of the conference called the "Santo Domingo Declaration" 
further strengthened the Latin American and Caribbean states ' policy 
approach to the question o f  the sea conference . Bo th the Caribbean and 
the Latin American s tates emphasized the need to apply p ressure on the 
sea is sue with respect to arriving at an equitable solution which would 
render equal opportunities to : all � This they cons idered no t only an 
essent ial condition for peace but als o  a necessary solution to the s ea 
crisis . They believed that the resources of  the sea could be utilized 
for the speedy development o f  the developing nations and any ac tion 
taken by the affluent nations to monopolize these resources would des­
troy the economy and the ecology of the developing nations . They stressed 
cooperation and protection as the mo tto of their debate at the future con­
ferences . They indicated that if the resources of  the deep ocean were to 
be dispensed on an equal basis through harmonization of the needs o f  each 
state and those o f  the international connnunity , they would be willing to 
compromise on the more controversial policies and cooperate with the 
affluent nations to reach a decisive solution over the sea crisis . But 
until then , they found it necessary to pro tect their original claims on 
- the sea . They declared the sovereignty o f  the territorial states , with 
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respect to the sea , to extend to areas adj acent to their internal waters , 
the superadj acent air space and the s:ubajacert.t seabed and subsoil . The 
breadth o f  the territorial sea and its delineation , they cons idered a 
matter subj ect to international agreement acceptable to all nations . 
But since such collective decisions had not yet been reached , they main­
tained that each s tate had the right to es tab lish a limit o f  up to twelve 
nautical miles measurable from the baseline . They agreed to allow inno­
cent passage in these waters as es tab lished by the int ernational law .  
On the subj ect o f  the patrimonial s e a  they indicated their claim 
for the coastal atate to exercise its sovereignty right over the "renewable 
and non-renewable natural resources found in its waters , seabed , and sub­
soil within the area adj acent to the territorial water . " The Latin Ameri­
can nations believed that the coas tal s tates deserved the right to control 
pollution and scientific research within this area to the two hundred-mile 
limit which was considered as the end o f  the patrimonial sea . The littoral 
s tates should try to avo id disputes among themselves for the sake o f s treng­
thening the declaration but if such disputes could not be  avoided , the 
guiding principle to settle all disputes among themselves in the sea would 
be in accordance to · the U . N . procedures s t ipulated in the charter . With 
respect to the continental shelf ,  they declared that the coastal s tates 
have the sovereign right to explore and exploit its resources whether on 
the seabed or the ocean floor to the dep th of two hundred meters or beyond 
to the limit where exploitab le resources could be found but no t outside the 
two hundred-mile limit . With respect to the declaration on the international 
seabed which had been o f  great concern to the Latin American s tates due to 
the exploitation go ing on there , they emphasized that , it is the e.ommon 
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heri tage o f mankind as declared by the U . N . resolution 2 749 (XXV) which 
subj ects the exp loitation and exploration area only to the regime estab-
lished by the general consent of all members of the General As sembly . 
They considered the high seas to b e  an international area - suoj ect 
to indiscriminate use by all members of  the international community and 
sub j ect to international rules and regulations accep table to all . This 
conference showed for the f irst time ever a collective endeavor by all 
the nations in South and Central America and the Caribbean to endors e a 
periodic meeting to review , coordinate and , if necessary , harmonize 
national policies in order to ensure maximum utilization - of their 
resources to of fset the policies , proposals and activities o f the 
ffl . h h . f h 
144  a uent nations wit respect to  t e is sue o t e sea . The degree to 
which all the nat ions supported the declarations demonstrated their col-
lective realization that their regional interes ts must  prevail over the 
interests of the af fluent nations . They mus t  collectively guard agains t 
any activities in their s eas and the international sea that is detrimental 
to their economic development and well being .  Thus , they maintained that 
all policies concerning the s ea at future conferences mus t represent fully 
their regional interests . S acrif ice of regional interests would come about 
only when equitable proposals and agreements wer_e reached which represented 
the interests o f all nations and which gave consideration to the needs o f  
the developing nations . 
This collective interes t developed by the Latin Americans and their 
Caribb ean friends surfaced at the later stages of the U . N . committee on 
seabed and ocean f loor conference . In the Latin American states ' draft 
articles , reso lutions , proposals and working papers submitted to the 
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committee they re-emphasized their stand with respect to the sea issue . 
The draf t articles of Ecuador , Panama and Peru introduced in July 1 3 ,  
19 7 3  by their delegations indicated that , 
"Article 1--The sovereignty of the coastal s tate 
and consequently the exercise of its j urisdiction 
shall extend to the sea adj acent to its  coas t s  up 
to a limit not exceeding a distance of 200 nautical 
miles measured from the appropriate baseline . 
"Article 2--The afore said sovereignty and j urisdiction 
shall also extend to the air space over the adj acent 
sea ,. as well as to its b ed and subsoil . 1 1 145 
Uruaguay ' s  draf t treaty article on the territorial sea also had some 
bearing on the outcome of  the conference and reflected to considerab le 
extent the Latin American policies adop ted in the Santo Domingo Declara-
tion . 
"Article 2--Every s tate is entitled to determine the 
breadth of its territorial sea within limits not exceeding 
a , dis tance o f 200 nautical miles measured from the app lic­
able b aseline • • •  " 1 46 
Brazil also reflected the same attitude . In her draft article on the 
territorial sea she emphasized that , 
"Article 1--Each s tate has the right to estab lish the 
breadth o f its territorial sea wi thin reasonable limits , 
taking !nto account geographical , social , economic and 
national security factors . "  
"Article 2--The breadth of the territorial s ea shall in 
no case exceed two hundred nautical miles measured from 
the b aselines determined in accordance with Article • • •  
on the present convention . " 147 
On the ques tion of the continental shelf ' s natural resources , the guiding 
princip les of the Latin American s tates ' draft articles were the policies 
adopted by the Santo Domingo Declaration . Argentina ' s  draf t article 18  
stated that "a coastal s tate has sovereignty over the resources o f its  
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cont inental shelf .  The said resources includes the mineral and other 
non-living resources • • •  1 1 148 This was the nature of  the resolutions and 
declarations tabled at the colllllli t tee level o f  the conference on the law 
of the sea by the Latin American s tates to subs tantiate the fac t that a 
solution could no t be  arrived at by the conference and they were no t 
ready to rescind their claims either . The degree to which many o f the 
Latin American s tates and their Caribbean neighbors s tres sed this radi-
cal position raises the question o f  whether any concrete means can be 
arrived at , by which the exp loitation o f  the resources o f  the inter­
national sea and the areas beyond the twelve-mile limit could be carried 
out . All the draft articles of  the Latin American s tates openly rej ected 
any proposal which d id not allow for the es tab lishment of an organ , whether 
at the national level or the international level under the U . N . body . This 
organ would be solely entrus ted with the responsibility o f exploration , 
scientif ic research and exp loitation . The dividend resulting from such 
exp loi tation , they concluded , mus t  b e  equitab ly dis tributed to meet the 
needs o f  all nations . Their s tatements and draft articles showed no 
relaxation in their demands and no willingness on their p art  to accept 
any proposals which they believed would give the aff luent nations an 
advantage over the poor nations . With this  s tand by the Latin Americans , 
the af fluent nations were convinced not to relax their ef forts to regulate 
the influence of  the U . N .  body on exploitation and exploration of  the 
international sea and areas beyond the twelve mile-limit . The unwilling­
ness o f  both parties �nd o ther nations to arrive at a concrete solution 
on how the resources of this area of the o cean should be adminis tered and 
the func tions and powers , if any ,  that would b e  performed by the inter-d 
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national organization led the sub committee to es tablish alternatives 
from the conflicting suggestions introduced by Latin America as well 
as the other nations present at the convention , with the intention of 
finding the most  favorable alternatives . 
Alternative A 
All exp loration and exploitation activities in the area could b e  
undertaken by either a contracting party o r  group o f contracting parties , 
or j uridicial persons under their sponsorship and authority but subj ect 
to regulation by authority with regard to rules estab lished for explora­
tion and exploitation in these articles . 
Al ternative B 
All activities of scientific research and exploration o f the area 
and exp loitation of its resources and o ther related activities shall be 
conducted by the authority directly or , if the authority so determines , 
through service contracts or in association with persons natural or 
j uridicial . 
Alternative C 
All exp loration and exp loi tation ac tivities in the area shall be 
conducted by the authority either directly or in such o ther manner as it 
may from time to time determine if  it considers it appropriate and sub­
j ect to such terms and conditions as it may determine . The authority 
may decide to grant licenses for such activities to a contracting party 
or group of contracting parties or through them to natural or j uridicial 
persons under its or their authority or sponsorship including multi­
national corporations or associations . 
Licenses may also be issued for this purpose to international 
organizations active in the f ield of the direction of the authority .  
Alternative D 
All exploration and exp loitation activities in the area shall be 
conducted by a contracting p arty or group o f  contracting parties or 
natural or j uridicial persons under its or their authority or sponsor­
ship , subj ect to regulation by the authority and in accordance with the 
rules regarding exp loration and exploitation set out in these articles . 
The authority may decide , within the limits o f  its financial and techno­
logical resources , to conduct such activities . 149 
In add�tion to these alternatives there was also further consid-
eration for the es tablishment o f  general rules with regards ro safety 
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procedures , work plans , inspection , service payable , revocati.on of  
services , contracts , integr ity of investments and the revocation of 
licenses on the international ocean . 1 5 0  Latin American s tates not only 
favored the Alternative D but also vigorously showed their support for 
immediate establishment of rules and adoption of  such rules in order to 
safeguard their interests and to prevent the need for any delay in adop­
tion of the rules . The af f luent nations sensed defeat if such a has ty 
demand to initiate and exercise rules over the deep ocean was accepted . 
They demanded that any rules conc erning the activities and control of  the 
deep ocean would have their support only with the consultation and approval 
of their experts and agenc ies in charge of the s ea is sue . At this point 
the Latin American s tates began to suspect the intentions of the affluent 
nations towards the economic needs of the develop ing nat ions . Their 
refusal to endorse the making of rules  to guard the deep seas reconfirmed 
to Latin America that the af fluent nat ions were determined to continue to 
play politics with the sea issue and not give in to the demands of the 
poor nat ions . 
In recapitulating on the Lat in American policy approach at the sub­
committee level of  the convention on the seabed and ocean floor , the con­
tinuous refusal of the affluent nations to give in to some of the safety 
measures reques ted by the Latin Ailierican s tates , called for continuous 
research by the Latin American states into the damage that would result 
if the affluent nations had the advantage in the decis ions concerning the 
sea (Table XV) . The . f indings of  such long research had begun to sur face 
in Latin America , the Car ibbean , Africa and Asia . The Latin American 
states were aware of the consequences , if such monopolization in the sea 
TABLE XIV 
THE EFFECT OF OCEAN RESOURCE EXPLOITATION ON 
LATIN AMERICAN LA."!IID RESOURCE PRODUCERS 
Copper : Profoundly affected : Peru , Chile 
Lesser ef fec t : Haiti ,  Bolivia , Nicaragua , Mexico , Cuba 
Manganese :  Profound effect : Brazil  
Lesser effect : Trinidad and Tobago 
Nickel : Profound effect : Cuba 
Lesser effect : Guatemala , Dominican Republic 
Cobalt :  Profound effec t : Cuba 
1 1 0 
Source : Third U . N .  Conference on Law o f  the Sea , pp .  1 8 0- 1 8 2 , 
by the affluent nations was allowed , · This was s trongly and vociferously 
indicated at the convention of  the subcommittee on the seabed and subsoil 
beyond the national j urisdic tion . Thus , the Latin American states endorsed 
strongly the view that the mineral supply o f  the deep ocean must , at all 
costs , be placed under a strong central control � The enormous po tential 
resources in these areas mus t be regulated or else , These - d eep sea 
resources would compete with the monopoly enj oyed for thousands of years 
by the land-based resources (Tables XV ,  A, B ,  C)  and eventually destroy 
the land-based mineral resources economic potential . S ince the deep ocean 
is out of the sovereign control o f  any nat ion-state ,  the likelihood of  the 
affluent nations devising s trat egies to dominate the outcome of  the con-
ferences was seen by the Latin Amer ican s tate s  as a means by which the 
affluent nations could enj oy a monopoly in exploiting and exploring these 
areas to their advantage , subsequently causing further deterioration of  
the market prices of the land-based resources o f. .  the Latin AUlericans , The 
dependence on these land -based resources for national income and as a means 
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TA.ijLE XV (A) 
MINERAL PRODUCTION OF THE WORLD AND LATIN AMERICA 
ITEM 
WORLD PRODUCTION 
EXCLUDING LATIN AMERICA 
LATIN AMERICAN 
PRODUCTION 
Copper 
Lead and Zinc 
Tin 
Precious Metalsb 
Alloying Metalsc 
Ligh t Metalsd 
Miscellaneous Metalse 
�excluding tin) 
Chemical Mineralsf 
Miscellaneous Non-Metallic 
Mineralsg 
Crude Petroleum 
Iron Ore 
6 . 3  
1 1 . 2  
10 . 7  
3 . 6  
10 . 6  
1 3 . 3  
5 . 8  
8 . 8 
5 . 2 
7 . 9  
8 . 1  
-0 . 5  
5 . 1  
- 3 . 1  
-0 . 8 
5 . 6 
9 . 7  
1 . 9 
1 . 1  
-0 . 7  
8 . 6  
24 . 1 
aProduction data for some minerals exclude countries with centrally­
planned economies ( e . g . ,  Mainland China , USSR , and Eastern Europe} . 
bGold , Silver , Platinum . 
cManganes e ,  Chromium , Nickle , Tungs ten ,  Molybdenum , Cobalt , 
Vanadium, Colombuim and Tantalum . 
dAlminium, Magnesium and Titantium .  
e 
Antimony , Mercury , Cadonium , Bery llium , Zirconium and Bismith . 
f Salt , Phosphate Rock , Potash , Sulphur , Pyrite , Borates , Fluospar , 
Sodium Nitrate and Guano . 
gAsbestos , Mica , Graphite , Quartz ,  Talc , Barite , Diamonds , Kaolin , 
Feldspar , Magnesite , and Natural Abrasives . 
Source : Third U . N .  Conference on Law o f  the Sea . 
1 1 2 
TABLE XV (B) 
PRODUCTION OF MINERALS AND METALS BY LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES 
(thousand s of dollars)  
1 945  1 95 0  1 955 
Argentina 3 9 , 1 8 0  7 4 , 0 1 3  1 1 3 ' 7 09 
Bolivia 69 , 556  8 0 , 143 98 , 06 1  
Brazil 4 7 , 808 78 , 947 133 , 1 1 2 
Chile 1 7 4 , 1 3 4  280 , 2 1 7  490 , 240 
Colombia 5 0 , 4 1 5  107 , 7 7 2  1 55 , 1 2 2  
Costa Rica 1 27 3 2  35  
Cuba 1 4 , 548 1 2 , 7 4 1  3 1 , 4 1 4  
Dominican Republ ic 7 4  8 1  223 
Ecuador 6 , 7 8 9  1 0 , 838 1 1 , 2 1 2  
El Salvador 7 5 1  1 , 5 92  561  
Guatemala 89  1 , 1 02 3 , 358 
Haiti 25 1 0 1  1 3 8  
Honduras 2 , 1 67 3 , 983 2 , 207 
Mexico 1 8 5 , 4 93 3 9 7 , 584 546 , 306 
Nicaragua 7 , 3 6 7  8 , 237  8 , 237  
Panama 8 61  4 2  
Paraguay 5 
Peru 5 2 , 9 5 1  1 04 , 589 1 7 9 , 1 7 1  
Uruguay 29  1 7  44 
Venezuela 3 98 2 601  1 1 3 7 9 2 08 9 2 2 287 , 9 7 5 
TOTAL 1 , 050 , 1 7 2  2 , 54 1 , 144 4 , 07 2 , 7 4 5  
Source : Statistical Bulletin for Lat in America , Vol . IX , June 
1 9 7 2 ,  U . N .  
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TABLE XV (C)  
LEADING LATIN AMERICAN NATIONS CRUDE PETROLEUM EXPORT 
COUNTRY 
EXPORT IN 1 968 
(millions of  U . S . $)  
A.  Petroleum as maj or 
foreign exchange · ·· 
earner (aijove c 1Q% , 
o fr total exports) • 
Venezuela 1 , 973 . 9  
Bolivia 
B .  Petroleum as import-
ant foreign exchange 
earner (between 3%-
1 0% of  to tal exports)  
Colombia 40 . 3  
Trinidad and Tobago 29 . 0 
Mexico 4 0 . 8 
c .  Petroleum as Minor 
foreign exchange 
earner ( less than 
3% total exports)  
Peru 1 2 . 5 
Uruguay 0 . 54 
Value of Petroleum as 
a percentage of 
GROSS DOMESTIC 
TOTAL EXP PRODUCT 
69 . 1 1 9 . 9  
7 . 2 � 0 . 4 
6 . 2 3 . 6  
3 . 2  0 . 2 
1 . 4 0 . 3 
0 . 3 0 . 03 
Source : Third U . N . Conference on the Law of  the Sea , Vol . III , 
p .  1 7 9 . 
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of creat ing employment to millions of the Lat in Amer icans , meant that 
certain interests had to be safeguarded until an equitable international 
rule could guarantee every s tate an equal share of the prof its from the 
proceeds from the explo its o f  the high sea and also transfer technology 
to the weaker nations to g ive them a viable competitive position in the 
deep sea . The Latin American s tates believed that this would create new 
capital which would help to alleviate Latin America ' s  economic problems . 
The Latin American states believed that any agreement reached at the 
international level should give considerable advantage to the already 
disadvantageous nations in which category they belonged . They have seen 
as endemic the unwillingness of the affluent nations to accede to this 
appeal . The Latin American states · at tributed the unwillingnes s of  the 
affluent nations to accept the appeal to the fac t  that mos t of the 
mineral resources in Latin Amer ica were once the proper ty of the affluent 
nations . S ince these resources  have become antionalized and now belong 
t o  the Latin Americans , the af f luent nations have taken an offens ive 
att itud e against the conf iscation of their investment s and are anxious 
to s trike back at the Latin Amer icans . If the sea resources provide such 
means of striking back ,  the affluent nat ions see no reason why they should 
no t utilize it . The affluent nat ions , the Latin American states conclude ,  
would not hesitate to d irect all their ac t ivities and investments in the 
tax free and duty free deep sea . The Latin Amer ican states stressed these 
po ints and positions at the convention in subcommittee one , where their 
request for international control  or au thor ity over the d eep seas was 
approved by the maj or ity of the General Assembly . This demand was no t 
· to hamper any progressive sc ient if ic d evelopment in the d eep seas but to 
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ensure that any decision made would not endanger the economic resources 
of their countr ies . 
In subcommit tees two and three , the Latin American states pro­
j ected a similar attitud e  as they had expressed in subcommittee one . 
The attitudes and proposals of the Latin American s tates were dominated 
mo st ly by agreements reached with their C!ar:iJibean neighbors in conj unct ion 
with the pr inciples pf the Santo Domingo Declaration which became the 
guid ing pr inciple of Latin Amer ican policy formation . They began to mea­
sure their territorial claims from the point of  political , economic , and 
military signif icance with respect to the Latin American region in parti­
cular and the poor nations as a whole . The Latin American states were 
willing to sacrifice earlier claims of  sovereign control of the two 
hundred-mile limit . A greater maj ority of  them immediately reversed 
their sovereign control to the twelve-mile -l;f;mit ·:o. . The Lat in American 
states viewed their action as  a means of  speeding up the conference into 
reaching an acceptable solut ion to all part ies and nations . But the Lat in 
Americans d id no t heistate to indicate that if such a sacrif ice was no t 
responded to , it would mean that these Latin nations would reverse back 
to exercis ing exclusive sovereign control over the two hundred-mile zone . 
In all the proposals introduced by the La tin American states at this time 
of the convention , they indicated the twelve mile-limit as a sovereign 
control area , with the exception o f  Brazil and a f ew others . Brazil d id 
not reverse her claim to within the twelve-mile - limit . In her draft arti­
cles submitted to the subcommit tee , she emphasized the desire to establish 
full control over navigat ion and over flight up to two hundred nautical 
miles of her territor ial sea .  Brazil ' s  ac t ion was not viewed by � the o ther 
1 1 6 
Latin Amer ican states as  contrary to the collective approach they had all 
endorsed to take . Ra ther , they saw it a s  a measure correspond ing to the 
policy of collective approach . In the Santo Domingo Declaration , which 
had been the guid ing princ iples of the Latin American states policy stand , 
the declaration on the patrimonial sea emphasized that any nation could 
claim up to two hundred miles , while the article on territorial seas empha­
sized that a state has the right to claim a twelve-mile ·limit territor ial 
sea . Thus Brazil , in claiming two hundred miles and exercising control 
in this area , was actually conforming to the collective endeavor policy 
as exercised in the Santo Domingo Declaration . Brazil ' s ac tion was , there­
fore ,  regarded as exercising Brazilian claim subj ect to national interest 
and regional interest .  Those who supported the twelve-mile· sovereign con­
trol , including Uruguay , declared to subcommittee two that though Uruguay 
exercised two hundred mile economic z9ne r ights , she had limited her 
exclus ive sovereign territorial claim to within twelve nautical miles for 
navigation and overflight . Thus ,  Uruguay indicated her willingnes s  to 
allow innocent passage in the twenty-four mile contiguous zone of  the 
outer twelve to two hundred-mile limit . Ecuador , Panama , and Peru ' s 
proposals exerc ised the two hundred-mile sovereignty and j ur isdic t ion 
but had navigation and overflight control over unspecified bread th but 
it was in a narrower zone . 1 5 1  The provisions entertained in these pro� 
posals of the Latins was .-·exerc.ised . only on the high seas but excluded the 
subsoil ,  which meant that the privilege was given only to overflight and 
navigation , but whenever the resources of  the ocean were included in the 
debate or issue at hand , the Latin American s tates emphasized their eco­
nomic claim up to the two hundred-mile limit . Similarly , they reserved 
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the navigation and overflight over their water s in accordance with the 
Santa Domingo Declaration to vessels and ships of all states , whether 
coas tal or no t ,  excluding military ships . Since they considered the 
passage of military vessels  as involving security matter s , they vehem-
ently requested that all the established legal formalities and agreeable 
rules established for ships with spec ial characteristics be complied with 
in Latin American waters . 
When the question o f  the resources o f  the sea within the national 
jurisdiction was raised in subcommittee two , the Latin American states 
showed strong support for the coastal states to fully control  and pro tect 
the resources in these areas , whether l iving or non-living .  Ecuador , 
Panama ,  and Peru ,  in their draft  articles in this subcommittee indicated 
in Article 8 that , 
"The pro spec ting , pro tection and conservation 
and exploitation of the renewable resources of 
the adj acent sea shall also be subj ect to the 
regulations of the coastal state • • • • 1 5 2  
The three countries indicated though that such measures were only appro-
priate to regulate ac tivities o f  o ther nat ions in such areas until such a 
time that relevant agreement was reached on the international level ,  which 
would s tress cooperation among states and ensure control over such an area 
by investing power in the hands of an international technical organization . 
The La.tin American states regarded any change in policy stand now as limit-
ing their power over these areas and making accessible the explo itation of 
these areas by the industrial nat ions � With the s trong recognition o f  such 
areas as an economic zone , the Latin American s tates had proclaimed the 
resources of  these areas where ,  in the form o f  o il , natural gas , or other 
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mineral resources as belonging to their sovereign right . Argentina ' s 
draf t  article  vigorously s tressed this point by indicating that , 
" the coastal s tate has sovereignty over the 
renewable and non-renewable natural resources 
of  its continental shelf . The resources inc lude 
the mineral and o ther non-living resources of  the 
seabed and subsoil together with living vegetable 
organisms and animals belonging to  sedentary 
species ; that is to say , organisms which at the 
stable stage , either are innnobile or under the 
seabed or are unable to move except in constant 
physical contact with the seabed. or subsoil . 1 5 3  
All the Latin Amer ican draft  art icles t o  the subconnnittee strongly 
expressed the need for the coastal s tates to authorize sc ientif ic 
research and to participate in the under taking of such activities . 
Where the coastal s tates were not dir ect  par t icipants , the Latin 
Amer ican states requested that information on the resul t  of the 
research be disseminated to tho s e  coastal states . The underlying 
as sumption of the La tin American states ac tions and proposals in sub-
committee two was geared towards complete protection of their sea either 
within the twelve mile or the outer limits of the two hundred miles . The 
Latin Amer ican states reco gnized the disadvantageous position in which 
they had been placed with respect to the exploitation of the sea . They 
were concerned at this convention whether there was go ing to be an agree-
ment and if such agreement was pos s ible , they felt that it should not 
overlook the interests of the poor nations . The Latin Amer ican states 
strong endorsement of  the transfer of t echnology to poor nations and the 
dissemination of information on the outcome of scientific research to the 
poor nations , was considered by the Latin American states as a stepping 
stone to reach · an acceptable solution . With such determination to repre-
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sent the posit ion of the poor nations , the Latin American s tates ' 
doctrine of  a two hundred-mile economic zone began to enj oy considerable 
backing from the maj or ity of  the poor nations ,  who found such a claim on 
a two hundred-mile economic zone favorable to the protection of their 
interests from the ravages of  the technology of  the af fluent nations .  
In essence , this hard line po sition taken by the Latin Amer ican states 
with respect to promoting the interests of the poor nations , was intended 
for tha t  purpose . Contrary to general belief that the Latin American 
states were only representing the interests o f  the poor coastal states , 
the Lat in Americans were able to deomonstrate their greater interest  in 
all the poor nat ions by applying in all their proposals terms such as 
"the developing nations " and "disadvantaged nations" without showing any 
favor whatsoever to the coastal s tates . The lack of b ias in the Lat in 
American s tates ' support to the entire range o f  poor nat ions could be 
attributed to the accommodation mad e  on the regional level between the 
landlocked and the coastal states of Latin America . The coastal Latin 
American states assumed that such measures to settle the dif ferences 
between the landlocked and the coas tal  states of  the poor nations were 
either taking place or had taken place in their r egion . The Latin Ameri­
can s tates believed that the Third World nations could never succeed at 
the conference unless they had acconnnodated their landlocked s tates . 
Awareness of the economic crisis that would result if the affluent nations 
sustained domination of the deep seas , has eventually surfaced in the rest 
of the poor nations . · The Latin American sta tes f elt that all the Third 
Wor ld nat ions would make the necessary provis ions to come to the conf er­
ences ready to defend their co llect ive r eg ional economic interes t  which 
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was now threatened rather than the coastal  states of the poor nations 
pushing for their interests . I t  could be notic ed from the pattern of 
voting and policy proposal s  o f  the Third World nations that the dif fer­
ences between the coastal and landlocked poor nations had been accommo� 
dated to a considerable extent . The greater support the landlocked 
states demonstrated for the concept of  the two hundred- mile economic 
zone substantiated the fact that the Latin American states were consider­
ing the total interests of  all the developing nations whether coastal or 
landlocked . Even the advanced nations began to consider the economic zone 
theory of Latin America which they ( the affluent nations) found very bene­
fic ial to their inter ests against the super ior technology of the o ther 
aff luent nations who could eas ily outexploit the l esser developed af fluent 
nations in the deep seas . Canada , for ins tance , began to look into the 
economic zone claim ,  realizing the threat po sed by the super ior technology 
of the U . S . in Canadian waters . Such reactions a s  exhibited by Canada 
could be  cred ited to the Latin American states .  It is therefore conclu­
sive that the Latin American states realized the conflict that would 
arise no t  only among the poor landlocked or shelflocked s tates , but also 
among the landlocked industrial nations whose competitive power in the 
sea would be hand icapped due to their geographical po s ition . The Latin 
American states '  action•· to endorse strong state control of their coastal 
waters and endorsing international regimes in the high seas was d ed icated 
to bring about peace among all nat ions . The Lat in American states demon­
strated this willingness f or peace by redefining their exclusive sovereign 
claim of two hundred miles to a limit o f  twelve miles . This demonstrated 
that Latin Amer ican act ions at al l  the previous conferences on the law of  
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the sea were not motivated by selfish means . ·  Instead it was a response 
to the new developments at sea which they believed were highly detr imental 
to their active existence a s  independent nations . In view of their eco-
nomic and political dependence on the sea any ac tion or inac tion in such 
areas of the world must respect their interests . This reality of  protect-
ing the economic interests in the economic zone became common in many of 
the proposals to shbconnnittee two . In the draf t ar ticle , Canada , India , 
Kenya , Madagascar , Senegal and Sri Lanka supported the Latin American 
economic zone theory , by emphasizing the need f6r >e±t1ier coastal s tates , 
international or regional organizations to manage the seas in order to 
conserve and preserve the living and non-living resources of  the economic 
154  zone . Australia and Norway ' s draf t articles on the continental shelf 
also indicated the need to conserve the l iving and non-living resources 
of the economic zone . 1 5 5  The U . S .  draf t  article to the subcommittee at 
this time began to reflect the need to protect the extinction of  the 
fisheries of the sea and , therefore , endors ed withou.t spec 1fy:ing the exact 
limit of territorial sea to be controlled , the coastal state r ight to 
exercise j urisdiction over and , thus , control the resources in that area . 
The economic zone resolution was , therefore , enacted . 
In subconnnittee three , charged with the duty of f inding an accept-
able solution to scientif ic research , the pollution issue became a para-
mount area of d isagreement • The Latin American states strongly stressed 
the Bioma theory of  the Santo Domingo Declaration . To the Latin American 
states , the need for. the coastal states to promote and regulate the con-
duct of  scientific research within the economic zone a s  well as  adopting 
measures to prevent mar ine pollution were j ustif iable . To ensure Latin 
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American sovereignty over all the resources and activities in this area , 
they are , of course , preventing the destruction of  their ecosystem .  The 
Latin Amer ican states reflected strong pollution measures which would 
guarantee the safety of their interests . The draft  articles of Colombia , 
Mexico , Venezuela ,  submitted to subcommittee three , indicated tha t the 
coastal s tates would take a measure necessary to prevent marine pollution 
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o f  the economic zone . Ecuador , Panama , and Peru indicated in draf t 
ar ticle 9 that , 
" it shal l  be the responsibility of  the coastal 
state to establish measures to prevent , reduce 
or eliminate in its adj acent sea any danger or 
risks ar ising from po llut ion or o ther e f fects 
detrimental or da�gerous to the environment , 
water , heal th and the r ecreation of its popu­
lation . 1 1 1 5 7 
In lieu o f  this measure to promo te regulative pol lution devices ,  the Lat in 
American states found it necessary to command pollution control within 
two hundred-miles . They were not willing to sacrif ice any lesser dis-
tance for such contro l , though many o f  the affluent nations openly dis-
agreed with the two hundred-mile Lat in Amer ican pollution control  terr i-
tory s ince there had never b een an agreed start ing point for the inter-
national sea .  The arrogant attitude showed by the Latin American states 
with respect to the d emand by the af fluent nations that Latin American 
states should reconsider the two hundred-mile pollution control clairil :to . 
a twelve mile , signif ied the extent that the situation ar ising in the sea 
had struck the Latin Amer ican states . As indicated in the early chapters , 
Latin Amer ican experience with pollution in their coasts (no tably Mexico 
and Venezuela) ,  and the extinction of many o f their l iving resources called 
for firm ac t ion to be taken with respect to pollution . The Lat in Amer ican 
states  overall attitude with resp ect to the convention was that of an 
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ambivalent nature , Though very strong in protecting the security of the 
Latin American states from the hoard ing vessels and technology of the 
affluent nations , the Latin Amer icans were willing to str ike a justif iable 
outcome of the conference . The nature of  the agreement reached between 
the par ticipatory nations indicated the Latin American states ' determina­
t ion to support the conferences in order to f ind an equitable solution . 
The minor disagreement that resulted at the convention which led to the 
next conferences could not be attributed to the Latin American states 
s ince their failure to endorse many proposals or resolutions only ind i­
cated that such resolutions would no t benef it their interests . 
CHAPTER VII 
THIRD U . N .  CONFERENCE ON LAW OF THE SEA AND LATIN AMERICA 
Resolution 27 50 (XXVI ) of the 1 97 0  conference , Resolution 288 1 
(XXVI )  of  December 2 1 , 1 9 7 1  and Resolution 3029  (XXVII )  of December 1 8 , 
1 9 7 2  requested the convocation of a future law o f  the sea conference 
with the emphasis on the repor t s  submitted by the committee on the peace-
ful uses of the seabed and the ocean floor beyond the l imit s of national 
. . d . i 1 5
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i Am . h J uris ict on . Lat n erican s tates present at t is meeting were more 
united in their policy . At the plenary meeting ,  the Argentinian repre-
sentat ive , speaking on behalf of the Latin American nations , ment ioned 
that Latin America had been aware o f the weal th of the sea , and deemed 
it necessary that a solution to the problem of the sea lay in j ust  and 
equal distribution of such wealth . He continued to indicate the Latin 
Amer ican nations '  willingness to cooperate fully for the successful 
1 59 accomplishment of  a satisfac tory r esult from this conference . The 
Lat in American states ' pledge for cooperation was reflected in their 
subtle reaction towards the structure and the compos ition o f  the elected 
bodies to the various established commit tees . The Latin Amer ican states 
agreed easily over their role in the general and drafting committees , 
which were responsible for reviewing the subj ect mat ters undertaken by 
the previous three subcommittees o f  the last convention . The Lat in 
_ Americans further agreed to the formation o f  a forty-eight member 
general committee . But in appor tioning the s eats , the Afr ican and Asian 
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groups had twelve members ,  Latin American states were given nine member 
seats , Western Europe was represented by nine members and Eas tern Europe 
had six members . In the drafting committee consisting o f twenty-three 
members , Africa was given s ix member seats , Asia received six member 
seats ,  Lat in American states received f our member seats  and Western 
Europe and other groups inc luding t.he U . S .A .  received f ive seats  and 
1 60 Eastern Europe ,  two seats . At this j uncture Latin Amer ican s tates 
drew attention to the unequal distr ibution o f  the seats .  They charged 
that this allocation o f seats had not been equitably distributed accord-
ing to geographical d is tribution . They expressed that the underrepresen-
tation of Latin American states and the developing nations had been a 
clear ind icat ion of  the European nations ' determination to dominate the 
po litical body of the conference regardless of all effort s  by the Lat in 
Amer ican states to cooperate . The Latin Amer ican s tates demounced this 
tentative apportionement and wanted i t  changed before it was off icially 
established . Ms . Flourett ,  speaking as Argentina ' s delegate ,  indicated 
that , "La tin American states had adopted the decision that no country 
would occupy more than one of  the seats or pos t s  allocated to their 
1 6 1  group .  The Latin Amer ican s tates envisioned the advantage the two-
to-one vote margin the affluent nat ions would have over the developing 
nat ions if the dual-representation was allowed to remain . The Brazilian 
delegate in responding to the af fluent nat ions over-representation indi-
cated that , "Its delegation had always thought that there were only f ive 
geographical groups ; it had not been aware o f the existence of six . "  The 
�raz ilian delegate continued by elaborating their strong support  for the 
Latin American states ' c laims that no country should hold more than one 
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1 62 office . In a unif ied way , the Latin � ericans in the plenary session 
of  the conference ,  made the af fluent nations aware of the extent to which 
they , as a collective regional entity , were r eady to go in order to ward 
off  any possible threat that would be used by the affluent nations to 
fur ther exhibit the dominance of  the affluent nations ' national interests 
over that of o thers . The Latin American s tates d id not hesitate to show 
a great concern for the success o f the conference even though they resis ted 
the manipulation of the developed nations . The Mexican delegate showed 
the Latin Americans ' desir e  to honestly look for a so lution to the sea 
cris is by propos ing that this is sue o f  over-representation by the U . S .  
and the European groups in the general committee , the main connnittee , 
and the draf ting committee should be dir ect ed to the conference where 
it could be settled once and for all . The Mexican propo sal in actuality 
wanted the U . S .  and the Western European delegations to settle the ques­
t ion of their own representation in the draf ting committee . 1 63 The Latin 
Amer ican s tates as a whole supported the Mexican proposal allowing the 
plenary sessions to continue . However , the Lat in Amer ican states ' pro-
tests regarding the seating was ac tually a measure geared towards chal-
lenging the rules of procedure which had been established by the aff luent 
European imperialists at the peak of the imperial era . This process of 
rule making in the modern era was considered by the Lat in American states 
as discriminatory to the interests as  p erceived by the weaker states .  
Latin Amer ica ' s  challenge was to domonstra te that today ' s  international 
conferences must  be fully represented by all  interests and must fully 
reflect the realities of today ' s  society . Any decision arrived at , -· 
according to the Latin Amer ican states ,  must  be free from the control 
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of one dominant group over the weak. The new nations , which constituted 
the maj ority in the world body , must be allowed equal re?.resentation and 
equal roles in deciding the fate o f  humanity . The Venezuelan delegate ,  
Mr . Diaz Gonzales , reflected this attitude by indicating that  the con­
ference must begin to employ democrat ic rules in shaping its polic ies 
and must allow states to represent their inalienable right to legal 
equality . He therefore denounced the princ iple established at the San 
Francisco Conference that some s tates were more equal than ochers and 
that the formation of the Security Counc il ,  which was dominated by the 
European nations , was a conspiracy to establish their hegemony over all 
the nations in the U . N . , thus giving . them decision-making advantage over 
the nations who are not Security Council members . In his proposal the 
Venezuelan delegate expressed the need f or a democratic vo ting process 
which could be applied in electing of f icers and setting down rules for 
the conference rather than adopting the San Francisco pr inciples . 1 64 
The Latin Amer ican states , therefore , endorsed as a viable alternative 
to the previous system of delegating seats , an equitable geographical 
representation in which the exerc ising of  equal distributive votes would 
be based on the ration and percentage of representatives ,  regional groups 
and states present at this conference .  One s tate ,  one seat was what the 
Latin American states were will ing to settle for before the conference 
itself started . Her e ,  again , the Latin American states met with success 
and their demand received overwhelming support . The general nature , pro­
cedures and rules of  ·the conference were based on the one state , one seat 
principle ( gen�lemen ' s agreement ) . 1 65 
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The election of officer s  to the various seats of  the commi ttees 
was by acclamation . The chairmanship of  the f ir s t  committee was Mr .  
Engo of Cameroon . The second committee chairmanship went to Mr . Aguilar 
of  Venezuela . The third committee chairmanship was given to Mr . Yankov 
of Bulgaria .  In the twenty-three member draf ting committee , the chair­
manship was given to Western Europe and o ther states (U . S . A . )  with Mr .  
Beesley of Canada receiving a vote o f 8 1  against 54 votes received by 
Mr . Harry of Australia , to become the chairman of the Western European 
group . 
Af ter the election , the conference was ready to start . The f irs t 
committee was responsible for investigating the international regime and 
machinery for the seabed , and subsoil beyond the limits of national 
j urisdiction . This committee was to establish a working group and a 
negotiating group to gain consensus in the area to be established as the 
international sea . The second committee was to embrace all the trad itional 
law ,  including the problems and issues with regard to the territorial sea , 
s traits , archipelagos , the high seas , the economic zone , living and non­
living resources , the continental shelf , and access to the sea . The third 
committee was concerned with pollution and transfer of technology . 
With the activities  o f  the committees inaugurated , the political 
grouping which had characterized the previous conferences began to sur face 
in this Caracas , Venezuela confer ence .  The political group ing of the Latin 
American states and that of o ther states became predominant and pervasive . 
Among the many obvious groups were the Afr ican , the As ian , the Eastern 
European , the Western European and the Latin Amer ican groups . Also visible 
as interest group s were the bloc groups of the dissatisfied nations com-
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prised o f more than one hundred nations , but known a s  the group of  
Seventy-seven . This group of  seventy-seven were overwhelmingly 
developing nations . The subregional group ings o f  economic interests , 
in this case the Arab s tates , the European Economic community , the 
COMECON--East  European community , and the shelf locked and landlocked 
nat ions and coastal s tates were exerting political pressure within the 
committees to influence the outcome o f  the conference and hoping to be 
able to tilt the accepted resolutions to meet their desired goals . The 
Latin American states reacted to the politic s  o f the conference by 
strongly emphasizing harmony and regional representation . They shif ted 
emphasis at this time to settling and accommodating minor dif ferences 
among themselves in order to create room for a common policy goal with 
respec t to the establishment of an international regime in the deep seas 
out s ide national j ur isdiction . The central cry of  the Lat in American 
states at this conf erence was dedicated to cooperation in making the 
conf erence a more highly productive one than the previous ones .  
With respect to the first  committee , draft art icle 9 which has 
already been discussed in the last chapter , was reintroduced for further 
consideration and to find an agreeable alternative , if possible , to the 
four resolutions recommended by the subcommittee . These new alternat ives 
were regarded by the Latin Amer ican states as favoring the interests  o f  
dif ferent groups , therefore , the Latin American s ta tes d id not hes itate 
to suppor t alternative B of Ar ticle 9 ,  which ruled that , "all activities 
of scientific research and exploration of the area and exploitation of 
its resources and other related activities shall be conducted by the 
authority directly or , if the authority so determines , through services 
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contracts  or in association with persons natural or j uridicia1 .
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The Latin Amer ican states viewed this alternative as the only one 
which would protect their interes t s from the greed of the af fluent 
nations and would limit the af fluent nat ions '  technology from invading 
the international sea . On the o ther hand , the affluent nations over­
whelmingly supported alternat ive A of Art icle 9 , which favored " the 
single system" of exploitation and exploration of the resources in the 
internat ional sea , _ through contracting par t ies , group s  of contracting 
parties and natural or j urid icial per sons under the sponsor ship of such 
contracting parties . 1 67 This alternative , as envisioned by the affluent 
nations , was intended to make the international sea ,  also known as " the 
common heritage of mankind , "  absolutely independent of any international 
authority , thus giving them more access and non-interference in their 
exploration and exploitation of this area . The vir tual eliminat ion in 
alternative A of the effec t ive role of  the international regime in par­
taking in the ac tivities in this area , triggered of f mo s t  of the reactions 
from the Lat in American states and the poorer nations . The Latin American 
states refused to suppor t the idea that the only power granted to the 
internat ional regime in alternative A was that of an administrative and 
licensing role.. Though this role was subj ected to rules and regulations 
as seen f it by the conference ,  the Lat in Amer ican s tates saw the move by 
the affluent nations as if it were a conspiracy to weaken the pos ition of 
the international seabed authority , so that the power of the af fluent 
nat ions would overshadow the internat ional author ity . The Lat in American 
states d id not see why alternative B could no t be adopted since it was 
the only alternative that contained a multiple system serving all interests . 
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The handing over of  power to an international seabed authority to exer-
cise the pr imary ac tivities of conduc t ing exploratory exped itions in the 
area , and also having the power and the ability to contract o ther natural 
and j ur id icial persons to conduc t explorations and explo itations in the 
international waters , the Latin American states saw as a measure that 
would protect the threatened interests o f  the nations which depend 
heavily on their export of mineral resources for development . Mr . 
Illanes , the Chilean delegate , r epresented this idea in the following 
word s : 
. . •  the concept of cOmm.on . heritage would serve as 
the' corm�rs tone of the international regime and 
machinery .  The impor tance of  the declarat ion of 
the pr inc iple was both po litical and legal . • . • 
One consequence was that any exploi tation o f  the 
area must be prohibited until the international 
regime had been established . Another was that 
the explo itat ion of  the mineral r esources must  
not harm the interests of  the developing nations 
which were themselves mineral producer s and 
exporters . • • internat ional machinery with powers 
ad equate to ensure the application o f  the regime 
• • • •  The machinery should , therefore , control all 
economic and related ac tivities in the area and 
its resources • . • • The essential aim was to ensure 
that the resourc es o f  the sea benef ited equitably 
the whole of mankind . 1 68 
The reac t ion of the Lat in Amer ican states to the article sup-
por ted by the af fluent nations , had demonstrated that the Latin Amer ican 
states were not willing to take this resolution in committee one lightly . 
To the extent that the f ear of the af f luent nations dominated the thinking 
of the Latin American s tates , no viable agreement to the alternatives in 
Ar t icle 9 could be arrived at . All efforts by the first  committee to nego-
tiate a settlement through working group s  failed to convince the Latin 
Amer ican states , neither d id it convince the other developing nations on 
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the committee . The affluent nat ions were themselves not will ing to g ive 
in to any change of their po sition . Thus , no alternative settlement was 
reached by all of the parties . 
The overr id ing fac tors , which the Latin American states were con­
cerned with at this point of  the conference , were the economic , political 
and social impl ications of  the affluent nations ' domination of the min­
eral resources of the sea . Receiving more information on the domestic 
danger of  such exploitation , after the 1 9 68 seabed convention repor t was 
out , the Latin American states became convinced that the economic impli­
cations , if the sea were to be dominated by the affluent nations , would 
become intolerable to their economies .  Thus , the collective policy 
approach , with respect to the conf erence on the mineral resources of the 
seas , by the Latin American states was construc ted in a manner similar 
to that at the earlier conferences  on f isher ies and terr itor ial bound­
ar ies . Such action taken by the Lat in American s tates was designed to 
temporarily pro tect their interes t s  from the af fluent nations whom the 
Latin Amer ican s tates knew had developed the technology capable of 
exploiting the resources of the sea to the po tential detr iment of the 
prices of the landbas e  resources upon which the Latin Amer ican states 
depend for their economic development . If this unregulated exploitation 
by the affluent nations was allowed to carry on , it would in turn weaken 
the purchas ing power of the Latin American s tates . The fatal result would 
be not only a fall in purchasing power amid s t  the constant upsurge in 
prices of impor ted good s , but po s s ibly also a complete phase out of the 
Latin Alllerican s tates ' mineral resources which would no longer be needed 
in the industries of the affluent nations . The Latin Alller ican states , 
therefore , saw their collec t ive action against the alternative A of 
Ar ticle 9 ,  of the f ir s t  committee , as  the mo s t  logical ac tion to take 
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in order to avoid any unf:'o.r.es.een d isaster to their economies either now 
or in the futur e . The only viable alternative for Latin American s tates 
was to support alternative B which called for a central control of the 
author ity responsible for the maj or exploitation in the international sea .  
The Latin American states demonstrated f irmly their s trong subscr iption 
to the rule of equity , in that whatever the outcome of the explo itation 
of the resources of the international sea , a central authority with con­
trol of all facets of this area , would mean a greater secur ity for the 
Latin American states . Any economic lo s s  to the Latin Amer ican s tates 
due to the exploitation of the resources in the sea by the central organ 
established by the U . N .  would be replaced by the d ivid end which the cen� 
tral organ would appropriate to all nations according to their economic 
need s . Thus , the Latin American s tates had shown clearly their suppor t  
for the exploitation of the international ocean only i f  it was going t o  
be carr ied o n  f o r  the interests of all nations and not only for the 
inter ests of the few nations who po sses sed the means of exploiting the 
sea . Until a greater consensus had been r eached on the question of what 
means should be used in the exploitat ion o f the international sea , Latin 
Amer ican states would continue to demonstrate the strong policy s tand 
which had been charac teristic of their po sition in the committee on the 
peaceful uses of the seabed and the ocean floor beyond the limits of  
national j ur isd iction . 
In committee two , the Latin American s tates ' defense o f  their two 
hundred-mile economic zone claim was very persuasive . Adher ing to the 
rigidity of the Santo Domingo Declaration on the economic zone , the 
Latin American states fever ishly defended their various claims of the 
twelve to two hundred miles solely for secur ity measures and , were 
unwilling to refrain from pressing these claims . They unanimously 
endorsed the creation of  an international mar itime zone in which the 
coastal states would play a role in exerc is ing and implement ing the 
rules es tablished for such a zone . When the ques t ion of the control 
of the continental shelf and the type of  activities to be under taken 
in this area was raised , the Latin American states , in their usual 
defense of the continental shelf , ind icated as they had in the past 
conferences , that they would exerc ise exc lus ive control over their 
continental shelf ,  and would never allow the construction , maintenance 
of any operat ion by any country on their continental shelves . In taking 
such a stand , the Lat in American s tates indicated their unwillingness to 
accep t any military installations or any other installations by any 
country on their continental shelf . Such a po licy ,  if adopted by the 
U . N .  conference , the Latin Amer ican states were certain would impede the 
vessels of the affluent nations from inf iltrat ing their continental shelf 
area for the covert purpose o f  exploitive ac tivities . All the proposals 
of the respective Latin American s tates in committee two ref lected control 
of the continental shelf . Peru ,  Brazil , El Salvador , Panama and Uruguay 
expr es sed sovereign claim over their coas tal water s  to a distance of two 
hundred miles ,  and exercise in this area of  their sole authority . However , 
the sor t of author ity . to be exerc ised in this area over which they had 
rights d if f ered considerably . El Salvador ind icated in her working papers 
and proposal that she would recognize only innocent passage in the two 
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hundred-mile limit . Uruguay conceded to the "plurality of regime " in 
her two hundred-mile limit , but claimed the zone as exclusive area for 
her nationals and author ized foreign vessels to f ish in the second one 
hundred miles . Ecuador , Panama and Peru , on the o ther hand , d eclared 
their two hundred-mile limit as  sovereign area , but they indicated that 
they would not deter exploration and scientif ic research if it were con­
duc ted j o intly with the coastal state or independently with the knowledge 
and consent of the coastal state . 1 69 
A maj ority of the member s of the conference showed considerable 
favor toward s the Latin American s tates ' claim over the patr imonial sea . 
Of the one hundred and f if ty-eight member nations present at the conf er­
ence , one hundred nations accepted control over the cont inental shelf ,  
some even accepted the three hundred-mile l imit as the zone to which their 
authority extended . Why , then , d id some of the Latin American states still 
use the word "sovereignty" to represent the two hundred-mile claim o f  their 
economic zone? Peru , Ecuador , Panama and Brazil refused to use any other 
term to represent their claim of the two hundred-mile. limit ;. , The.i-T.- - · ..,  
refusal to change the term was predicated on the fac t  that the problems 
facing the sea were no t  as yet resolved . Thus , it was their intention to 
continuously use "sovereignty" to ref er to their two hundred-mile limit 
claim in order to demonstrate to the affluent nations their des ire to 
continue to �protect what they deemed to be very vital and important a 
matter at this time . The experience s  encountered by the Latin Amer ican 
states , as a result of the extinction of . their whales , anchovy and other 
sea lif e  by fore ign vessels , coupled with the inability to reach an agree­
ment at the international level were the pr ime reasons for the Latin 
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American states ' s trong defense of this  sovereignty . The Latin Amer ican 
states ' constant exhibition of rad ical po licies and their deliberate and 
sys tematic approach towards the present c irsis of the sea was j us t if ied , 
in that it was evident tha t in claiming exclusive right of  the two 
hundred-mile limit , Latin American s tates had been able to secure the 
r ight to supervise all sc ientific research and to endor se all ac tivities 
in such areas . The protection o f  the two hundred-mile claim of the Latin 
Amer icans wa s deemed very impor tant . This was indicated by Mr .  Valenc ia 
Rodr iguez , the Ecuadorian delegate , in the following word s  . . .  
Ecuador was f irmly oppo sed to any claim that 
would infr inge its r ights over all the spec ies 
in its two hundred-mile territorial sea ,  nor 
could it accept  that the basis  for the organi­
zation of the f isheries regime should be the so­
called d ivision o f  species whereby some would be 
termed ' international ' s imply because o f  their 
migratory hab its  • . • , while these f ishes could 
be called international , they should be regarded 
as local and under the control o f  the coastal 
j urisdiction f or the purpose of conservy7bon 
and utilization by such coastal s tates . 
When the draf t article o f  the committee declared that it  was  the global 
obligation of nations to prevent pollution in the sea , the Latin Amer ican 
s tates were relieved . The Ecuador ian delegate , respond ing to the measures 
adopted by the connnittee , ind icated that such ac tion would help in pre-
serving the national inter est and the international interest that would 
be at s take if pollution is allowed to destroy life in the sea . He 
stressed the s ignif icance o f  the Latin American s tates ' c laim to the two 
hundred-mile limit as a means of preserving their mar ine lif e .  Thus ,  the 
Latin American state.s accepted fully the establishment of national and 
regional bodies to coordinate act ivities in pre serving the regional water s , 
in conj unc tion with the international organ , which would be established 
to protect and preserve the high seas . 
It must be realized that in supporting pollut ion control devices 
for the seas , the Latin Amer ican s tates d id not hesitate to point out 
the degree to which these laws affected the develop ing nat ions the mos t . 
They no ted that if such laws were evenly applied , it would restrain the 
developing nations ' newly acquired technology . This would be a handicap 
to the developing nations since it would prevent them from gaining ground 
on the domination achieved by the technology of the developed nations in 
the sea long before the pollution laws came into effec t . Mr . Barra , the 
Caribbean delegate , emphasized the d iscriminatory nature of the law . He 
contended tha t if such laws were made it would hur t the poorer nat ions 
most . He stres sed that separate laws should apply to bo th the developing 
and the developed nations . His reasoning was that s ince the ships of the 
developed nations were responsible for the present pollut ion in the sea , 
they should be subj ected to stronger rules . S ince the ships of the 
developing nations d id not contribute to the pre sent pollution , Mr .  Barra 
concluded that , the developing nations should not be subj ec ted to the same 
laws as the developed nations . The Cuban delegate ref lec ted the same views 
as that of the Chilean delegate and even went beyond to attribute pollu� 
tion of  the international water s  and the nat ional waters to the developed 
nations . Mr .  Hernandez de Armas , po inted out that • • • 
• • •  the current situation was the outcome of  the 
unfettered development of capitalistic indus trial 
soc iety . : . the pollution of the sea was caused by 
the installations of the trans-national corpora­
t ions of the imper ialis t s  in the waters of  the 
developing nat ions . 1 7 1  
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The common belief among the Latin Amer ican states was that the pollution 
of the sea was the sole ac t of the developed nations and they alone should 
be burdened with the restr ic tions which the U . N . was going to implement 
The controversy that charac ter ized the issue of  pollution and the 
lack of agreement in the committee led to the adj ournment of the pollution 
is sue to ano ther confer ence where the differences would be nego tiated . 
This thesis ,  so far , has shown that the pattern o f  the Latin 
American states ' behavior in the law of the sea conferences demonstrated 
that Article 2 of the - 1 958 Geneva convention on the four freedoms of the 
sea was too unrestr ictive . This freedom , · which opened the international 
sea for unrestric ted activities could not meet today ' s  realities . At a 
ti.me when the sea has become a great economic asset , the scient if ic and 
technological advantage enj oyed by the developed nations in the sea was 
enough cause for anxiety to a number of  countr ies with long coas tlines , 
but limited means of obtaining information and inability to develop the 
technology to exploit their wealth in the sea . Latin Amer ican s tates 
f itted into the group of anxiety-prone nations and will continue there 
until an agreeable solution on the sea issue has been reached . Mr . 
Escallon Villa , the Colombian delegate ,  indicated this attitude by 
saying that since information was hardly available for the poor coas tal 
states as  to the wealth in their sea , it is their duty to have the r ight 
to regulate and control all act ivities in their terr itorial sea , patr i­
monial sea , or the economic zone and their cont inental shelf . This ac tion 
he exemplif ied as a measure by the poor coastal s tates to partake in any 
_ research conducted in their water s with the mo tive of receiving the bene­
f its from such research for the sake of their people in part icular and 
the international community as a whole . 1 7 2  
CHAPTER VIII 
LATIN AMERICAN CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE SEA CONFERENCE 
Whether or not the Truman Declarations were . the catalyst f or 
the Latin Amer ican states ' challenge to the trad itional laws of the sea , 
there is no question that the declarations generated in Lat in America 
the awareness of the great resources in the ocean . This contr ibuted to 
their governments ' determinat ion to question the ancient laws of the seas 
which were established by the international community of predom�nantly 
white nations . The continent of  Lat in America began , from that point on , 
to challenge the traditional laws which they considered obsolete , estab­
lishing and extending their territorial water s  to areas beyond the reach 
of the established three-mile limit . This new extens ion was considered 
by them to be their economic zone , or patrimonial sea , or epicontinental 
sea . The limit of the new terr itorial claim extended from twelve to two 
hundr ed miles with exclusive sovereign control over all activities in� this 
area . The announcement of  such claims were made in Presidential decrees 
and declarations similar to the Truman decree . These declarations then 
became the national law of the Latin Amer ican nations . The exercise of 
aboslute power in these areas of extended terr itorial waters was rein­
forced by the seizure of f oreign ships , mos t ly of the af f luent nations , 
for refusing to respect Latin Amer ican national law with respect to their 
territorial waters .  The cr itical nature o f  the confus ion over the issue 
of the sea led to the U . N . conference on law of the sea to f ind a viable 
modern solution to modern problems of the sea . 
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With the opening of the . U . N  • .  conference the . Latin Amer ican nations 
d id not hesitate to . .  represent in their proposals their intent ion to extend 
the sea territory beyond the three�mile limit . They viewed this area of  
extension , the mar itime zone , as  their econ0mic zone . Though at the ini­
tial stages of their utilization o f - the term "economic zone , " considerable 
support was  no t shown for their concept , the term soon received recogni­
tion by the world nations . Mar itime and economic zones became accep ted 
terms in the U . N .  and were inser ted into . the U . N .  documents .  Af ter r ecog­
nition and s trong debate over the legality of the Latin American states ' 
economic zone claim ,  mo st of the world nations began to accep t  the eco­
nomic signif icance of the wider claims of  the sea , and , therefore ,  began 
to extend their own claim into this economic zone area . Ano ther contri-
bution of  the Latin Amer ican state s , in the law of the sea conferences , 
was their applicat ion and usage of  the term "adj acent sea" . The or i­
ginality of  this term was contained in the propo sal of  Ecuador ,  Panama 
and Peru . This proposal explicitly declared tha t "the sovereignty o f the 
coas tal state and consequently , the exercise of its j urisdic t ion , shall 
extend to the sea adj acent to its coa s t . 1 1 1 7 3  The usage of  the phrase 
"adj acent sea" by these Latin American s tates showed the extent to which 
their authority would be exercised in areas  of their coas tal water s , a 
distance no t  exceeding two hundr ed nautical miles . Su�h a phrase was 
adopted by the U . N . conference on law of the sea in suppor t of the Latin 
American s tates ' premise that there is always a geographical , economic 
and social relationship between the sea , the. land and man . Therefore , 
man has a lawfu� priority to protect whatever sustains his lif e and that 
of the environment in which he lives . Although the U . N .  organ did no t 
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concede wholehear tedly to the "Bioma . Theory . (as the Latin Amer icans d id ) , 
it realized the effects and consequences that pollution , exploitation and 
colonizat ion of the adj acent sea by the affluent nations ,  would have on 
the lives of the poorer nations ,  who depended mainly on the mar itime 
resources for their development and foreign exchange . The accep tance and 
endorsement by the U . N .  of the principle of the r ight to adj acent sea 
recognized and gave considerable leverage to the Latin Amer ican states ' 
d emand for coastal states to have the r ight to conserve , explore , and 
exploit her terr itorial water s  without interference from foreign nations . 
The greatest contribution that the Latin Amer ican states have made to the 
law of the sea conferences could be their r evelation to the rest of the 
developing nations that the traditional law of the sea represented solely 
the interests of the Europeans . By using rational agreement s ,  the Latin 
Amer ican states impressed upon the rest of the developing nations the need 
to organize themselves into a political bloc in order to weaken and break 
up the solidarity of the affluent nations .  The alacrity with which the 
poorer nations organized into a bloc and extended their terr itorial waters 
to the two hundred · mile or more economic zone demons trated the eff ect ive­
ness  with which Latin America was able to meet the af f luent nations . The 
Latin Amer ican states were able to br ing the developing nations into sup­
porting realistic rather than rhetor ical propo sals . The fatal blow struck 
to the three and the twelve miles rule , re spect ively ,  signif ied greater 
amalgamation among the poorer nat ions . They endor sed the expansion of the 
territorial sea , requested international j ur id ic ial organization over the 
sea , and demanded harsh pollut ion abatement laws agains t  the affluent 
nations . The Latin American s tates ,  therefor e ,  have through their count-
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less efforts in reac ting to . their nat ional interests revealed to the 
entire international connnunity that laws should be made to reflect all 
interests and no t only those of powerful nations . The Latin Amer ican 
states believed that such a step would open . the door for gr eater sacri­
f ice of national interests to be replaced by enlightened interest of all 
the nations present at the conference . The Lat in  American states were 
the f irst to demonstrate the will to sacr if ice some of  their own interests 
in order to encourage o ther nations to f ollow suit . Their strong insist­
ence on the word cooperation in their propo sals and their willingness to 
rever se their sover eign claims from the two hundred-mile limit to the 
twelve-mile limit was proof  that the Latin Amer ican states d id represent 
the greater interests  of large number s of nations rather than representing 
their national or regional inter ests . The att itude of arrogance sometimes 
shown by the Latin Amer ican s tates and the then developing nations was a 
strategy initiated by the Latin American states in order to emphasize 
ho stility to any resolut ion detrimental to their national interest s . The 
greater fusion which character ized the developing nations voting patterns 
against the developed nations , and the homogeneity that characterized the 
European nations voting behavior in opposition to the strong vo ting _homo­
geneity of the developing nat ions proved that the confer ence had not then 
arr ived at a concept of the collec tive interests of all states . 
The resolution , which called for the connnencement of the 1 97 5 
conference , was designed to acconnnodate the maj or d if f erences that still 
existed from the previous conference . 
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THE DIFFERENCES IN LATIN AMERICAN STATES ' POLICIES 
The differences which appear ed in the Latin American s tates ' poli­
cies and propo sals at the three conferences on the international law of 
the sea , 1 958 , 1 960 , and 1 9 7 4 , could be  traced back as far as the 1800 ' s  
when the regional s tate of  belligerence was evident in Latin America . 
The Inter-American s tates confer ence held in 1826  was intend ed to solve 
problems of b elligerency in the area . Not until 1 945  when the Truman 
declaration appeared were effor ts mad e  by them to redirec t  Latin Amer i­
can states ' f ear to the external thr eat impo sed by the U . S .  The national 
laws with respect to the Latin American states ' claims to the sea var ied 
considerably . As Table I indicated , the period from 1 930- 1 94 0  showed 
divergence in the claims of all the s tates . The purpose of  such d iver� 
gent claims was to pro tect domestic tariff s ,  customs , and f ishing , as 
well as secur ity which was then threatened by o ther powerful Latin 
American s tates . 
When the U . S .  evolved from her long era of  isolationism to assume 
dominance in internat ional po litics ,  the s tate  of  belligerency , which for 
many year s existed in Latin Amer ica , was negated by the c lo se relationship 
which the U . S .  developed with her neighbor s (Monroe Doctrine) . Fr iendly 
ties with the Latin American republic s  put the U . S .  into a paternalis tic 
role in f inding a so lution to the warr ing s ituation that had long existed 
in Latin America . This led the Latin Amer icans into s tronger economic , 
trad e ,  and security ties with the U . S . until the emergence of  the Truman 
Proclamation in 1 945 . The proclamation necessitated the Latin Amer ican 
· states to call ' for a review of what their relationship with the U . S .  
should be . The Truman Proc lamation tr iggered a series o f  conferences 
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from which the Sant iago Declaration of  1 952 , discussed in this thesis ,  
was of signif icant importance in shaping the Latin Amer ican states ' 
initial collective approach to the modern sea crisis . The Santiago 
6onference called , for the f ir s t  time , for the unif ication of La tin 
American policies favorable to the reg ional inter ests . The openess of  
the declaration with respect to what limits would be claimed by the Latin 
Amer ican states was one of the maj or r easons why mo s t  o f  the Lat in Ameri­
can states did no t claim a two hundred-mile l imit at the 1 958 and 1 960  
law of the sea conferences . The Santiago Declaration lef t the option 
of the terr itorial limit choice to the discretion of each ind ividual 
state . The openness of the declaration also made it p o s s ible for the 
affluent nations to influence the moderate Lat in American states to 
rescind the two hundred-mile c la im .  B y  the 1 97 0  convent ion on the law 
of the sea , it had become eminent that the "Bioma Theory" , which emerged 
at the Santiago Conference , had gained unanimous suppor t ,  not only among 
the poor nations , but among the technologically lesser d eveloped affluent 
nations . They held the "economic zone theory" as logical and protective 
against the technological advantage enj oyed by the better advanced tech­
nology of the most affluent nations . The extension o f  the terr itorial 
claims of the lesser p eveloped affluent nations into the two hundred­
mile limit also encouraged the bloc o f  Latin American states to c laim a 
two hundred-mile economic zone l imit and a nine to twelve-mile terr itorial 
sea with absolute sovereignty and j uridicial control of these limit s . 
It could be concluded , therefore , that the conformity in Latin 
Amer ican states ' policies , as noted at the 1 9 7 0  convention and the 1 974 
conferenc e ,  could be attributed not only to the economic cr isis which 
had been felt in the whole of Latin Amer ica or which will be  felt in the 
future is the affluent nations are allowed · access to the deep sea , but 
also could be attributed to the d egree with which the d eveloping nations 
and some of  the aff luent nations overwhelmingly suppor ted the Latin 
American call for pro tection of  the sea s  from the greed o f  the af f luent 
nations . The general favor which greeted these Latin American states ' 
resolutions at the 1 9 7 0  convention and . the 1 974  conference acted as a 
moral boost for all La.tin Amer ican nations to fur ther d evelop a more 
homogeneous policy approach for all future confer ences . By the end of 
the 1974 conference , the Latin American s tates had emerged as a regional 
entity with policies which favored �bsolute protection o f  the entire 
international sea from all forces . 
CHAPTER IX 
CONCLUSION 
The likelihood of failure to arr ive at a universally acceptable 
conclusion to the 1 9 7 5  conf erence was great . The emergence of s trong 
political groupings with highly visible act ivities by bo th the advanced 
and d eveloping nations to dominate the outcome of the conf erence raises 
a sharp question as to whether thes e  bloc s  will continue to function at 
forthcoming conf erences . Such bloc formations and deliberations within 
the bloc s  produced devastating blows to the advanced nations who have 
the technology to be used in the ocean for the benef it of all . In an 
era of shortage of resources and the existing energy crisis , it would be 
highly advisable for the affluent nations to try and str ike a middle of 
the road bargain which would allow them immediate access into the ocean 
for the purpose of utilizing their technology for the benef it of all . 
Since they po ssess the technical knowledge to operate such instruments ,  
the operation co st  alone could br ing them more profits which would off set 
the total dividend distributed from the explo itation of the ocean to all 
nations according to their needs . The aff luent nations should realize 
that the co st of providing the technology needed to invade the sea cannot 
be overlooked by the international organ selected to exerc ise control in 
the international sea·. The payment of the co s t  of the technological instru­
ments could al�o add , as another profit , to the affluent nations when all 
these operation and cons truc tion . .  costs  are subtrac ted from the general 
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prof it ac crued from the sea . The rest of the dividend , when d ivided , , 
would give the aff luent nations nations gr eater monetary advantage over 
the developing nat ions . This alternative would help free the high seas 
from exploitation and balance the shor tages which face  us  today . But 
ins tead , the aff luent nations have s teadfastly held to their demands .  
At the North .American Lawyer s Convention held on Augus t  1 0 ,  1 97 5  in 
Canada to review present internat ional law of the sea , the U . S . Secr e­
tary of State , Dr . Henry Kissinger , : resporided to the threatening claims 
of the developing nations in the sea , and s tated that if the present 
conf erence ( started Apr il 1 9 7 5 )  could no t of f er any decisions on the sea 
crisis , the U . S .  would star t to exploit the resources without regard to 
the U . N .  Char ter which forbid s  all ac tivities in the ocean . If such a 
statement is taken seriously , it would mean that the already tense situ­
ation on the sea would be escalated beyond its present po int . 
It should be no ted that the Latin Amer ican states ' reac tion to 
the traditional law has been motivated by the fear of the U . S . , Japan and 
Russia ' s  domination of their water s ;  s imilarly , if the United States once 
again began to invade the international water s  to exploit the mineral 
resources there , it will create new anxiety in the Latin .Amer ican states , 
forcing them to reac t more severely . The results could produce a more  
serious situation than before . Not only would the Latin .Amer ican nations 
extend their sovereign limit beyond the two hundred miles , but they would 
be forced to exercise strict military duties in their new terr itory which 
would obviously lead ·them into open confrontation with the U . S .  ves sels 
or military ships which would be released to escor t the vessels . The 
subsequent result of such confrontation is highly pred ictable . Latin 
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Amer ica , known for its high degree of  instability and revolutionary 
fervor , would be for ced to take a negative approach to their relation­
ship with the United Stat es which has enj oyed over two hundred year s o f  
good neighbor poli c ies . The rad ical elements and the revolutionary 
elements , already a lllenac.� to the relationship which Lat in Amer ica 
has with the United States , would be forced to strike back at their 
national government with the motive o f  over throwing the systems in 
Lat in America favorable to the U . S .  government . Russia would no t 
hesitate to take advantage of  such an opportune s ituation , since the 
ideological belief s of the revolutionary and the radical elements lean 
toward s the Russians . To avoid such a situation from occurr ing in Latin 
Amer ica , the U . S .  must  rather inf luence and negotiate with the Latin 
Americans on their (Latin Amer ican) policy positions . I t  is neces sary 
for the U . S .  to guarantee to the Lat in Amer ican states that  their inter­
ests  will be recognized . Maj or reductions in the many d if f erences that 
have charac ter ized the previous conf er ences is necessary before any con­
crete solution to the sea crisis can be reached . The af f luent nations 
must be willing to recognize the needs and the demands of  the Lat in 
American states . An understanding of the basis of  Lat in American 
anxieties , as well as those of the o ther developing nat ions , would help 
the affluent nations to cope realistically with the demands . The Latin 
American nations have a legitimate reason to pro tec t the sea until they 
have been guaranteed that their economic interests and needs would be 
favorably met from its exploitation . If this is under s tood by the 
affluent nations and reflected in the present conferenc e  or the coming 
conference ( 1 9 7 5 ) , then , on the o ther hand , the Latin Amer ican s tates 
and other Third World nations could begin to give . r ealis tic considera­
tion to the new proposals of the aff luent nations . This means that the 
political maneuver ing , which had dominated the proposals of  the affluent 
nations , must  be guided by a genuine application of nonpolitical and 
humanitar ian proposals .  The overall interests of  Latin Amer ica and the 
Third World nations have been economic , This , however , cons titutes only 
one area of the complexity of intere s ts the affluent nations have in the 
ocean . If the aff luent nations would accede to some of the wishes of the 
Lat in Amer ican s tates , they ( the affluent nations) would open the oppor­
tunity to obtain approval of  their intended ac tivities in the sea which 
are of no interest to the Latin American states . In my op inion , the 
protections the Latin American states have requested are not outrageous 
enough to warrant refusal by the af fluent nat ions . Compromise on the 
sea can only be achieved at gr eat sacrif ice of the national interests . 
The Latin American awar eness of  the economic realities of the sea is a 
condition the af fluent nations must  accep t  and recognize that national 
interests  may have to give way to be replaced by the general interests 
of all . It is very d if f icult to see Latin American states succumb ing 
to any decis ion that will limit their effective par tic ipation in the 
sea explo itation . The aff luent nat ions , therefore , mus t  accommodate the 
interests of the Lat in Amer ican states or else the Latin Amer icans will 
continue to perceive threat from the af f luent nat ions . The Latin Amer i­
can nations will continue to protect the f ish which s till sustain their 
life and economic well being . Inasmuch as the r esources d iscovered in 
the ocean and subsoil are viewed as  detrimental and po se threats to their 
economies , the Latin Amer ican s tates will not relax on the sea is sue until 
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the outcome of the cnnferences  ensur es . contro l - of the problems envi­
s ioned by the Latin Amer ican nations . I hope the 1975  conf erence will 
address itself to these fear s  demonstrated by the Latin Amer ican s tates . 
SUMMARY OF I.ATIN AMERICAN STATES ' POLICY FORMATION 
1 8 26- 1 902 
Latin American republic s '  po l icy formation on the sea was based 
solely on internal and regional threat s  from o ther Lat in Amer ican states 
who po ssessed strong naval and f ishing power and were able to establish 
dominance over the r est of  the weaker Latin American states . 
British inf luence was felt a t  this per iod in the waters of Latin 
Amer ica but no t to a considerable degree . 
1 902- 1 9 3 0  
The U . S .  defeat of  Spain in the Gulf of  Mexico and the Car ibbean . 
This development heightened the Latin Amer ican states '  fear and , therefore , 
readjus ted individual states ' claims to within the three-mile limit to 
protect the traditional three-mile l imit . 
By 1930 , the Latin Amer ican s tates exhibited some consensus and 
determination to include the contigious zone into the national territory . 
This was no ticed in the League of Nations ' Conference . But the state of 
belligerence which existed in the area and the closenes s  of the U . S . , 
which at that time had developed s trong maritime power to protect Latin 
American states ,' dif fused the Latin American states ' c la im .  Pol icy infor­
mation of the Latin Amer ican states was based on ind ividual nations ' pr ior­
ity . 
l S.l 
1 9 3 9 - 1 945 
The per iod of emergenc e of  unity o f  policies . The Panama Con­
f er ence was held to consider World War II and the question of secur ity 
in La tin American water s . The three-mile rule and the future secur ity 
from war was put to the foreign minister s  present . There wa s general · 
agreement to extend the l imit of the territorial sea ; but only bilateral 
agreement wa s reached between Latin Amer ican s tates and the U . S . 
1 945  
Advent of  the Truman Declaration . Gr eater unity began to sur­
fac e  as Latin . America f elt threatened by the U . S .  declaration which they 
envis ioned as a deliberate act ion which would f orce foreign vessels into 
Lat in Amer ican water s . Also , the economic signif icance of the Truman 
Declaration began to occupy the thinking of the Latin American sta tes . 
1 95 0- 1 958 
In 1 950 , the Organization of  Amer ican States und er took to study 
the economic and j ur id icial s ignif icance of  the sea . At the Inter-American 
Counc il of Jurists Conf erenc e ,  the Latin Amer ican states ' policy on the sea 
began to show a pattern . Jurists at the conference began making accommo­
dation for the right of  s tates to pro tec t their soil , subsoil ,  continental 
shelf of the sea , and the air space of their region . 
1 95 2  
Santiago Conf erence .  At this conference , the Lat in American 
s ta tes unilaterally adop ted uni ficat ion o f  f ishing regulations , uni.f ica-
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tion of whaling regulations , unif ication of scientif ic study , and unif i­
cation of coord inate measures  to control extinc tion of f ishing resources . 
They unanimously endorsed the extension of the t erritorial limit to the 
two hundr ed-mile limit . 
1 953 
In this year , the Inter-American Council of  Jur ists  Conf erence 
was once again convened . All the j ur is t s  again endorsed the two hundred­
mile limit . The only exceptions came from Bra z il ,  Colombia and the U . S .  
1 95 6  
The Mexican Conference was held in Cuidad Truj illo , at  which the 
council unanimously declared the r ight and respons1bility of states to 
establ ish the two hundred-mile claim .  Brazil and Colomb ia ,  at this point , 
showed support  for the declarat ion and their oppo sition withered . 
1 958 
The Geneva Conference on law o f  the sea was convened . The fail­
ure of the conference to reach an accep table solution , and the failure 
of the Latin  American states to reach a uniform policy called their atten­
t ion to reorganize their s trategy . They f ormed the Southern Pac ific Alli­
ance which was to stike a f inal blow to the three-mile rul e . 
1 960-1 9 7 4  
The Latin Amer ican states ' alliance was not that effective . This 
was tested in the 1 9 60 conference . The j oint Canadian-U . S .  propo sal was 
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the testing propo sal for the Latin American unity . The United S tates 
took the initiative to call a meeting with the Latin Americans in ord er 
to win their support for the new Canada-U . S . proposal which called for 
recognition of  the twelve-mile limit . Innnediately , many Latin American 
states showed suppor t for the Canada-U . S . proposal (Argentina , Cuba , 
Guatemala , El Salvador ,  Chile and Ecuador ) .  Tho se who showed disfavor 
for the p r oposal included Panama and Venezuela . 
1 9 7 0  
By this time the d ifferences which had been prevalent in the 
po lic ies of the Latin American s tates had been replaced with a more 
dynamic policy . This was , in fac t ,  due to the rest  o f the developing 
nations ' awareness of the wealth of the ocean , and willingness to sup• 
port Latin American proposals which the developing nat ions saw as repre­
senting their economic interests . Similarly , the developed nations had 
began to show signs of awarenes s  in their efforts to repress  the claims 
of the developing nations . Instead , some of  the affluent nations began 
to adopt  the econ0mic zone theory of the Lat in Amer ican states . 
1 9 74  
At this law of the sea conf erence , the Latin American nations had 
gained a s trong momentum in their proposals . They enj oyed considerable 
suppor t from almost all the poorer nations at the conference . The Latin 
American nat ions had' achieved'. a greater unity in pol icy propo sals in this 
conference than they had ever had . 
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B raz i l  4 7 08 . 5  5 4 6 0 . 3 6 7 4 8 . 9  8 5 08 . 8  9 5 1 0 . 0 1 0 0 7 2 . 2 9 5 3 0 . 5 
Col omb i a  8 8 6 5 . 8  1 1 6 3 7 . 6 1 1 4 32 .  3 1 1 0 3 5 . 1 1 0 1 0 6 . 2  1 2 2 8 '.; . . 4 1 2 7 2 5 . 5  
Ch i le 1 1 49 . 6 2 0 1 9 . 8  1 9 7 6 . 0  1 9 6 6  . 5  2 1 7 7 . 4  2 1 2 2 . 4  1 9 7 6 . 5  
Ecuad o r  4 3 8 . 3 4 5 3 . l 4 1 1 . 8 3 4 9 . 4  2 80 . 1 2 4 9 . 1  2 2 9 . 6  
Peru 3 0 6 1 .  2 3 6 6 7 . 1  3 6 6 0 . 6  4 1 1 0 . 4  4 30 1 . 1 4 1 7 3 . 3 4 2 2 8 . 6 ...... 
Vene z ue l a  1 6 5 6 1 3 . 4  2 0 1 5 3 3 . 0 1 9 5 6 2 8 . 5  2 0 5 5 1 1 .  2 2 0 9 7 5 8 . 7  2 0 8 5 6 5 . 0  2 1 5 1 7 7 . 0  "-.! Vt 
C a n ' t .  
Con ' t .  
P r o d uc t and Coun t ry 1 9 60 1 965  1 9 6 6  1 9 6 7  1 9 6 8  1 9 6 9  1 9 7 0 
----- ----
Cub a  25 . 0  2 9 . 0  5 o . o* 1 35 . 0  6 1 .  o* 5 8 . 0 
Me xi co 1 7 2 9 3 . 0  2 1 008 . 0 2 1 4 6 6 . 0  2 3 8 35 . 0  2 5 5 1 4 . 0  2 6 7 6 9 . 0  2 9 2 35 . 0 ---- ---- ---- ---
S ub to t a l 2 1 1 8 7 5 . 9  2 6 1 9 6 6 . 3  2 5 89 9 7 . 0  2 7 6 0 3 2 . 5  2 8 4 0 4 2 . 4  2 8 7 3 2 lf . 0  
T r in i d ad-Tabago 6 7 3 9 . 0  7 7 7 3 . 3 8 6 8 8 . 4  1 0 3 4 0 . 4  1 0 6 4 4 . 0  9 1 3 6 .  7 
To t a l  2 1 86 1 4 . 9 2 6 9 7 3 9 . 6  2 6 7 6 85 . 4  2 8 6 3 7 2 . 9  2 9 4 6 8 6 . 4  2 9 6 4 6 0 . 7  
P roduc t and Coun t ry 1 9 6 0  1 9 6 5  1 9 6 6  1 9 6 7 1 9 6 8  1 9 6 9  1 9 7 0  
Tho us ands of Tons 
MANGANES E 
Argent i na 1 3 . 8 9 . 3  7 . 7  1 1 .  6 9 . 3  1 0 . 9  
B raz i l  4 38 . 3  6 1 4 . 3 6 4 0 . 2  5 9 7 . 7 9 2 2 . 5  
Ch ile 1 9 . 8  7 . 8 8 . 4  6 . 6  .1 0 . 5  9 . 9  1 1 . 7 
P e ru 0 . 7  0 . 4  0 . 4  0 . 5  2 . 7  4 . 5  0 . 6 
Cuba 8 . 2 a 34 . 4b 3 1 . 0* 2 6 . 7 
Me xi co 7 1 .  9 5 8 . 8 3 1 . 1 3 0 . 8  2 6 . 7  6 0 . 1  9 8 . 6  
S ub t o t a l 55 2 . 7  7 2 5 . 0  7 1 8 . 8 6 7 3 . 9  
Gyana 4 9 . 9  6 5 . 0  6 4 . 0  6 3 . 5  3 8 . 4  
To t a l  6 02 . 6 7 9 0 . 0  7 8 2 . 8  7 3 7 . lf 
aun i t e d  S t a t e s  imp o r t s  
bE s t imat e d  exp o rt 
cExpo r t s  
,... 
C an ' t .  
....., 
°' 

Can ' t .  
P ro d u c t  and C o un t ry 1 9 6 0 1 9 6 5  1 9 6 6  1 9 6 7  1 9 6 8  1 9 6 9  1 9 7 0 
. 
Tons 
TIN 
Argent ina 2 4 2 . 0  1 2 2 5 . 0  1 3 2 1 .  0 2 0 7 3 . 0  1 7 2 8 . 0  1 9 8 9 . 0  
B o l iviaa 2 05 4 2 . 0  2 34 06 . 0  2 5 9 30 . 0  2 7 7 2 0 . 0  2 9 5 6 7 . 0  3 0 0 4 5 . 0  
Braz i l  1 5 8 1 . 0 1 2 1 9 . 0 1 34 1 .  0 1 6 2 6 . 0 1 8 2 1 .  0 2 4 9 7 . 0  
P e r u  2 5 . 4  2 0 . 3  2 0 . 3 2 0 . 3  2 0 . 3  2 0 . 3  
Me xico 3 7 1 . 0  5 1 1 .  0 8 02 . 0  5 9 7 . 0  52 8 .  0 5 0 0 . 0  
To t a l  2 2 7 6 1 . 4 2 6 3 8 1 . 3 2 9 4 1 4 . 3 3 2 0 3 6 . 3  3 3 6 6 4 . 3  3 5 0 5 1 .  3 
P ro d u c t  and Coun t ry 1 9 6 0  1 9 6 5  . 1 9 6 6 1 9 6 7  1 9 6 8  1 9 6 9  1 9 7 0 
Tho us an d s  o f  Tons 
I RON 
Argent ina 5 8 . 0  5 4 . 0  6 9 . 0 . 1 0 0 . 0 1 2 1 . 4  1 3 3 . 9 
B ra z i l  6 3 5 5 . 0  1 4 1 1 2 . 0  1 5 8 1 3 . 0 1 5 1 6 3 . 0  1 7 08 4 . 0  1 5 44 7 . 0  
Co lomb i a  1 7 8 . 0 3 7 0 . 0  3 1 0 . 0  4 04 . 0  5 3 8 . 0 
Chi l e  3 8 04 . 3 7 7 6 3 . 0 7 7 9 0 . 7 6 85 3 . 2 7 4 2 8 . 1 7 1 6 0 . 6  
Pe ru 3 9 4 7 . 2  6 0 0 9 . 1 5 8 80 . 8  6 1 1 1 . 4  7 0 1 6 . 8  6 4 1 1 .  7 
Vene z ue l a  1 2 4 7 4 . 0  1 1 2 9 6 . 0 1 1 4 1 8 .  0 1 0 9 5 9 . 0  9 9 2 2 . 0  1 2 4 1 0 . 0  
C ub a  1 . 0  1 . 0  
Gua t emala 4 . 1 8 . 5 1 0 . 0  1 0 . 2  3 . 7 
Me xico 5 2 1 . 4  1 5 9 2 . 7 1 4 8 0 . 5 1 6 1 7 . 1 1 9 2 1 . 3 2 0 9 7 . 0  
Domin i can Rep ub l ic 8 2 . 0  
--- ----
To t a l  2 7 4 2 5 . 0  4 1 2 0 6 . 3 4 2 7 7 2 . 0  4 1 2 1 7 . 9 4 4 0 3 5 . 3 
aExp o r t s  
Can ' t .  ,_.. -..,J 
00 
Con ' t .  
P roduct and Country 1 9 60 1 9 6 5  
SULPHUR 
Argentina 3 9 . 9  2 9 . 3  
Bolivia a 1 . 2  9 . 5  
Co lomb ia 9 . 0 1 8 . 4 
Chileb 3 1 . 4  4 5 . 6  
Ecuador 0 . 4 
Mexi coc 1 3 3 6 . 2 1 5 8 1 . 3 
Total 1 4 1 7 . 7 1 6 84 . 5  
aExp o r t s  
brncluding sulphur f rom mine s ,  p y r i t e s  and gas es 
cMining and petro leum product ion 
dnr ied equivalent of crude o re 
1 9 6 6  1 9 6 7  1 9 6 8  1 9 6 9  
Thousands of Tons 
3 0 . 4  3 1 . 9  34 . 2  34 . 5  
5 7 . 5 5 0 . 3  3 5 . 4  36 . 2  
2 1 . 0  2 4  .. 0 
5 1 .  1 6 8 . 2 7 5 . 1 1 1 2 .  2 
0 . 4  0 . 3  6 . 1 8 . 5 
1 7 0 1 . 1 1 8 9 1 .  2 1 684 . 9  1 7 1 6 . 2 
1 8 6 1 . 5 2 0 6 5 . 9  
Source : Stat i s t i cal Bulletin for Lat in Ame rica , Vol . IX , June 1 9 7 2 , United Nat ions . 
1 9 7 0  
4 0 . 1 
1 6 . 3  
1 1 8 . 5  
1 3 6 6 . 4  
GLOS SARY OF TERMS 
Cont inental S he l f  
The area o f  the s e a , s eab e d  and s ub s o i l  adj acent t o  the coas t 
b ut o ut s id e  the t e r r i t orial s e a  area t o  a dep t h  o f  two hundred me t e rs 
( app roxima t e l y  one hundred fat homs ) o r  b eyond that limi t , t o  whe re the 
depth o f  the s up e radj acent wat e rs a dmi t s  o f  the e xp lo i t at ion of the 
nat ional resources of the are a .  
Ma re Lib e rum 
P o s tulat ed that the s e a  sho u l d  be o p en and f re e  o f  any domina t i on . 
The p u rp o s e  o f  s uch the o ry was b a s e d  on the fac t t hat they mus t b e  allowed 
to p rovide acces s t o  all ship s for the p u rp o s e  o f  c a r ry in g o ut c o mme r c i al 
in t e re s t s  anywhe re . 
Ma re C l aus um 
Cont rary to the Mar e  L ib e rum , this do c t r ine was t o  contain a l l  
nat ions from domina t in g  t h e  s e a  b y  v i r t ue o f  t he i r  naval p owe r . The 
coas t a l  s t a t e  i s  res p ons i b l e  by de c l arat ion to p ro t e c t  s o me d i s t an c e  in 
the s e a  to the exc lus ion o f  the mar in e  t ra f f i c  o f  o t he r  nat ions . 
C . E . P .  
Abb revi at ion f o r  Ch i l e , E cuado r ,  and P e ru , the p ione e rs o f  the 
two hundred-mile limi t . 
1 8 0  
1 8 1  
S a t i s f i e d  S t a t e s  
Re fe rs t o  the advanced na tion s  d u e  t o  the e c onomi c s up e r io r i t y  
they have o ve r  t he p o o r  na t i ons . The s e  s a t i s f i e d  nations inc lude t he 
Europ e an nat ions , U . S . , and C anada . 
P a t r imon ial S e a  
The re gion o f  t he s e a  wh i ch s t re t ches b e yond t he t e r r i t o r i a l  
l imi t t o  the ab yses o f  t h e  s e a  wh i ch o f te n  re ach e s  t h e  e d ge wh e re the 
int e nrnt i onal s e a  s t a rt s .  Thi s  a re .a i s  known t o  c on t a in a l o t  o f  l ivin g 
an d nonl ivin g r e s ource s . 
E c on omi c Zone 
Al s o  called the p a t r imoni a l  s e a , i s  the area b e tween the t e r r i ­
t o r i al sea n a d  t h e  h i gh s e a s  t o  the area whe re t h e  i n t e rn a t ional wat e r s  
t ake a f fe c t . This a re a  is s ub j e c t e d  to the s up e rv i s ion of the c o a s t a l  
s t at e . 
D i s s a t i s f ie d  Na t i ons 
Re f e r s  to the p o o r  nations o f  the wo rld . The s e  nat ions incl ude 
A f r i can , Asiat i c  and Lat in Ame r i c an nat i ons . Lack o f  e co nomic s o c ial 
de ve lopmen t comp a rab le t o  that of t he deve loped nat ions , l e d  t o  the 
c o in in g  of the word to s i gn i fy the i r  d i s s a t i s fact ion with the wor l d  
e conomi c o r de r .  
Base l ines 
The p o int at wh ich t he me asurement of the t e r r i t o rial sea com­
men ce s . The re are d i f fe rent fo rms and shap e s  o f  the coas t l ines making 
i t  ve ry hard to d r aw the b as e l ines . 
1 8 2  
(Was us ual l y )  The un ive rs a l ly accep t ab le three naut i c a l  mi l e s . 
Th i s  f ac e d  a gre ivi n us p rob lem a t  t he p re s en t  con fe ren c e . 
C annon Rul e  
A r u l e  e s t ab l ishe d by t he B r i t ish , whi ch ( s imp ly ) empha s i z ed t hat 
t h e  s o ve r e i gn t y  of a s t a t e  ove r her co as t a l  wat e r s  c o ul d  on ly be a d i s t anc e 
wh i ch a c annon sho t can e f fe c t i ve l y  d o  d amma ge t o  he r .  Th i s  di s t ance i s 
cons i d e r e d  t o  b e  three mile s . 
C on t i guous Z one 
Coined at the Hague Con f e ren c e , r e f e r s  to the s upp lemen t ary z one 
adj acent t o  t he t e r r i t o r ia l  water s .  O f t en regarded a s  t he d i s t an c e  b e t ween 
the end of t he three mi le t e r r i t o r i al l i mi t  t o  s ix mi l e  con t i guo us zone . 
